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PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN PROBLEMS

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INTRODUCTION

J. A. HADFIELD

INTRODUCTION

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DELIVERED as a course of lectures at the Institute of Medical Psychology, the material here presented appeared to be too valuable and suggestive to be left to resound only on the walls of that Institution, or in the minds of the few who were privileged to hear. They cover a wide range of interest and no claim is made for a complete presentation of the subjects treated, no finality for the views expressed. But the reputation of each contributor is sufficient guarantee of the soundness of these views.

It may seem a little surprising to those who have already scanned the table of contents of this book that there is no chapter on Psychology and Medicine, since it is in the field of Psychopathology that the greatest advances in Psychology have been made during this last generation. No doubt the reason for this was that regular courses of lectures are already given at the Institute on Psychopathology and Psychotherapy. But the fact remains that it is this aspect of the subject that has given such an impetus to recent psychology.

For generations past psychology was studied as a subject of philosophy in which the maximum of theory was based on a minimum of observed fact. Valuable and necessary as was that philosophic

approach, it tended on the whole to hinder the study of psychology as a science, especially in the insistence on the doctrine of free will which emphasized the incalculability of human behaviour, and, therefore, put it outside the realm of experimental science. This philosophic phase gave place to that of experimental psychology, which was scientific in its methods and so laid the foundations of modern scientific psychology, but unfortunately it had little reference to human life. But when the physician was called upon to face the problem of human lives, with their morbid anxieties, hysterical attacks, pathological ideas, sex perversions, obsessive thoughts, compulsive actions, and terrifying dreads, he was compelled by sheer necessity of treating his patients to face these problems and attempt to discover the causes of their disorders for the sake of freeing man from their terrible curse. So the philosophic and the academic phase gave place to the psychopathological, and there is no doubt that the important advances in psychology during this generation from psychopathology would certainly not have taken place had it not been for this practical need. For one thing, few people would have voluntarily submitted themselves to undergo the unpleasant process of analysis and reveal all the hidden motives of their life and conduct, except under the urgent necessity of having themselves cured of some illness.

Originating in a practical therapeutic measure, the cures that it has brought about have given the science of psychopathology a place amongst the recognized

methods of medical treatment. But the influences of these new discoveries have spread far beyond the scope of psychopathology and the uses of psychotherapy. It has thrown light upon the ordinary processes of the human mind ; thus, the discovery of mechanisms underlying pathological processes, like repression, projection, identification, displacement of affect, are found to be ordinary processes of mind, common to what we regard as normal life.

Moreover, by the newly discovered methods of investigating deep-seated processes of the human mind we are now able to explain the hidden motives of ordinary human conduct ; so we can discover why a man marries a particular type of woman, why he chooses a particular profession, why he becomes a philosopher instead of a business man, why he loves pleasure or is ascetic, why he is genial and sociable, or why he is reserved. On the other hand, we can explain why this marriage goes wrong ; why he is a misfit in his occupation ; why he fears isolation, or why every step in life he takes is fraught with anxiety.

The chief credit for these advances in psychopathology is due to Freud, though one must not overlook those clinical researchers who, as always happens, made the discovery of the genius possible. Freud, like all other great discoverers, has his antecedents.

Now, if modern analytic methods of investigation in the individual reveal to us the hidden workings of the human mind, it is bound to throw light upon every science or aspect of life that deals with human

conduct, and the time must inevitably come when the knowledge so gained must be applied to every study of human activity as in anthropology, in art, in education, and in religion.

The effort has not been without result.

To mention but one obvious example: some psychoneurotic patients suffer from obsessions which take the form of performing rituals and ceremonial acts, and avoidance of taboos like the " contamination complex." Psychopathology has investigated those curious conditions in the individual, and their source is now well-nigh discovered as the conflict between forbidden unconscious self-willed desires and the fear of consequences. These ceremonial acts are in part the attempt to propitiate for these desires, and to avert their evil consequences. But these neurotic compulsions of civilized man are of precisely the same nature as the curious customs, ceremonial acts, and taboos of primitive man, the meaning of which we can only guess at in observing him, and which he himself cannot, as a rule, explain, except by some plausible but shallow rationalization, since he cannot, any more than the neurotic, understand their real significance, but upon which psychopathology can now throw considerable light.

The same applies to " anxiety states " from which so many patients suffer, irrational fears of trifling objects or situations, not themselves the objects of fear, so analogous to the fear prevalent amongst primitive people, which is not fear of objective dangers like wounds and death, but fear of unknown

or mysterious forces. In psychopathology we discover that these fears are fears of repressed impulses within ourselves, of unknown and unconscious forces, which become projected on to outside objects because the real object of fear is hidden and repressed. But whilst applying these principles to the study of primitive man and his habits, we also test our principles, and the objective study of primitive man and his doings should help to confirm or otherwise the subjective findings of psychopathology and to act as a corrective to our theories. If there is this correspondence, therefore, between primitive behaviour and psychoneurotic disorders, it is surely of great advantage to both anthropology and to psychopathology that their researches should be compared, for the enrichment of both.

Amongst the many interesting problems raised both by Dr. Seligman and Dr. Ginsberg—the one from the anthropological, the other from the sociological point of view—is that of "racial characteristics," which are generally regarded as temperamental and dependent upon differences in physiological constitution. In both cases the evidence brought forward is against the view hitherto held as to the definiteness of such characteristics. In his detailed and closely argued paper, Professor Seligman discusses the evidence for such racial characteristics from the development of the brain and its effect upon psychic processes (as illustrated by the differences in cortical development of the Australian and the Chinee), and also as determined by the application

of mental tests to different races. His general conclusion is that genetic differences exist but that there is increasing difficulty in defining their differences. National characteristics seem to change within a generation, which implies that such characteristics depend much more on environmental conditions and human incentives than on innate constitutional factors.

Professor Ginsberg's paper appears to support this view. In combating the generally accepted view as to the racial characteristics, he points out that people of the same race are found to have entirely different characteristics, whilst in other people national characteristics seem to change, sometimes within a generation or two. The Italian, for instance, who was regarded as incorrigibly lazy has now, under the impetus of a national movement, become one of the most hard-working men in Europe. His paper is rich with illustrations to prove this point, a particularly amusing example being concerned with the reputed cleanliness of the Englishman. Whilst bringing such evidence to destroy the accepted view, Professor Ginsberg is wisely reticent when it comes to positive conclusions, but his arguments seem to justify the inference that since racial characteristics are not as firmly differentiated as was believed, and since national characteristics and social habits change from generation to generation, such characteristics depend much more upon sociological and psychological factors (community of interest, proximity, etc.), and upon human incentive,

than on innate constitutional factors : and if this is so, the possibility of changing undesirable characteristics, whether in the race or in the individual, is immensely strengthened.

This conclusion corresponds with what we find in psychopathology. In the analysis of character traits in individuals we find hereditary factors play a less important part in producing *specific* character traits like jealousy, depression, thoughtfulness, kindliness, or tranquillity than was originally thought. So little is known about temperament that it is at present impossible to dogmatize, and while psychologists treating the psychoneuroses are convinced that temperamental factors undoubtedly play an important part in the determination of character, and in the production of psychoneuroses, it is difficult to determine how great a proportion is due to these hereditary and physiological factors and how much to environment.

But when we investigate the origin of these specific character traits, normal and abnormal, we find that most of them are traceable to early experiences. It is true that we often find the same characteristic in father and son, and it is very natural that we should regard this as a case of hereditary transmission. But this similarity is not sufficient to justify us in regarding it as hereditary. Transmitted it may be, but the transmission is frequently found to be by way of *identification* of the son with his father (a very common feature in every child)—which leads him to adopt the characteristics and idiosyncrasies of the

father. The woman who complained of her husband's ill-treatment of her, but explained that it was useless to try to do anything because cruelty to wives was "hereditary" in his family, as his grandfather and father had been cruel to their wives, was making the same mistake that not a few eminent scientists make when they assume that because a feature appears in several generations, it is, therefore, hereditary. The boy naturally identifies himself with his father, and if he sees his father bullying his mother he may himself adopt that same attitude to his mother, other women, and later to his wife. It is a psychological complex, not a hereditary predisposition. Psychopathology, therefore, tends to confirm the view that environmental conditions (of course, acting upon hereditary and innate dispositions) are the determining factor in the vast majority of individuals as well as of racial characteristics, and therefore the possibility of altering them is not only greatly strengthened, but in fact constantly demonstrated in the consulting-room.

This is as important a fact for the educationalist and the sociologist as it is for the psychophysician, for it places a much greater burden of responsibility upon the parent, the teacher, and the statesman—those responsible for the environmental conditions of the individual.

As regards education, no modern educationalist can afford to neglect the discoveries that psychopathology has made as to the early causes of abnormal conditions in the child, and this should have a

profound effect upon the prevention of the psychoneuroses by taking them early.[1] But apart from this, psychology has brought about a complete change in educational outlook due to the emphasis upon the dynamic rather than the static view of the mind. The older static view regarded the mind as a structure, built up of sensations and impressions and perceptions: now we regard the mind dynamically, as consisting of potentialities, forces, urges, and impulses. No longer is the child regarded as a passive and plastic organism designed for the accumulation of knowledge; his education consists in encouraging, releasing, and utilizing the potentialities with which he is endowed.

The watchwords of modern education are, therefore, *liberation* and *direction* towards healthy ends.

This change has involved not merely a change in educational method; it has involved an entire change in educational ideal: no longer is the accumulation of knowledge regarded as the aim of education, but emphasis is laid upon mental health and that the child should grow up healthy-minded. If a child is free and healthy-minded it will not only be happier, but be able to adapt itself biologically to life. The change in ideal has taken place largely as a result of the influence of medical psychology with its insistence upon the healthy-mindedness of the child. It is more important that a child has confidence than that he has a correct style; determination is a more

[1] Courses of lectures and clinical instructions are given at the Institute of Medical Psychology with that end in view.

important quality in life than a knowledge of Latin, for if he has determination he can master Latin (if he wants to), whereas he may have a knowledge of Latin or higher mathematics, and be head of his Tripos in Cambridge (like a patient of mine), and not have the confidence to apply for a job or capacity to hold it when he has one.

The emphasis on character, therefore, is the theme of Dr. Crichton-Miller's paper. The ideal and aim of education, he says, should be the training of character. In particular he stresses the importance of the child having freedom to think for himself and that his aims and ideals should be determined by his reason and not be determined for him by affective states and suggestibility. He therefore condemns the exploitation of the suggestibility of the young in favour of religious and political creeds. "The more dogmatic is any system" (religious, political, or educational), "the greater the need to catch the young early; the more philosophic the system, the less is the need." The appeal to prejudice, so essential to the success of the demagogue, is based upon affect and suggestibility and can only be contraverted, in the opinion of Dr. Miller, by a universal education in character.

The demagogue of whatever creed, as Dr. Crichton Miller says, appeals to the emotions rather than to the reason of the crowd, and seeks to influence the child during its affective and suggestible period by the appeal of authority. He therefore urges the training of character so that the child may be free to act in

accordance with its reason rather than from prejudice or the dictates of authority.

The exposure of the demagogue, and indeed of every pathological enthusiast, is an urgent necessity. "Personalities," it is said, "should be ruled out of politics," but most psychopathologists have had the task of analysing public men, and when we discover why in fact certain of them advocate views with all the sincerity and conviction of an established and universal law, the motive of which we discover in some purely private grievance of early childhood, we realize the danger of accepting them as guides; however true their principles themselves may be, the truth is bound to be falsified by personal bitterness. So the view of a man upon marriage carries little weight when we discover he is homosexual: it does not mean that his views are wrong; it means only that we do not accept him as a reliable guide on this question because of his personal bias. It is indeed fairly true to say that those who belong to any party or creed can be divided into two groups, those who are motivated by a positive love of the principles and ideals of the body in question, and those who are motivated by hate of the opposite party. It applies to politics; it applied to movements like that of the enfranchisement of women. Many women worked for women's emancipation, a cause which they had sincerely at heart, whilst many others joined the movement because of hatred of men, or even from an unconscious jealousy because they wished to be men. It applies even to bodies so

benevolently disposed as those which exist for the prevention of cruelty to children and animals; whilst most who belong to these movements are undoubtedly motivated by a real love of children and animals, others, without knowing it,[1] are motivated by a hate of those who are cruel (having perhaps themselves so suffered), but with no real love of the child: still others are motivated by a hatred of cruelty because they are themselves unconsciously cruel, and hating cruelty in themselves they project it and hate those who, like themselves, are cruel. The propaganda of many a statesman, the preaching of many a moralist, the interpretation of life of many an artist, would fail to lead men astray, as they so often do, if people could recognize the motives that underlie them. No greater service can be done to humanity than that the motives of the false propagandist should be exposed: the self-seeking of the demagogue, the conservatism that is based on anxiety, and the communism that is motivated by personal resentment against early authority.

The recognition of unconscious motives, with the ability to unearth them, is one of the most profound discoveries in modern psychology, and the application of this to politics, religion, and everyday conduct would produce a most profound effect upon our public life; indeed, it would be well if every political leader should be analysed to reveal his inner motives before he was let loose on the community!

The problem of authority and freedom, which Dr.

[1] We know it from having analysed them.

Miller deals with as an educational problem, is further discussed by Professor Ramsay Muir with great conviction in the political sphere, and the conclusions at which he arrives are closely akin to the findings of psychology and psychopathology. In nations the problem is between the authority of governments and the freedom of the people: the individual's problem is the demand for freedom for the expression of native tendencies, on the one side, and the restraint and repression of these by the authority of conscience or of the sense of right and wrong, on the other side.

The problem of human beings suffering from the psychoneuroses arises from this conflict between tendencies and impulses which demand expression, and the authority within themselves which curbs, inhibits, and represses those impulses.

The origin of this authority of conscience in the individual is interesting; it was at one time the external authority of others imposed upon the child, and then accepted by him by the process already referred to of *identifying* himself with them. The child wants to do something and have his own way; the authority of the present saying, "You mustn't!" the child identifies himself with his parent and his principles, and so says to *himself*, "You mustn't." So springs the moral authority, once originating from external authority, but now established within the individual himself. This standard now incorporated within the individual guides, controls, or represses his instinctive urges and the whole future

health and happiness of the individual depend on the nature of this authority or the healthiness of his ideal.

When the ideal presented is a healthy one and is voluntarily accepted by the child, there is the natural direction of its impulses towards that ideal, and we have the conditions of mental health. On the other hand, if the ideal is unacceptable, the child may openly rebel and refuse to accept this external authority as his guide. But where such authority is *forced* upon the child's acceptance, perhaps because of fear, and the child accepts these standards, though unwillingly, there is a conflict between this accepted authority and the child's native impulses, with the result that these impulses are repressed and later emerge in the form of psychoneurosis.

The disorders in a State are manifestations of mass neurosis, in which there is a conflict between the spontaneous impulses of its people and the restrictions of authority which has failed, as in the individual, to direct them adequately.

The problem of the individual, like that of the State, is how to co-ordinate freedom with authority. Impulses are free only in so far as they are in harmony with the rest of the man, and this means the establishment in the individual of an ideal or purpose towards which the various tendencies may be directed. Ideals in the individual are necessary to personal freedom because it is the only way to peace and harmony. Obviously, how far we can enjoy personal liberty in an authoritative State depends

upon the nature of that authority and the way it is capable of being wielded. In other words, authority exists to secure liberty, which is precisely the rule we discover psychologically in the individual. This principle is in entire agreement with the conclusions of Professor Ramsay Muir, that " the adjustment which the modern world has made between the claims of liberty and the claims of authority has not involved any restriction of the power or functions of government . . . but it has implied a profound change of outlook regarding the purposes which governments exist to serve " (p. 113).

Nations, like individuals, progress when their energies have been directed to some great end or enthusiasm, be it art (as in the Renaissance), the expansion of the Empire, as in the Victorian period, or the re-establishment of a nation, as in Germany : nor must we forget that the direction of all the energies of a nation even to a common purpose like that of war has led to the emancipation of many individuals and groups, such, for instance, as farm workers in this country. But where there is no common aim, or where the aim or authority is of such a nature that it fails to unite the whole group, but represses powerful but active elements, the result in the nation, as in the individual, is to destroy freedom and to produce mass neurosis.

In view of this, an interesting psychological study is the rise of Dictatorships in the modern world. Democracy implies, as Professor Ramsay Muir says, that the people themselves have a part

in determining the laws they will themselves have to obey (p. 114). But after the war problems arose too complicated and subtle for the mass of people to understand, still more to solve ; so that people were only too glad to hand over the leadership of the nation to those who gave the impression of having a definite aim and strength of purpose, knowing what they wanted and with a determination to secure it.

In other words, feeling defenceless and incapable of solving their problems, the bewildered people of Europe become children again, seeking protection and guidance ; having no principle of their own to direct them, such as they have in times of peace, they look to others to guide them—hence the rise of dictatorships.

Perhaps it is not so much that the principle of liberty has been abandoned, as that conditions have made it impossible for the individual to find his way about in the modern world, or even to have an opinion about the complicated problems of life, and in submitting to the dictatorship he is seeking for an authoritative end to pursue : after all, is he not exercising his freedom in seeking for such guidance ? A child in a situation of danger does not sacrifice its liberty when it reposes its confidence in its father, but is acting in a way most calculated to give him that liberty he needs. But the result will depend, as in the individual, entirely upon the type of aim presented and the method of presentation. The dictator who, like Moses, is one who exercises the function of a father of his country, to guide it through

its troubles and difficulties, will unite and hold the confidence of his people, whereas if he rules by crushing and repressing strong elements in the State, the result is bound to end in disaster. The evidence of the historian and of the psychologist are here at one.

But psychology has as yet collected far too little data to be dogmatic upon these questions, and far more scientific work requires to be done before we can be confident in laying down principles for future action. For instance, provided we seek to bring about a certain end, whether in the individual, in education, or in politics, it is not merely a question of what our aims should be, and whether those aims will produce the best results, but how these may be achieved.

Here lies an immense field for psychological research: namely, what kind of treatment, whether in the State or in education, is calculated to produce certain specific results. If I want to make my child unselfish and social, shall I best do so by making him share everything he possesses from the beginning or by first giving him the sense of right to his property, so that he may find more satisfaction in giving to others what is his own? Shall I make my boy more keen on yachting by giving him abundance of it or by giving him little of it, so as to whet his appetite for more? If I wish my son to be pacifist, shall I forbid him to fight at school, or to let him get his pugnacious impulses off and learn that there are better and more peaceful methods of securing one's

ends? Will the attempt to make a nation militarist succeed best by frequent contact with armed forces and reviving the glories of warlike conditions—as at present in Italy—or will this treatment make it sick of militarism? Certainly the greatest advocate of Prussian militarism before and during the war was himself one who was deprived by ill-health of doing military service; his military passions were no doubt a compensation for his feeling of inferiority.

This is a proper study for psychology as well as for the historian, but one which has not yet received the attention it deserves because we have assumed that training in the exercise of certain qualities encourages these qualities, whereas it often produces a reaction in the opposite direction, and the laws that determine these varied reactions are not yet sufficiently known. We find, in fact, that qualities of character or interests can be exaggerated as much by thwarting the desire as by encouraging their expression.

It is only by a much larger collection of facts, therefore, that any adequate progress can be made in psychology and in those human sciences like sociology and education which depend so much upon it, and in our present state of knowledge it is premature to try to lay down rules for the determination of future results with any certainty that they will happen. There is, therefore, a growing tendency at the present time to turn from the propounding of theories to the more assiduous collection and study of scientific facts. This is the scientific attitude of mind in

which Professor Flügel has approached the subject of marriage. He has discussed, with that wit and penetrating insight with which we have come to identify him, the problem of marriage, and particularly " why we marry " ; and if by the end he has not persuaded us to marry, at all events he has not persuaded us not to !

There is perhaps no subject in this book which it is more necessary to discuss from a scientific psychological angle, for this and kindred personal problems are fraught with emotion and sentiment, with the result that when things go wrong, instead of looking for a psychological or other definite cause of matrimonial troubles, we resort to mutual recrimination with disastrous results.

This does not mean, however, that psychology must be merely analytic ; it is also creative, for ours is a study of man as a whole, and in so far as psychology aims at mental health it recognizes that the whole man needs satisfaction. This is a need that psychology itself cannot satisfy, but which is met in philosophy, in art, and in religion.

Modern art, as Dr. Emanuel Miller points out, is linked with function rather than form alone, and, therefore, utility, which is the successful service of function, becomes an essential feature of modern art. Nothing must be beautiful but what is useful : and everything useful, even a factory, should have its utility expressed in form of beauty. Since man seeks for satisfaction of his whole self, this co-ordination of form and utility gives to modern art a satisfy-

ing quality we do not find in decoration alone, and explains the simplicity of modern artistic design, especially in architecture.

At no time like the present, at least for centuries past, has man been recognized as a whole, and has it been appreciated that he needs satisfaction for his whole personality. His art, like his philosophy, must cover his whole life, and not merely satisfy segments of his life, or else it is discarded like the dilapidated ornamentation of Victorian architecture. If life seems to have become complex, art is seeking to restore it to simplicity and wholeness; at the present time, indeed, art is the expression of man's inner craving for simplicity in a life made too complex by the inventions of science. What we seek from art is what, as Dr. Miller says, is given by modern art, namely, balance and proportion, and this is precisely the aim in mental health also.

It may be held that art is unnecessary to those who see beauty in ordinary life, the movement of a running boy, the stretching of a healthy girl upon the beach, or the complacency of an old lady—all forms of artistic expression. But the artist, like everyone else, seeks forms of expression for the dynamic urges within him and for the fulfilment of his life; and art, therefore, in addition to supplying the needs of life, is of psychological interest to those who study the sources of artistic expression.

Nor let it be said that to recognize the psychological significance of art and to bring artistic productions under the scrutiny of science is to pull to pieces

the flower and spoil its beauty. If that is so for anyone, he is at liberty to appreciate the work of art as art, and refuse to consider its significance. But to others the human element is important, and it does not spoil the work of art that we should be interested in the emotions and feelings of the artist, or to have it revealed what is the message of the work of art, any more than it spoils a work of art, but rather enhances it, that it should be made to serve some useful purpose, as Dr. Emanuel Miller has pointed out. As the combination of beauty and utility is a characteristic of modern art, so the combination of form and meaning should elevate both to a higher sphere. If the painter's art is not spoiled by the study of pigments—the material sources of his work—nor the art of the musician in the study of tones and wavelengths, neither is their art spoiled by studying the source of inspiration within the soul that produces it. In any case, there are some whose minds are so scientifically constituted that they have more interest in the subtle feelings of the man who produced the work than in the work itself.

Further, when we study the soul of the artist (for even artists are sometimes the victims of psychoneuroses and have need of treatment), we sometimes find the source of the artistic production in some morbid complex within his soul : indeed, those who are acquainted with the neuroses can often at a glance detect in the work of art the type of perversion from which the artist suffers and which inspires his work. If this is the case, may it not be that psycho-

logy will perform an important function in life by discriminating what is " true " and what is " false " in art ?

In religion as in art, man is seeking for his higher completeness. Whatever be the origin of religion —whether fear, morality, dependence or love—there no doubt exists in the human soul the urge towards a larger fulfilment of life. To say, as some do, that God stands in the place of the father does nothing more than point to the fundamental feeling of dependence in the soul of man. The need is deeper than its attachment to a person, whether father or God.

If religion is an illusion, as Freud says, it is no less true that life is illusion ; but we continue to live, we continue to regard life as a reality, and make the best of it.[1]

So we may do with religion, belief in which gives some people enrichment in life as well as courage and confidence. If it is weak to seek help in religion, to find in it courage and hope to enable us to carry out our duties and responsibilities in life, it is no less weak to seek help by going to a psychoanalyst to enable us to do the same.[2]

[1] When Freud says religion is an illusion, men call him a genius ; when others say that life is an illusion, we call them pessimists : the truth may be that Freud also is a pessimist, and that his arguments spring more from his pessimism than from reason.

[2] A chapter devoted to the principle that religion is a therapeutic measure is contained in a volume at present in the press (I. Suttie, *Origins of Love and Hate*), and is worthy of the attention of those interested in this aspect of the subject.

But the whole trouble is that we cannot define an illusion without first defining reality, and it is precisely at this point that Freud falls foul of the metaphysician.

The conception of "reality," as Dr. Matthews rightly points out, is a term which the psychoanalyst uses in a purely objective and materialistic way without discussing the nature of the meaning of reality, or what is to be considered real. Indeed, if we claim that every politician should be analysed, it is only fair to put forward the demand that every scientist should have a training in philosophy; and as a first step in this direction we would seriously urge that the elements of philosophy should be taught as a regular subject to all boys and girls of 17 or 18 in our Public Schools, an age when they are intensely interested in the problems of life, and are quite capable of appreciating the material of philosophy if presented in simple form. It would give them a broader conception of life and enable them to think more clearly and to avoid some of the fallacies of thought all too common in scientific work. A lecturer in Philosophy recently told me that most of his examples of logical fallacies are derived from scientific treatises!

Psychology has been, and is, too superficially studied in our theological schools. Unfortunately, many books written on psychology and religion seek rather to use the discoveries of psychology to back up the tenets of religion and to try to show that religion is upheld by psychology. This attitude has very

rightly been avoided by the Dean of St. Paul's in his lucid study of the subject. Whilst severely critical of its more blatant fallacies, he speaks as one who recognizes the value of the contribution that psychology has for religion. In one sphere, at any rate, the contribution is enormous; whatever may be the relation of psychology to the theory of religion and the belief in God, there can be no doubt that in the light it has thrown upon the difficulties and problems, especially the moral problems, of the individual, it is bound to be of inestimable value to those who sincerely study it in dealing with the "cure of souls." To us who are psychopathologists and who deal with the inner problems of the human soul it is no less than tragic that those who are to care for the souls of men are trained in theology and in the religious message they are to give, but pay only the scantiest attention to the soul itself to which they minister. For how can one adequately care for the soul of man unless one understands something about the motivation of conduct, the reasons for its disorders, and the source of the needs of the human soul?

Psychology may also be of service to religion, as to art, in helping to distinguish the false from the true: the religion that is the result of morbid anxiety; the religion which is a constant propitiation for even more persistent forbidden desires; the religion that is a narcissistic desire for personal "holiness"; and the religion which is a selfish desire to save one's soul—all these forms of religion are derived

from morbid complexes and do nothing but bring discredit upon religion, and a recognition of this should help to differentiate the false from the true and establish religion as a healthy and healing influence in life. Atheism itself may be a form of religion in which hatred of God is merely a reflection of hatred and fear of the father in early childhood, and therefore expresses a desire to get rid of him.

The function of psychology in modern problems is, therefore, of considerable importance in establishing principles for the health of the individual, for the development of education, for the conduct of social and political life, and for the understanding of the human soul. This book is a mere introduction of all these problems.

One of the greatest services that any book or course of lectures can render is that of suggesting lines of thought, for surely the greater joy in life is to have one's mind stimulated and one's imagination aroused, to discover for oneself new ways of regarding things, new light on old problems, to experience not only what the writer tells but what he leaves to the imagination and intuition. These chapters, therefore, should be regarded each as a gateway through which we may look at the country beyond, and, looking, be tempted to explore one or another of these rich provinces of thought.

NATIONAL CHARACTER AND NATIONAL SENTIMENT

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NATIONAL CHARACTER AND NATIONAL SENTIMENT

By MORRIS GINSBERG

IN 1897 Vacher de Lapouge, one of the founders of the racial school of sociology, wrote : " I am convinced that in the next century millions of people will kill each other for a few points more or less of their cephalic index. It is on this basis that nationalities will be marked off from each other." In this particular form the prediction has not been fulfilled. In the Great War the alignment of the combatants had little to do with race, and broad-heads and long-heads were to be found on both sides of the combatants. Nor is there any obvious correspondence between racial and national groups. Every great nation includes men of diverse racial stocks. Thus the blond type is not confined to the Teutonic peoples ; the heavy-set, darker East European type is common to many of the Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe, to the Germans of Austria and Southern Germany, to the North Italians, and to the French of the Alps and Central France ; the Mediterranean type is found in the Iberian Peninsula, in the Western Mediterranean islands, South France, South Italy, the Grecian Islands, and in local patches in the British Islands. Similarity in race, again, is no guarantee of union or even of friendly

relations: witness Chile and Peru. Yet the connection between race and nationality has a strong hold over the popular imagination, and in one form or another has received and still receives strong scientific support. Sir Arthur Keith, for example, has argued that nations are races in the making, and Professor McDougall applies the term "sub-race" to the English. Similar views are implicit in the widely held theory of national characteristics as stable and innate, and as the determining factor of historical evolution.

It is necessary, to begin with, to say something of the meaning which is here to be attached to the highly ambiguous terms race and nation. By nation I understand a body of people, associated with, if not actually inhabiting, a certain territory, who have in common a stock of sentiments, thoughts, and conative tendencies, acquired and transmitted during the course of a common history, and who have the will to be, or to become, politically independent, that is, to exist as a separate State, or to have some measure of autonomy at least in cultural matters. Some writers find it convenient to distinguish between nations and nationalities. Thus Steinmetz defines a nationality as a nation that has not succeeded in achieving political unity or has lost it, and he has written an interesting account of the conditions which lead groups of individuals to differentiate themselves from the larger unit of which they form a part and to strive for independence.[1] Similarly, Professor Boas urges

[1] Cf. *Die Nationalitäten in Europa.*

that the terms "nation" and "nationality" do not coincide; thus, a nationality may be divided into several nations, like the Spaniards of Central America, or be included in several nations, like the Germans in Austria, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Italy. The definition of "nation" given above includes nationalities as groups which are not independent political entities, but strive for unity, and are thus nations in germ. The essential characteristic of the nation is the sentiment of unity. In this sense nationalism must be very ancient, since there must always have existed groups conscious of their unity. What characterizes modern nationalism is the desire that this unity shall receive expression in the form of a politically independent State; in other words, what is new is the principle of nationality, that is, the principle that the State should coincide with the nation.

There is little hope for the present of obtaining an agreed definition of "race," but the following may be suggested as implicit in the use made of the concept by many representative physical anthropologists. A race is a group of people who, within given limits of variation, possess in common a combination of hereditary traits sufficient to mark them off from other groups. To be useful as criteria of race, traits must be hereditary and relatively independent of changes in the environment. Anthropologists differ in the number of traits which they take as the basis of classification, and accordingly there is great variation in the number of groups which they arrive at.

There is also a fundamental difference of attitude in the work of anthropologists according as they seek to describe and tabulate groups of characters actually found in combination in existing populations, or to discover ideal types, that is, hypothetical entities supposed once to have existed in pure form and to have intermingled in such a way as to account for the existing distribution of traits and the varying frequency with which they now occur in association. All anthropologists recognize that intermingling has been going on from time immemorial, and that at the present time there can be few, if any, peoples that can be described as racially pure, though this is sometimes alleged of such primitive and numerically insignificant peoples as the Andamanese, the Bushmen, or the jungle Vedda.[1] The facts are so complex that many anthropologists abandon the attempt at genealogical schemes, and fall back frankly upon the geographical classification of the distribution of traits and their combinations, leaving aside the problem of the genetic affinities of peoples.[2]

Whatever classification of races be adopted, it is clear that national grouping does not follow racial lines. The three principal European races are represented, though in varying proportions, in all the European peoples, and countries like Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Switzerland show that intense national self-consciousness may coexist with

[1] Cf. Haddon, *Races of Man*, p. 2.

[2] For fuller discussion, cf. my *Sociology* (Home University Library), chap. 3.

great diversity of racial origins. Individuals of the same race, but belonging to different nations, do not feel any special affinity with each other. An " Alpine " Frenchman will not recognize his racial connection with the Alpines of South Germany or Central Russia, and the link between the " Nordics " of France and Germany is certainly not sufficient to overcome their national antagonisms. The nationalistic quarrels of our time have but slight relation to racial contrasts ; witness the Serbs and the Croats, the English and the Germans, the Poles and the Russians. It has been suggested that the conflict between the Irish and the British has a racial origin, but the racial composition of Ireland is, so far as can be ascertained, analogous to that of Western Britain.[1] The illusion of racial kinship appears in any event to be easily and rapidly acquired. The Mohammedan Negroes of the Sudan, it is said, assert with pride their descent from the Arabs of Mecca or Yemen.[2] The racial theory of nationalism is perhaps the modern variant of the myths of common descent which are so widespread among ancient tribes and peoples.

What lies behind this myth of racial unity and racial purity, and why has nationality to present itself in the guise of race ? These are questions which psychologists have not yet adequately explored. Sir Arthur Keith sees in the facts a device of nature in the process of racial differentiation, and he regards

[1] Haddon, *Races of Man*, p. 83.
[2] Hertz, *Race and Civilization*, p. 323.

national movements as a recrudescence of the old machinery of racial evolution. In a somewhat similar vein Bergson appeals to the instincts which operate in what he terms the closed society. But these explanations will not take us very far. It is doubtful whether racial antipathies are based on instinct. At any rate, they exhibit extraordinary variations in intensity. Thus, as Professor Boas points out, race feeling between Whites, Negroes, and Indians in Brazil is quite different from what it is in the United States; while on the Pacific Coast the feeling of the Whites against Asiatics is almost as strong as that between White and Negro.[1] The attitude to the Indian has undergone great transformations in a comparatively short time, and now there is even a tendency among individuals with admixture of Indian blood to be proud of their ancestry. In the East there is little race feeling against free coloured peoples, but there are bitter traditional enmities between peoples racially akin, resembling race hatred in their intensity.[2] The instinctive elements in group antagonisms are thus capable of being aroused in the absence of racial distinctions, and in any event both racial and other antagonisms are clearly conditioned by historical and sociological factors.

But if the simple identification of race and nationality is easily seen to be out of harmony with

[1] *Anthropology and Modern Life*, p. 64.

[2] Cf. Von Luschan, *Völker, Rassen und Sprachen*, quoted Hertz, p. 67.

the facts, there is a more subtle form of the racial theory which requires more careful examination. Nations on this view clearly contain ingredients derived from different races, but they contain them in different proportions, and in many instances the blend has attained sufficient stability and coherence to deserve the name sub-race, or at any rate to justify us in regarding the character of the group as racially determined. As to the mode of inheritance, there are roughly two possibilities. Dispositions may be transmitted either as complex wholes, in which different characters are genetically linked, or there may be a segregation of characters which will therefore appear in different combinations. Upon both types of dispositions environmental agencies act selectively, either augmenting or eliminating certain qualities, with the result that even peoples, who in the beginning of their history have the same racial composition, come to have very different bodily and mental characteristics. Especially important is the selection exercised by social institutions. War, for example, may facilitate, as de Lapouge thought, the elimination of the belligerent or pugnacious Nordic type. The institution of celibacy, it has often been argued, must have had an effect upon the quality of peoples by discouraging the multiplication of a type of men with a bent towards things of the mind. The Spanish Inquisition, as Galton and Fouillée have argued, destroyed or drove into exile large numbers of able and resolute individuals, who would not accept her narrow

creed.[1] Similarly, as Fouillée argues, the wars of Charles V and above all the American Conquest must have had the effect of eliminating or driving out of the country many individuals of energy and ability. At the present time many Germans of high individuality and mental independence are forced to migrate, with possibly serious effects upon the future quality of the German people. Again, in so far as the institutions of a people affect the fertility rate of its different groups, they may have the effect of altering the proportions in which the qualities of these groups are represented in the people as a whole. It is to be remarked that on this view there is a reciprocal relation between racial character and social institutions. The institutions act indirectly upon the originally given qualities by way of stimulus, inhibition, or elimination. On the other hand, the original qualities are in a sense the basis of the institutions and the course of historical evolution. Thus, for example, the elimination of individuals of great mental independence facilitates the growth of institutions requiring submission and docility, and the institutions thus developed help to impress these qualities upon the mind of the people. Processes of social selection of the kind here briefly referred to may bring about, it is held, rapid changes in the quality of a stock, but if sufficiently continuous and prolonged, will produce a national character of relative permanence and stability.

[1] Cf. Galton, *Hereditary Genius*, p. 345, for an estimate of the numbers; and Fouillée, *Esquisse psychologique des peuples européens*, p. 159.

Put thus in outline this racial hypothesis of national character is perfectly plausible. But it has never, so far as I know, been worked out in any detail, and when closely examined it will be seen to imply an appeal to numerous unknown and probably unknowable factors. In the first place, we know singularly little of the mental characters of the original races, if ever they existed in pure form. The descriptions which are given of the inborn constitution of the Nordics or Alpines are derived from generalizations regarding the behaviour of groups of peoples and not of races. When, for example, the mental characteristics of the French and the English are explained by reference to the supposed racial qualities of the Galli and the Germani, the ethnological problem of the racial composition of these tribes is not faced, and according to recent accounts they were very mixed. Similarly, when qualities of leadership are ascribed to the Nordic race because of the part it played in certain historical movements, e.g. the founding of the American States, no direct evidence is given of the physical character of the individuals in question. In fact, however, such investigations as have been made into the physical characters of the old Americans suggest that only a small proportion were blond, and that the round-headed were distinctly more numerous than the long-headed.[1] The statement, likewise, that the Nordics are the finest explorers in the world is not substantiated when inquiry is made into their physical type.

[1] Cf. Hrdlicka, *The Old Americans*, p. 54.

According to Havelock Ellis, English explorers, at any rate, are mostly men of dark eyes and hair.[1]

In the second place, insuperable difficulties are encountered when we try to relate the concrete behaviour of individuals, and still more the institutions of a people to racial or genetic factors. A few examples will make this clear. An old theory, recently restated by Professor McDougall and others, alleges a close correlation between the distribution of Protestantism and the dominance of the Nordic race; and this is explained by its supposed innate independence in thought, inquiry, and action.[2] Though at first sight plausible, the theory breaks down on a wider survey of the facts. In Switzerland, for example, the distribution of Protestantism bears no relation to ethnic traits, as is clear from the detailed analysis made by the late J. M. Robertson.[3] Ripley shows that neither in Germany nor in Holland do religious divisions follow racial lines.[4] Wales has but little of the Nordic element in it, yet it is strongly Protestant. The spread of the Rationalist movement, which is perhaps a better test of mental independence and initiative than the diffusion of Protestantism, does not favour the Teutonic peoples, who were among the last to contribute to it.

[1] *A Study of British Genius*, p. 404.
[2] Cf. *The Group Mind*, p. 115.
[3] Cf. *The Evolution of States*, p. 346.
[4] Cf. *Races of Europe*, pp. 214, 293.

Similar doubts are raised by the numerous attempts that have been made to link up racial characteristics with art forms. Professor McDougall, to take but one instance, has contrasted the art of the Nordic race with that of the Mediterranean. In the former the romantic qualities predominate, namely, a profusion of qualities, suggestion beyond what is actually portrayed, complexity of relations, indirectness of appeal, figurative and symbolic use of material, and a sense of mystery. The art of the Mediterranean peoples, on the other hand, is predominantly classic, characterized by clearness, formality, simplicity, directness of appeal, rationalism, and psychical distance. The difference is explained by a supposed difference in temperament and instinctive equipment racially determined. The Nordic is held to be constitutionally introvert, strong in the instinct of curiosity, the root of wonder, and weak in the herd instinct, the root of sociality. In the Mediterranean race the reverse holds good : it is extravert, weak in curiosity, strong in sociability. This hypothesis is presented by Professor McDougall with his usual skill and persuasiveness, but its precariousness is made manifest when we find on turning to Jung and Seligman that precisely the opposite relations are asserted, introversion being connected by them with the classical qualities and extraversion with the romantic.[1] Upon the whole, I think it safe to say that so far no definite relation has been estab-

[1] Cf. Jung, *Psychological Types*, p. 404; and Seligman, "Anthropology" in *The Mind*, ed. R. S. S. McDowall, p. 256.

lished between race and any demographic or social phenomena, and it appears that the racial factor, if it operates at all, is too vague and obscure to be useful in a study of the part played by hereditary differences in social life.

Thirdly, there is the difficulty of estimating the degree of permanence or stability which may be safely ascribed to alleged national characteristics. Energy is a characteristic now commonly attributed to the English by Continental writers, but in the sixteenth century Meteren declared that Englishmen were as lazy as Spaniards, and this is confirmed by the testimony of other contemporary writers. Two centuries later Holberg declared that the greatest examples of human indolence were to be found among the poorer classes in England.[1] The habits of personal cleanliness of the English have been attributed by some to their Nordic ancestry, but in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries commentators on English life refer continually to the " extraordinary uncleanliness of their habits and their persons," [2] and Addison makes his wealthy London citizen think it worth while to record in his journal, as an event, the couple of times a week on which he had chanced to wash his face. The English people, again, had not always the reputation it now enjoys of steadiness and constancy. In the twelfth century Pope Eugenius spoke of their " levity," and Wycliffe in the time of Richard II wrote that " the English have properly the moon for

[1] Cf. Pearson, *National Life and Character*, p. 99.
[2] Cf. Rogers, *Labour and Wages*, p. 336.

their planet, by reason of their inconstancy." [1] Even Kant called the English a " people of whim." In the nineteenth century it was the French who were looked upon as fickle. So also before the French Revolution the turbulence of the English was frequently contrasted by historians with the orderliness of the French. Of the Swedish people Voltaire wrote in 1730 : " The Swedes are well built, robust, agile, capable of sustaining the most exacting labours, hunger, and want ; born fighters, full of arrogance, brave rather than industrious, having for long neglected, and to this day practising ill, the commerce which alone would give that which is lacking to their country." Arrogance and pugnacity at any rate can hardly be predicated of the Swedes to-day. Estimates of the potentialities of a people on the basis of its supposed innate character are particularly precarious. Early observations regarding the industrial potentialities of Germans and Italians are decidedly amusing in the light of later history. The Germans it was thought would never reach the degree of industrial development or the density of population attained by the English and the French. The railways, it was believed, had no future in Germany owing to the inborn disposition of the German to " hasten slowly." Till quite recently the Italians were regarded as incapable of intensive industrial work. In 1894 Sombart was of the opinion that the Italian workers had such a feeble sense of their wants that they would make no effort to raise their standard

[1] Cf. Barker, *National Character*, p. 8.

of life. Twenty years later they reached the fourth place in the statistics of strikes.[1] German race theorists, in describing the character of the French people, are fond of quoting the assertions of Roman writers that the Gauls were capable of great gallantry, but not of persevering efforts in the face of difficulties. Yet the tenacity of the French resistance was by general agreement one of the most important factors in the victory of the Allied and Associated Powers in the Great War. On the other hand, German discipline and organizing power is a relatively recent trait. It is not particularly noticeable in the early history of the Scandinavian stocks, or in the Anglo-Saxons before the Norman Conquest, and Seneca congratulates the Romans on the German lack of discipline and steady policy.

The examples I have cited are, I think, fairly representative of the generalizations which abound in the so-called psychology of peoples. No doubt there is some truth in such statements as that on the average Dutchmen are more " stolid " than Italians, or Scotchmen cooler than Irishmen, or that while the Germans are " heavy " and slow to react, the French are vivacious and mobile. But when we are told that the whole Mongolian division of mankind is " reserved, sullen, apathetic . . . nearly all reckless gamblers " (Keane), or when a formula such as " hypocrisy-practical common sense " sums up the Englishman and corresponding pairs of characteris-

[1] Cf. R. Michels, *Wirtschaft und Rasse, in Grundriss der Sozialökonomik,* ii, p. 176.

tics are assigned to other peoples, for example, " clearness-licentiousness " to the Frenchman, " thoroughness-clumsiness " to the German, " dignity-cruelty " to the Spaniard, " vulgarity-vitality " to the American (Madariaga), we begin to realize that the interest of these generalizations lies not so much in the truth they may contain as in the light they may throw upon the growth of public opinion, and especially of the opinion that members of different nations have of each other. Despite the large number of books that have been written on the psychology of peoples, the distance between the raw generalizations which they utilize and scientific psychology is as great now as when Mill first planned his science of ethology. No doubt national character is a reality in the case, at any rate, of long-established nations, but very little has yet been done towards its psychological analysis, and it affords a very insecure basis for the study of social and economic life.[1]

More fruitful material for the study of the psychology of peoples is to be found in the numerous studies which are now available of the growth of nationalism, that is, of the consciousness of national unity and the striving for national independence. The complexity of the numerous factors involved is now widely recognized, as is the fact that nations differ enormously in degree of homogeneity, and in the extent to which

[1] Cf. the interesting criticism given by Professor Barker of the attempts that have been made to explain the differences in the governmental institutions of England and France in terms of inborn character. *National Character*, pp. 146–7.

they owe the unity that they possess to economic, political, religious, and cultural forces. A recent French writer has enumerated twelve to fifteen different elements as contributory to nationality, and he stresses the fact that the part played by them varies widely in different cases. " Germany," he says, " is a race, Egypt a river, Judæa a religion, Great Britain an island, Italy a language, Turkey a conquest, the United States a territory, Prussia a state, France a dynasty, a tradition, a territory."[1] Here I can only deal very briefly with some of these factors. Much has been written to show that a common religion is not sufficient to create the sentiment of nationality. But there can be no question of the importance of religion as an instrument both of union and division. The Scotch, for example, owe their national unity largely to the influence of the kirk.[2] Similarly, Welsh nationalism has been profoundly affected by the spread of " Dissent." The modern Greeks were probably saved from extinction by the Greek Church. The division between Serbs and Croats is sharpened by a difference of religion. On the other hand, Mohammedanized Bulgarians feel themselves at one with the Turks, and Lutheran Poles voted for Prussia in 1920. The part played by the Churches in the growth of national languages has often been described, and their influence in this respect can hardly be exaggerated.

[1] R. Johannet, *Principe des nationalités*, p. 418.

[2] Cf. E. Barker's remark: "Scottish nationality is a church." (*National Character*, p. 179.)

But nationalism may also unite where formerly religion had divided. Thus in Egypt national consciousness seeks to bridge the gulf dividing Mohammedans and Copts, and in India it may do much to bring together Mohammedans and Hindus.[1] The complexity of the relations between religion and nationalism becomes to some extent intelligible when it is remembered that the sentiments underlying them have much in common. Nationalism, like religion, helps to take the individual out of himself and brings home to him his dependence upon a larger whole. Hence the two sets of sentiments may, and frequently do, co-operate, but they may also come into conflict, and there is much in recent history to justify the prediction of Zangwill that " the more religion proper disappears, the more will the God *Patrie* become important, supplying as it does channels for both devotion and sacrifice, and even an after-life in the life of the nation." [2]

The importance of the political factor is implied in the definition frequently given of a nation as a body of people who are conscious of their unity and seek to give it expression in politically unified institutions. This, however, makes the feeling of unity antecedent to the formation of the State, whereas in fact there can be no question that often it is the State that

[1] " On the whole," says Sir Frederick Pollock, " we must say that religion has great power to reinforce national sentiment, for better or worse, but very little initiative. It has to be national first." (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. xx, p. 268.)

[2] *The Principle of Nationalities*, p. 69.

creates the feeling of unity.[1] There would, in fact, appear to be several distinguishable forms of the relation of State and nation. Theoretically, there are (i) national States in which State and nation coincide ; (ii) supernational States in which the area of the State is greater than that of the nation ; (iii) subnational States in which the area of the nation exceeds that of the State and where portions of the nation are included in different States ; (iv) cases like the Austro-Hungarian State which was not a nation, but a congeries of nations or nationalities. In actual fact (ii) is the most common. There are few nations that have not sought to incorporate within their political system populations differing from themselves in speech, religion, or tradition. The modern empire-States are in the nature of the case multi-national, though, of course, they differ widely in the amount of autonomy, cultural or political, which they are willing to grant to their subject nationalities. The unity actually attained varies greatly from case to case, and to do justice to the facts we have to regard nationality as permitting of considerable differences of degree. In this connection the relation between nationalism and liberal democracy is important. Nineteenth-century liberalism regarded the community as prior to the State and Government as the expression of the will of the community. Hence it was opposed to any rule

[1] Cf. E. Barker, " Historically, the State precedes the nation. It is not nations which makes State : it is States which make nations." (*National Character*, p. 15.)

imposed from without, and within the State it emphasized the importance of active consent and the removal of deep cleavages between the different sections of the community. On such a view the coincidence of nation and State is clearly the ideal to be aimed at, and in actual fact during the nineteenth century liberalism and national feeling arose and developed together. But though liberalism favours nationalism, the converse is not necessarily true. On the contrary, as recent history shows, States can make use of the very energy and vitality which they owe to national feeling to suppress all liberal movements within the State and, by fostering a spirit of racial arrogance, they hinder the growth of organic relations between peoples out of which a genuine international society might be expected to emerge.

In the psychological interpretation of nationalism it is important to remember that its development has involved a twofold struggle, one between the various groups within the people and one between peoples. In the course of the emergence of the national State there was an intense competition for power between the king, the Church, and the feudal nobility. It has been plausibly suggested that one of the reasons for the late development of nationalism among Mohammedan peoples is the absence of a sharp division between the temporal and spiritual powers, and of the tension between them and the feudal nobility which in European countries provided the opportunity for the growth and consolidation of the idea of social and political freedom. The rise of the

middle classes seems also to have been of great importance in the growth of national sentiment. In numerous instances we can observe a close connection between the emergence of native commerce and trade and the beginnings of nationalism. This may take the form of a movement against foreign traders and against all classes obstructing the new economic growth, but it may also in suitable circumstances express itself in the form of a movement for free trade. The rôle of the middle classes in the period of nascent nationalism can be easily illustrated from the recent history of the East, where the old ruling castes are being everywhere ousted by a rising class of merchants, lawyers, and men of letters, the protagonists of the new nationalist movements.[1]

The part played by struggle against external aggression in creating national unity is well known and has frequently been brought out by historians. Thus, to take but a few examples, it was the reaction against English domination that roused the spirit of nationality in France in the fifteenth century; the Dutch became a nation in the struggle against Spain: the principle of nationality emerges in pronounced form in the Napoleonic wars; the need of defence against the Turks produced the union of Austria-Hungary.

The aggressive elements in nationalism are explained by some writers as due to its origin in these struggles, and in particular to the survival of the dynastic ambitions with which it was associated

[1] Cf. Hans Kohn, *History of Nationalism in the East*, p. 10.

during the period of its formation. Nationalism, argues Schumpeter, is impregnated with the spirit of the dynastic State ; it is because kings needed soldiers that the modern bourgeois is a populationist and alarmed by a decline of the birth-rate : it is because warlike castes still survive that national interests are interpreted in terms of military prestige and glory. In this perhaps there is some exaggeration. Ancient tendencies do not retain their power for long unless favoured to some extent by present conditions, and the military conception of national honour has too strong a hold over the masses of men to be explained as a mere survival of a dynastic mentality. The truth is that nationalist feeling is kept alive, not only by the pride of the conquering peoples, but also by their fear of each other, rooted in political and economic rivalry, and by the fact that they oppress and exasperate their subject nations. Would the feeling of national unity retain its intensity if the causes of fear and hatred were removed ? Can union only be secured by the threat of a common danger ? Is the feeling we have for our group capable of being extended gradually to wider groups and eventually to the whole of humanity, or is Bergson right in thinking that there are two moralities, the closed and the open, and that the feeling of humanity differs in kind from the feeling we have for the members of our own group ? Without committing ourselves to this ethical dualism, we may be sure that upon the wide diffusion of an " open " morality depends the future of civilization. Nationalism has now spread from the

Western peoples to the rest of the world. Perhaps its very universalization may serve to reveal its inherent contradictions, and to impress upon the peoples of the world the need for diverting the rush of its crude and primitive emotions into a calmer and deeper current of feeling moving towards the rational good of humanity.

PSYCHOLOGY AND RACIAL DIFFERENCES

C. G. SELIGMAN

Synopsis

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INTRODUCTION

IF in the space at my disposal I am to place before you something more than vague generalities or hypothetical conclusions, I must confine myself to certain limited aspects of my subject. I shall assume that we are agreed that in the broadest sense the brain is the organ of mind, and that its cortex constitutes the machinery upon which depend our higher psychic and psycho-motor reactions.

I have taken as my definition of race Romanes' definition of species, namely, " A group of individuals which, however many characters they share with other individuals, agree in presenting one or more characters of a peculiar and hereditary kind with some certain degree of distinctness." [1] Race must be distinguished sharply from nationality, the latter, as pointed out by Oakesmith, being due to community and continuity of interest, conditions brought about by historical forces developing " in course of time into a characteristic traditional culture which gradually creates for itself machinery, legislative,

[1] G. J. Romanes, *Darwin and after Darwin*, 1900, vol. ii, p. 231.

administrative and other, for effecting its ends in the world of human action."[1] Nationality is, then, the expression of a continuous common interest, real or imagined, and this is probably as good a definition as can be framed, for when the component units of a nation are not strongly held in a bond of common interest, any severe stress will cause them to fall apart, as did the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the progress of the World War.

The definition of race that I have given is a zoological one, applied by Romanes to species, and since we traditionally recognize but one species of man, *Homo sapiens*, might be considered out of place in the present discussion. A moment's thought will show that it applies equally well to those groups commonly recognized as the primary races of mankind, which, since habit prevents us speaking of them as species, are fairly entitled to the rank of subspecies.

The earlier attempts at the classification of mankind into a definite number of great racial divisions are of historic interest only, nor is this the place to discuss the relative merits of the more modern schemes, none of which is ideal. In practice the following classification, with four primary races (subspecies), one divided into three great groups, often spoken of as "races," but which I shall speak of as "types," is as reasonable and useful as any.

[1] John Oakesmith, *Race and Nationality*, 1919, p. x.

The White, or Caucasian subspecies, usually subdivided into:
- The Nordic "race."
- The Eurasiatic "race."[1]
- The Mediterranean "race."[2]

The Mongol subspecies.
The Negro subspecies.
The Australoid subspecies (Australians, pre-Dravidians).

Whatever our classification of mankind, it is necessary to stress that characters regarded as "racial" are transmitted by inheritance and definitely exclude characters induced or modified by environment, whether these are easily recognized functional changes or not. As between individuals, common physical characters are generally held to point to a common ancestry, and this holds in a greater or lesser degree for all groups from the family upwards.

Before bringing forward the main facts that I propose to discuss in this paper, I should like to suggest that it is not unreasonable to expect some correlation between physical and psychical characters, and thus to find qualitative psychical differences between races differing greatly in skin colour, texture of the hair, nasal index, and other physical characters; indeed, in extreme instances it appears no more than common sense to admit that such occur even when

[1] A convenient term proposed by Sergi, to include the two great masses of Caucasian round-heads, commonly known as Alpines and Armenoids.

[2] Two other "races," the Dinaric and the East Baltic, are sometimes recognized and so given sub-specific rank. They are perhaps best regarded as of mixed origin.

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no formal experimental proof exists. Thus I do not doubt that there are differences that may be termed psychological between, let us say, the Australian aboriginal and the Bushman on the one hand and the European or Chinese on the other. Anyone who has even a slight first-hand acquaintance with the Australian will not doubt that he exhibits psychical characteristics which set him apart from any European groups, while the very slight experience I have had of African negritos seems to indicate that as a people they are as distinct from Australians as from Europeans.

In considering psychological differences between groups, whether we are discussing subspecies, nations or smaller groups, I suggest that there are three kinds of reaction which *prima facie* we may regard as likely to be influenced by genetic factors, i.e. by race. These are: (1) temperament, (2) character, (3) intelligence.

Temperament is defined in the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* as " constitution or habit of mind, especially as depending upon or connected with physical constitution." This, apart from instances in which disease produces, or may be thought to produce, a modification of temperament, implies, I think, that temperament is innate, i.e. congenital, and I shall use the word in this sense.

Character I would define as the result of the action of temperament and environment upon the individual.

Intelligence I do not propose to define, but follow

Spearman in believing that intelligence is revealed in the solution of problems, " the ability to perceive and educe the relations between things apprehended." [1] Also, again following Spearman, that there is a general factor for intelligence, G, innate and unaffected by environment, with added specific factors —S, S^1, S^2, etc.—susceptible to influence by training and environment.

BRAIN AND RACE (Subspecies)

After these preliminary remarks we must determine which aspects of our subject can usefully be considered here.

First, since no one will doubt that the brain is the organ that ultimately determines the psychological reactions of every individual, however much it is played on by chemical and physical factors present in the body (oxygen content of the blood, hormones, etc.), we may most profitably discuss whether the brains of the various subspecies exhibit constant anatomical differences which we may regard as typical. We shall inquire whether there is any feature in the gross anatomy of the brain that can be said definitely to be " racial," and that at the same time can reasonably be correlated with psychological characteristics also to be regarded as " racial." In pursuing this subject I have had the inestimable advantage of consultation with Professor Joseph

[1] R. Pulleine and H. Woollard, " Physiology and Mental Observations on the Australian Aborigines," *Trans. & Proc. Roy. Soc. South Australia*, vol. liv, Adelaide, 1930, p. 63.

Shellshear, who has spent many years studying the macroscopic anatomy of the brains of two peoples, belonging respectively to one of the lowest and one of the highest cultures, viz. Australian and Chinese.

With regard to brain shape, we know that the brain can be enormously deformed without altering the character of the individual. It has never been suggested, so far as I can discover, that the capacity or character of the Chinook (flat-headed) Indians differed in any marked degree from those of other Indians of the same north-western Pacific group. We may, then, discount any direct influence on the individual due to the shape of the skull as such, and if we find psychological differences between, let us say, populations consisting predominantly of Armenoids and Mediterraneans, or Nordics, we may perhaps consider these differences as correlated but not causally connected with the shape of their skulls.

Turning now to Professor Shellshear's work—and I take this opportunity of acknowledging my indebtedness to him for permission to quote from his unpublished MS.—the Australian brain " was selected after having examined a large number of Chinese brains," not only as a problem in pure brain morphology but also " to answer the question whether the brain could be used as an index of race." " Taken collectively, the brains of the Australian aboriginal appear from this investigation to differ from the brains of higher races of man. It is probable that an [any ?] individual Chinese brain could be distinguished from an Australian brain;

but much more work must be done before this can be regarded as certain." If we select " any of the features as significant of the Australian aboriginal, individual cases presenting the same features in the Chinese would probably be found. The same may be said to a lesser extent of groups of features." Thus, although for " the Australian aboriginal as a whole, it would appear that the new cortical areas are not developed to the extent that they are in higher races," and although " it seems certain that the most fully developed of the Australian hemispheres would look ill-formed and under-developed as compared with a fully developed Chinese brain . . . the crux of the problem is whether one would notice a definite difference between the most highly developed Australian and the least-developed Chinese."

The impression left on the writer's mind after discussion with Professor Shellshear is that, though there is a retention of primitive features in the Australian brain, the elucidation of brain-racial problems (as far as macroscopic anatomy is concerned) might be greatly forwarded by the compilation of percentage tables dealing with particular features.[1]

[1] The following passage from Professor Shellshear's unpublished MS. will indicate the class of facts he has in mind :

" A review of the hemispheres examined shows that in the lateral occipital region most of the hemispheres fall into two groupings which appear to contrast with one another. Firstly, a well-marked *sulcus lunatus* is present with horizontal folding of the striate cortex, and secondly, a striate cortex is folded in a vertical direction, frequently associated with a broken condition of the

It will be noted that Professor Shellshear writes that " the new cortical areas are not developed to the extent that they are in higher races." This is confirmed by the work of Professor Woollard, who has examined the growth of the Australian brain. Among other facts he notes that the " dimensions of the cortical fissures in the principal areas of the adult brain indicate that absolutely and relatively the occipital area is the most developed; that the parietal and frontal areas are moderately developed, the frontal, however, falling behind that of the white; while the temporal area lags very far behind that of the white."[1] Further, " histological examination of the cortex shows that the degree of cell stratification is less well established than in the White brain except in the visual area," while except in the visual area the cerebral cortex is everywhere thinner than in that of the White.[2]

Professor Woollard thus supports the general

sulcus lunatus. This vertical folding is accompanied by a retreat of the *area striata* from the lateral surface; but this retreat must be of a different order from that which occurs in the European races because the particular Australian hemispheres practically all reveal the very primitive form of the intrastriate *sulci* found in the higher apes in which the whole area of the *cuneus* is often occupied by the *area striata*. . . . But these groupings of subordinate areas do not give the solution of the racial difference, for I have found some of the best examples of vertical folding in the southern Chinese hemispheres. So, although the *sulcus lunatus* when it is seen in the Australian looks fuller and bolder than in the Chinese, the pattern shown cannot at present be regarded as significant of the race. . . ."

[1] H. H. Woollard, " The Growth of the Brain of the Australian Aboriginal," *Journal of Anatomy*, vol. lxv, 1930–31, p. 239.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 240.

relative poverty of the cortex, mentioned by Professor Shellshear. Actually, as will be recognized by those with even a slight knowledge of cerebral localization, Professor Woollard has gone farther than a general statement of the relative poverty of the Australian cortex, for not only is the occipital area that in which visual representation occurs, but, as noted above, it is only in this area that the cerebral cortex is not thinner than in Whites. In view of the skill of the Australian aborigine as a tracker, this is a most important observation, and leads Professor Woollard to continue that " the facts elicited in the presented study afford at least an approximate neural basis for the cultural level of the Australian aboriginal as well as an explanation of his special aptitudes such as those based on visual symbolization." [1]

The full significance and importance of the last sentence become obvious when it is remembered that the human cerebral cortex is originally evolved from three primary cell-laminæ: (1) an inner or polymorphic, (2) a middle or granular layer, and (3) an outer or pyramidal layer. The first is concerned with the performance of organic and non-voluntary activities, in other words the instinctual parts of life; the middle layer is essentially receptive in function; while the outer layer serves as the physical basis of the associative or psychic functions of the cerebrum. This layer is the distinctive feature of the cortex peculiar to the mammalia, and has been called by Elliot Smith the neopallium.

[1] Woollard, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

Dr. J. Shaw Bolton lays stress on the fact that the inner-cell or polymorphic lamina, being the prominent lamina in the lower mammalia, must be regarded as subserving such organic and instinctive activities as are not acquired by education, and that it may reasonably be held that this is its function in man.[1]

Actually, it is customary to divide the layers of the human cortex into five, two above and two below the granular layer, but this refinement (which has been

[1] "A Contribution to the Localization of Cerebral Function, based on the Clinico-pathological study of Mental Disease," *Brain*, vol. xxxiii, 1910–11, p. 118. The reason for this statement becomes very much clearer in the light of the ensuing facts. A study of the cortices of dog, rhesus monkey, and man, leads to the following conclusions :

"The outer cell-lamina or pyramidal layer of the dog is one-half of the depth of that of the rhesus, which again is three-fourths of that of the human subject.

"The middle cell-lamina is so deficient in depth as to be practically invisible, except to the experienced observer.

"The conjoined depth of the lower laminæ is practically the same in the rhesus and man, and is one-fourth deeper in the dog than in the others.

"The ratio of the depth of the second or pyramidal lamina to that of the three lower laminæ is in the dog about one-third, in the rhesus 1/1, and in man 4/3.

"As a very rough analogy, the pyramidal lamina of the dog may be compared with that of a stillborn infant; and the pyramidal lamina of the rhesus with that of an imbecile.

"Finally, in passing from the dog to the rhesus, and from the rhesus to man, there is a very marked and progressive improvement in the development of the individual cells in all the laminæ, which general improvement, however, pales before the great difference which exists in the three cortices with regard to the evolution, both in depth and in content, of the outer cell—or pyramidal lamina" (J. Shaw Bolton, *op. cit.*, p. 112).

followed in the preceding footnote) need not concern us. What I desire to emphasize is that we may regard the granular layer as a boundary zone, dividing the cortex into two layers standing functionally in opposition to each other : (*a*) the infra-granular layer, phylogenetically the older, concerned with deep-seated needs and instincts, the automatic " protopathic " side of life, unaffected by environment, and (*b*) the supra-granular layer, especially concerned with the higher inhibitory, adaptative, and intellectual side of life.

Dr. Shaw Bolton has shown that in cases of mental abnormality, grading from idiots and imbeciles through various types of dementia to the gross dement, great differences exist in the condition of the cerebral cortex, expressed especially in the thickness of the supra-granular cortex and also in the number and development of its cells. Indeed, the diminished thickness of the cortex is largely an expression of its deficiency in cells. The matter is well explained, and becomes I think easily intelligible, in the light of the following diagram, modified from one given by Professor R. J. A. Berry and itself based on the observations and diagrams of Dr. Shaw Bolton. Into the diagram given by Professor Berry I have interpolated an imaginary section of the Australian cortex, which differs from the other sections in that the deficiency of its supra-granular layers is not an actual measured amount but merely a diagrammatic representation of the fact that these layers are less developed than in the normal white man. Thus

considered, the lesser thickness of the Australian supra-granular cortex gives us a broad hint as to the reason, in a proximate sense, why certain races have lagged behind in civilization, and why when an attempt has been made to raise them to a higher cultural level their response has been so insignificant as



Diagram of microphotographs of the cerebral cortices of an idiot, imbecile, Australian, normal, and dement, to show the differences in the thickness of the supra-granular cortex. Adapted from R. J. A. Berry. *Brain and Mind, or the Nervous System of Man*, New York, 1928, p. 493.

to be negligible, their culture potential being so low that attempts to raise it have generally led to their disappearance.

CULTURE POTENTIAL AND CULTURAL CHARACTERS AS CORRELATED WITH BRAIN STRUCTURE

The Australian is undoubtedly one of those races quickly disappearing under White impact. Omitting

the relatively few cases of designed extermination of small groups in the early days of colonization, there has been no purposive destruction, yet in 1927 Spencer and Gillen estimated that the Arunta—some 2,000 strong thirty years earlier—had fallen to less than 400.[1] Let us briefly examine some of the mental qualities that we find in the Australians, arranging them as far as possible in positive and negative series.

On the positive side we may say that the Australian has a good memory ; this is shown by the many long and intricate ceremonials, into which are woven many different mythico-religious strands, while his numerous legends connected with almost every natural feature seem to support this conclusion.[2]

Intelligence (by which, let me again say, I mean " the ability to perceive and educe relations ") appears of high order along one particular line, hunting ; the skill of the best Black trackers is undisputed —perhaps because this skill so greatly assisted survival that a rigorous selection has taken place. There is probably a not inconsiderable tendency to adopt foreign devices and ceremonial observances when these belong to a civilization not too far removed from their own ; witness the adoption of the New Guinea drum among the Cape York tribes, and of hero-myths and cult objects, and even ceremonies, from Torres Straits and perhaps the Fly River

[1] *The Arunta*, 1927, p. 1.

[2] The ceremony to increase the supply of the Witchetty grub, one of the staple foods, takes Spencer and Gillen six pages to describe (*op. cit.*, pp. 148–53).

estuary.[1] The return boomerang is another noteworthy element on the positive side. This instrument cannot be derived directly from the South Indian boomerang (which does not return), but no doubt arose, as Dr. H. S. Harrison informs me, as an accident in the non-return hunting weapon. Even so, it is no small feat to have copied and stabilized the necessary curves so that in more than one locality the return boomerang is a definite cultural feature. I do not refer here to the extraordinarily complicated—as it appears to a European—system of kinship, for I believe that its apparent intricacy is due to the European coming to it as an outside observer of adult age. It seems reasonable that any child brought up to a series of duties and privileges *vis-à-vis* the other members of his horde will experience no difficulty in remembering the relationships and functions associated with these.

Among deficiencies, the lack of any method of conserving food (smoking, sun-drying) among groups frequently so hard up for food as the Australian is surely remarkable: "starving natives will eat as much food as they can hold, if it be given them, but will not think to preserve the surplus."[2] Always ready to share what food they have, they are absolutely careless of the morrow: "You can tell your Aranda boy or girl as often as you like that he is to

[1] I here refer to the hero cults and the masked ceremonies recently recorded by Dr. D. F. Thomson, "The Hero Cult, Initiation and Totemism on Cape York," *Journ. Roy. Anthrop. Inst.*, vol. lxiii, 1933.

[2] R. Pulleine and H. Woollard, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

warn you when new supplies of flour have to be ordered; they will never do it; they cannot understand anybody wanting to do anything else than satisfy his immediate hunger. Wandering about the bush, one often picks up a perfectly good boomerang. The owner has simply thrown it away because he is tired of it. He will then make a new one and the loss of time and labour will not trouble him in the least."[1]

Clothes seem scarcely understood: the central Australians undoubtedly feel the cold of the frosty nights, yet they have never thought (as it appears) to skin an animal and use its skin for protection,[2] though they are described as carrying dogs across their loins for the comfort of the animals' bodily warmth. It is true that kangaroo, etc., are usually cooked in the skin, but this will not really explain the Australian's lack of warm covering, while it must be remembered that knots and netting are well known and fillets of fur are used as adornment. Again, it is astonishing that their break-wind shelters have not been further developed. Inhibitions connected with the body, even cleanliness with regard to the excreta, are surprisingly few. Yet with these qualities we find

[1] Geza Roheim, "Psycho-Analysis of Primitive Cultural Types," *Internat. Journ. Psycho-Analysis*, vol. xiii, 1932, p. 85.

[2] Yet, as recorded by Basedow (*The Australian Aboriginal*, Adelaide, 1925, p. 100), the now extinct south-eastern tribes, including those of the River Murray and Adelaide plain, used skins, and even rugs, made by sewing kangaroo and opossum skins together. I am not aware that there is any evidence that this use was derived from white settlers.

an extraordinarily rich ceremonial life, associated almost everywhere with some degree of ceremonial mutilation (tooth avulsion, subincision, etc.).

Now I have long taught, and written, that dramatization, and generally speaking highly ceremonial dramatization, is the method *par excellence* by means of which primitive peoples face and overcome their psychical difficulties and socialize the repressed emotional elements which are the source of so many troubles and perplexities in life.[1] Moreover, I have long held that " the communication between the unconscious and the conscious [elements of the mind] is freer in savages than in Europeans." [2] If I am right in these opinions, formulated before I had knowledge of the work of Dr. Shaw Bolton and Professor Woollard, we may, I think, see in the Australians just those characteristics that we should expect to find in the behaviour of individuals whose brains exhibit a relative preponderance of the infra-granular over the supra-granular layers of the cortex.[3]

Nor is the Australian brain the only one whose structure provides, or at least suggests, the explanation of the existence of a relatively simple culture among

[1] C. G. Seligman, " Anthropological Perspective and Psychological Theory " (Huxley Memorial Lecture for 1932), *Journ. Roy. Anthrop. Inst.* vol. lxii, 1932, especially pp. 197–201.

[2] C. G. Seligman, " The Unconscious in relation to Anthropology," *Brit. Journ. Psychology (General Section)*, vol. xviii, 1928, p. 385.

[3] I do not discuss here the evidence to be drawn from a correlation of the brains and behaviour of cases in mental hospitals, though there will be found evidence which in my opinion decidedly supports my argument.

certain peoples. Evidence of much the same character as the Australian, though very much less precise, has recently come to us from Africa. The brains upon which observations were made were derived from natives of Kenya Colony, not pure negroes but of mixed negro and hamitic blood, and the publications dealing with them can scarcely be regarded as other than preliminary communications.[1] Observations on the frontal cortex, taking the European thickness (apparently von Economo's figures) as 100, give a supra-granular layer of 92 and an infra-granular layer of 106. "Very evident differences" in the cytology of the frontal cortex are also described, the essential difference being the "paucity of the large pyramidal neurons in the East African and the excess of small primitive type cells."

INTELLIGENCE TESTS

A large amount of work has been done by a considerable body of observers on the application of intelligence tests to individuals of different groups. These from the anthropological standpoint fall into two classes :

(1) Tests between groups of individuals belonging to two of the four great subspecies enumerated on p. 55. These groups may actually be of mixed origin within themselves, yet each group differs suffi-

[1] J. H. Sequeira, "The Brain of the East African Native," *Brit. Med. Journ.*, 1, 1932, p. 581. This paper refers particularly to the work of Dr. F. W. Vint, who has contributed a paper to the *Journal of Anatomy* (vol. lxviii, 1934) entitled "The Brain of the Kenya Native."

ciently in physical characters *vis-à-vis* its opposed group of one of the other great subspecies for this difference to be significant, and in fact to imply a high degree of genetic difference.

(2) Tests between divisions or subdivisions (often very mixed) of the same subspecies. Here the degree of genetic difference may be far less than is generally assumed, and it may be doubted whether the results of these tests are of any great value from the genetic standpoint. But since large numbers of individuals have been tested and considerable significance has been attached to the results obtained, these cannot be neglected. We must, however, never lose sight of the effect of environment, and comparison between different groups of the White subspecies or the higher groups of the Yellow subspecies (Chinese and Japanese) resolves itself very largely into consideration of the old question, Nature (genetic elements) *v.* Nurture (environment and culture).

Although the tests of Class 2 are the less important, it will be convenient to consider them first. In this country they have frequently been carried out upon Gentile and Jewish school-children dwelling in the poorer quarters of London. Two series of observations on Gentile and Jewish school-children indicate, according to three investigators,[1] that Jewish boys

[1] Mary Davies and A. G. Hughes, " An Investigation into the Comparative Intelligence and Attainments of Jewish and Non-Jewish School Children," *Brit. Journ. Psychology* (*General Section*), vol. xviii, Pt 2, 1927 ; W. H. Winch, " Christian and Jewish Children in East-End Elementary Schools," *Brit. Journ. Psychology* (*General Section*), vol. xx, Pt. 3, 1930.

are superior to Gentile boys. It is, however, stated by one observer that much of this superiority is due " not to race but to a superiority of social class."[1] These tests, especially when considered in the light of the much larger body of material brought together by Rumyaneck,[2] do not by any means substantiate the doctrine of innate superiority of the Jewish children; indeed, considering the difficulties of securing a really uniform environment, it may be doubted whether within the great " races " (subspecies) we are now, or are likely in the near future to be, able to assert that the children of one average group of individuals are higher in general intelligence or possess more general ability than those of another.

Tests of intelligence between groups of individuals belonging to two of the four great subspecies are perhaps more significant, though as between Whites and Negroes we are still faced with the difficulty of distinguishing hereditary and cultural characters. To this I shall return later. When comparing Australians and Whites this particular difficulty scarcely occurs, for there does not seem to be any body of Australians whose upbringing and education are comparable with those of any white group. There is, of course, the question whether it is scientifically permissible to compare the two groups at all. To

[1] W. H. Winch, *loc. cit.*

[2] J. Rumyaneck, " The Comparative Psychology of Jews and Non-Jews : a Survey of the Literature," *Brit. Journ. Psychology* (*General Section*), vol. xxi, Pt. 4, 1931.

this question I can only answer that I think such comparison is instructive and capable of yielding valuable results, especially if the formal tests of the psychologist[1] are supplemented by a series of common-sense observations such as those conducted by Dr. Pulleine and Professor Woollard, described in their paper to which I have already referred (p. 57), which I shall now discuss.

Intelligence Tests on Australians

I must preface my remarks upon these tests by pointing out that physiological tests indicate no notable sensory differences between Australians and Europeans apart from a higher threshold for pain in the former, though the visual acuity of the Australians may be rather higher. The group of Australians examined by Dr. Pulleine and Professor Woollard was not tribal but a random collection of individuals in or associated with a mission school, some " literate," others with no knowledge of letters. Examination was largely by the so-called common-sense method, and the authors point out that it was possible to corroborate their conclusions by comparing them with those arrived at by the various members of the administrative staff. The able-bodied men were for the most part engaged in farm work,

[1] Psychological observations, including discrimination of number, the Binet-Simon test, the Dearborn Form Board and Maze tests, will be found in a paper by H. K. Fry, " Physiological and Psychological Observation," in *Trans. & Proc. of the Royal Society of South Australia*, vol. liv, 1930, pp. 76–104.

while the young unmarried women carried out the necessary domestic activities of the hostel.

The farm manager, an especially skilled man, was well disposed towards the natives, and they appeared to have a strong regard for him, while the matron of the hostel, " a most kindly lady," got on well with her girls.

The conditions were thus excellent, but nevertheless the results obtained were poor. The men were fairly competent in matters in which they could be adequately served by memory, but not in positions in which a solution had to be found, nor had they sufficient persistence to finish a piece of work unwatched. The women learnt to bake bread, but no planning ahead was observed. The mission football team was keen and skilful, and the team spirit was excellent, but the general impression left by reading this most valuable account is that the Australian is perhaps less capable of being trained to lead even a simple form of European life than a high-grade defective. In order that the reader may form his own judgment, I print as an appendix that part of the report most important from our present standpoint. I should like to add that in coming to the above conclusion I have not failed to take into account personal experience regarding interest and the onset of fatigue among Melanesians and Veddas, and even my own small experience of Queensland Blacks. It should also be stated that the authors carried out an adequate series of physiological and sense-acuity tests, indicating that the physiological levels of the

aborigines are much like our own, or if anything rather better.[1]

Intelligence Tests in the West Indies (Whites and Negroes)

Perhaps the most important observations on Whites and Negroes are those made in the West Indies—in Jamaica and on Great Cayman Island—by Messrs. Davenport and Steggerda, who undertook the detailed comparative study of two groups of 100 each of adult full-blooded Negroes and local Europeans, half the number in each group being women. Both groups were composed of individuals of as nearly as possible corresponding social status; thus families of white officials were ruled out.

From the following abstract from the volume published by Davenport and Steggerda it will be seen that some of their subjects, white as well as black, lived a peculiarly simple life. Among the Whites, the Seaford group evidently led a routine and uncomplicated existence, obviously simpler and less ceremonial than that, e.g., of the Melanesian agricultural communities of British New Guinea, and probably than that of the majority of Africans relatively uninfluenced by White culture. It is perhaps unfortunate that a certain number of clerks from Kingston

[1] I take this opportunity to thank Professor Woollard, the only author whom I could reach in time, for permission to reproduce as an Appendix a lengthy extract from the paper by himself and Dr. Pulleine, as well as for his assurance that his colleague would be equally willing to give his permission.

were included, nevertheless the results achieved appear most valuable.

In Jamaica there are a certain number of "old whites," the descendants of Germans introduced into the island about the year 1833. At that time the planters believed that the freed slaves would no longer work on the plantations, and schemes were devised to get more labourers into Jamaica, an Englishman, Captain Byng, being one of the chief labour recruiters. Economic conditions in Germany were very bad, and Captain Byng by skilful misrepresentation experienced little difficulty in his work. One consignment landed between Falmouth and Montego Bay, and later settled a district now known as Seaford Town, where they were given land.

> "The present planters of Seaford, which name is now applied to the whole district, own their land, and are in the main thrifty and prosperous. Very little race mixture is practised in this region; on the other hand, due to the scarcity of Whites, much consanguineous marriage takes place. It is said that 'all could join hands in relation some way.'
>
> "The majority of the Seaford people are dominated by great caution. The families seem contented and quite self-centred; very few parties and entertainments are held in the district. The people all work hard at agriculture; bananas, arrowroot and ginger being the chief crops. No one seems to have any definite idea

of time, and most homes do not have a family clock. However, a few homes have watches. Another characteristic of this community is that not one person can speak the German language. Even very simple phrases like ' auf Wiedersehen ' are not understood." [1]

Investigations were also carried out on Grand Cayman Island, about 300 miles north-west of Jamaica. The Whites (there are also Blacks and Browns), numbering about two thousand, are descendants of shipwrecked mariners, and possibly of some of the old buccaneers.

" The White people are chiefly mariners and shipbuilders, and are not at all inclined toward agriculture . . . the people prefer the sea to the land and live with no other thought. Their physique is of the best. They are tall and well built. Their education is limited chiefly to that afforded by the sea, where they excel. There is no secondary school in the island . . . and only recently has compulsory education been administered. Those that leave the island are said to make good at the various lines that they enter. They chiefly are employees upon boats. . . .

" There is a library in Georgetown, but the people are not inclined towards reading to any

[1] C. B. Davenport and Morris Steggerda, *Race Crossing in Jamaica*, Carnegie Institution of Washington, Publication No. 395, 1929, pp. 13–14.

great extent. The only means of communication with the outside world is by boats, which until recently have run on a very irregular schedule.

" The social life of the people consists chiefly of swimming parties, although it must be said that only a certain class of people take part in these events. This group . . . have also dancing, bathing and sailing parties, and other forms of wholesome amusement.

" In the main the people are very unpunctual, there being no organized central time. The Government has set up sundials in the different settlements, and because they were found to vary a few minutes from some mariner's instruments, the people put no faith in them. Often there is a difference of one hour's time from the eastern to the western end of the island. . . ." [1]

Such, then, were the groups to which a series of tests were applied. Both groups spoke the same language, and it is perhaps fair to say, as the observers do, that both were living at the same medium to low economic level. The following is as nearly as possible a reproduction of the observers' conclusions, reference to the hybrid " browns " whom they also tested being eliminated.

" Ability to discriminate slight differences of form was tested with plane figures. In the

[1] Davenport and Steggerda, *op. cit.*, pp. 15–16.

circles the Blacks did best in pre-adult ages. This result is possibly due to less of astigmatism in the Blacks than the Whites. The adults did less well than adolescents in this test.

" In the copying of geometric figures the Whites, at all ages, especially the adult Whites, are much superior. . . .

" In the drawing of a man, without a copy, the Whites did best. . . .

" In the reconstruction of a manikin the Whites finished in much the shortest time . . . and made the fewest errors.

" The nature of the figures that would result from opening out a notched paper was understood best by adolescent and adult Whites. But in the juvenile series the Blacks . . . were superior to the Whites—an indication of juvenile precocity of the negro race.

" The form-board test (Knox moron) was passed most easily by the Whites. The Blacks made the greatest *improvement* on the second trial.

" In the substitution test, of Woodworth and Wells, the Whites were [considerably] speedier . . . and they made fewer errors. As in the manikin test, the Whites were markedly the most swift and accurate.

" In the cube imitation test the Whites scored highest. . . .

" In the criticism of absurd sentences the Whites are clearly best of the adults. . . .

"In the Army Alpha test the Whites stand first in: III, common sense; IV, synonyms and antonyms; V, restoring pied sentences; and VIII, general information. They are inferior in: I, following directions; II, arithmetic; and VII, analogies. . . . The Blacks stand first in: I, following directions; II, arithmetic; VI, continuing the number series, and VII, seeing analogies.

"The possibility of a correlation between grades of rhythm and capacity for drawing geometric figures was considered. The result of the study was to show no correlation." [1]

"The Seashore test for musical capacity yielded important results. In most tests of adults the Blacks showed themselves superior to the Whites—most strikingly in capacity for discriminating intensity and rhythm, but also pitch and time. In respect to harmony and tonal memory, there was no certain difference between the groups. The sense of intensity came to be superior in the Blacks only after adolescence, but their superiority in rhythm appears at 10–13 years." [2]

This superiority may be widespread among Negroes and Negroids, and of some importance as a basis for further study. It has at any rate been found that, using the Seashore tests, 96 East African natives

[1] Davenport and Steggerda, *op. cit.*, pp. 475–6.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 475.

(including 67 Kikuyu, and all, except possibly 3, of mixed Negro-Hamitic tribes) were superior to American seventh-grade children, taken as of approximately equivalent school standing, in a number of tests.[1]

> Africans were superior to the Americans in the senses of intensity, time and rhythm, in that order; inferior in the sense of pitch, the sense of consonance and memory for tones, in order of increasing inferiority.
>
> "An African boy of about fifteen excelled over 90 per cent. of American children of approximately his own school standing in each of the six capacities.
>
> "There was no relation between any of the six capacities and age." [2]

[1] Richard A. C. Oliver, "The Musical Talent of Natives of East Africa," *Brit. Journ. Psychology* (*General Section*), vol. xxii, 1932.

[2] Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 343. "The subjects of the experiment were the pupils of the Alliance High School, at Kikuyu in Kenya Colony. The Alliance High School is a central school for boys, offering the most advanced education open to natives in Kenya, and draws students from all parts of the Colony. The number of subjects tested was ninety.

"The exact ages of the students were known in only eleven cases, as it is only within the last few years that Missions and other agencies have begun to prevail upon Africans in Kenya to register births. The principal of the school, however, has estimated the ages of the other pupils from anthropometric measurements, and these estimates have been used. The ages, true or estimated, ranged from 12 to 24, with a mean of 19·75, and a standard deviation of 2·61. . . . Of the students' experience of European music, it is known that all are taught singing in school, and ten are taught

Discussing their results, Messrs. Davenport and Steggerda conclude that their tests indicate that the negroes are superior to the North Europeans in sensory equipment, or, at least, in ability to make sensory discriminations, especially in music.

> "... in cases where some ability to put through a planned composition (like the drawing of a man) is required, or to put 2 and 2 together to make 4, or, rather, to put 5 pieces of wood together to make a figure of a man, the Blacks fall far below the Whites. In this case the training of the two groups has been as like as possible. Inferiority of the Blacks also showed in the ability to solve correctly the problem of the notch in the folded paper. In the ability to organize and put through the simple form-board test of Knox the Blacks are much inferior to the Whites. This form-board test does bear on ability to visualize, to plan on the basis of the mental picture, and to profit by experience. ... The person who fails on, or is slow with, the form-board test is poor at planning, carries mental pictures poorly, and profits little by experience. There is reason for concluding that the Blacks are characterized, on the average, by a lower grade of capacity in these mental

to read music in staff notation and to play the harmonium. Further, forty-two students in Forms 2, 3, 4 and 5 had undergone the same tests three months previously, when the writer was trying to devise suitable methods of administering the tests to Africans" (*op. cit.*, pp. 334–5).

functions than are the Whites. Similarly, the Blacks seemed inferior to the Whites in ability to criticize absurd statements and to make such practical judgments as are called for in Army Alpha test No. 3." [1]

On the other hand, the Blacks seem to do better in simple mental arithmetic and with numerical series than the Whites.

It will be seen that Messrs. Davenport and Steggerda have consistently held in mind the necessity for testing individuals brought up as far as possible in the same environment and as nearly as may be of the same education, with tests equally fair to both, all elements the importance of which cannot be exaggerated. Many other races have been tested, too often out of their environment, and I feel sure that the anthropologist who has observed in the field the subtle influence of foreign environment and culture will not be likely to stress too highly the results of intelligence tests on groups of strangers in new environments. In their homelands the intelligence quotas of a number of peoples are given by Garth as follows, taking Whites as 100 :

" Chinese, 99 ; Japanese, 99 ; Mexicans, 78 ; southern Negroes, 75 ; northern Negroes, 85 ;

[1] Davenport and Steggerda, *op. cit.*, pp. 468–9. These conclusions are confirmed by Derrick, " Study of Intelligence of White and Coloured Students " (*Journal of Applied Psychology*, vol. iv, 1920), who concludes that the Negro is better in memory and in concrete and routine problems than in those involving abstraction and reconstruction.

> American Indians, full blood, 70 . . . the Chinese and Japanese score so nearly like the White that the difference is negligible. Certainly they possess a quality which places them in a class beyond the Negro, the Mexican in the United States, and the American Indian, whatever that is." [1]

Turning now to the White Race, during the war the most elaborate tests were made on American recruits. As a result it was claimed that the superiority of Nordics over Alpines and Mediterraneans was proved. It is unnecessary to discuss here how far the groups tested were national rather than racial, for Professor Brigham, who was responsible for some of these conclusions, has definitely withdrawn them, writing as follows :

> " This review has summarized some of the more recent test findings which show that comparative studies of various national and racial groups may not be made with existing tests, and which show in particular that one of the most pretentious of these comparative racial studies—the writer's own—was without foundation." [2]

Professor Brigham's view now is that the test scores do not represent unitary qualities, and therefore the scores of sub-tests cannot be added as was done in the earlier investigations.

[1] T. R. Garth, *Race Psychology* (New York), 1931, p. 83.
[2] *Psychological Review*, vol. 37, 1930, p. 165.

While accepting Professor Brigham's conclusion as substantially correct, it will be well to remember the existence of superior individuals not only in every race but in every people. I have known one such fairly intimately among a Melanesian group (it is interesting to note that he was born into the most important family of his clan), and among the Bantu the history of South Africa offers many examples. Others, whose I.Q. has been tested, have been recorded by Garth :

> " One Indian girl of twelve years in one of the south-western schools has an I.Q. of 142. A Mexican child of San Antonio, Texas, has an I.Q. of 144. Four Negroes of Dallas have I.Q.s around 125 and 129. And there are others in between these points and the white median I.Q. of 100." [1]

But although such examples indicate considerable overlap, the number of superior individuals in the non-White races—I purposely omit the advanced peoples of the East from my comparison—is small, probably smaller than among ourselves, among whom success, organized in our schools and colleges, can be tested numerically and fairly objectively—at least in its higher grades—by such devices as Nobel prizes, the membership of certain Academies, etc.

The figures given by Garth, with which I close this part of my subject, are as follows :

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 84.

> ". . . only 7·5 per cent. of the Negroes, 8·9 per cent. of the Mexicans, and 11 per cent. of the Indians (in the case of the non-language test) have I.Q.s attaining and exceeding the White median I.Q. of 100. The number of superior individuals in these groups is small to be sure. Of 1,272 Negroes there are 96, to express it in numbers, who are as good as or better than the average White. There are 90 Mexicans out of 1,004 and 75 Indians out of 667 who are seen to do as well as or better than the White median performance." [1]

TEMPERAMENT AND RACE

I first discussed temperament and race some ten years ago in a Presidential Address to the Royal Anthropological Institute (1924). Taking Jung's division of temperament into introvert and extravert, I indicated that of the groups that we generally accept as races some were introvert and some were extravert; indeed, I went further than this and pointed out that there were subdivisions within the larger racial units with which I dealt. I mentioned, but I now see did not sufficiently stress, that there was a time element to be considered, i.e. that certain historical periods and societies encouraged extravert or introvert tendencies respectively. I did not allow sufficiently for the difference that suitable environment might and probably would produce in the expression of introvert and extravert demeanour and

[1] Garth, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

habit. Nor did I sufficiently consider the result of education purposefully directed to producing or enhancing either of these, nor emphasize the necessity for comparing similar classes in different peoples. Thus, not having in 1924 been in the Far East, when writing of Chinese and Japanese I considered the former introvert and the latter extravert. A very little practical experience showed that while I was correct with regard to the Japanese [1] I was wrong as to the Chinese. My mistake had arisen from regarding the literary or Confucian man as the representative of the Chinese attitude to life, instead of realizing that he is the result of a special tradition and training, never given to or adopted by more than a small proportion of the population. Actually the Chinese are, as I believe, at least as extravert as the Japanese, though in both people literary and governing groups have accepted an introvert standard, to which they are carefully trained.

I made a more serious mistake when I quoted with a considerable measure of approval some of the generally accepted statements concerning Nordics, Alpines, and Mediterraneans, which I now see require stern revision.

It is indeed reasonable to believe that innate genetic differences exist between the groups that we call the Primary races (subspecies) of *Homo sapiens*, and also

[1] I regard the Japanese as definitely extravert; my reasons for this have been published elsewhere ("Japanese Temperament and Character," *Trans. Japan Soc. London*, vol. xxviii, 1931), so I need not overburden this paper by reciting them once more.

between less well characterized groups, as, for instance, those commonly included within the White subspecies. But time has shown the increasing difficulty of defining these genetic differences, and it is certain that no such facile statements concerning temperament and character as those in vogue ten years ago, and still acclaimed in some parts of the Continent, can now be regarded as generally acceptable.

But although mistakes have been made, especially in disregarding the continuity of historical tradition and its moulding effect on character, I still think that the division of temperament into two main types is important and correct. I need not elaborate the argument that led Jung to recognize the two dispositions; his reasons have been set forth in one of his most important works.[1] I may, however, point out that years earlier William James had divided not indeed mankind but philosophers into two classes, the "tender-minded" and the "tough-minded," who to a great extent correspond to Jung's two "types."

Much more recently an artist and a physician, working together, have pointed out that so far as Europe is concerned the works of famous painters fall into two classes distinguishable at sight in the more pronounced instances, and that these classes each exhibit a characteristic *facies* corresponding to one of the two dispositions.[2] They indicate that,

[1] *Analytical Psychology*, 1917, especially pp. 289, 290.

[2] Alfred Thornton and Ronald Gordon, "The Influence of certain Psychological Reactions in Painting," *Burlington Magazine*, May 1920, and "Art in Relation to Life," *op. cit.*, July and August, 1921.

broadly speaking, the form of painting usually termed " Classical " is characteristic of introversion, while " Romantic " painting is of the extravert disposition.

With regard to poetry, I may cite again the appreciation of an anonymous but obviously well-qualified writer, who has pointed out that there are two types :

> " Poets and poetry are, and always have been, of two kinds. You may make the division on many lines, but the results will not be very different. On the one side there is revolution, on the other acceptance ; on the one freedom and wilfulness, on the other art and labour and learning ; on the one conservatism, tradition, sobriety, the quietness and confidence of ancient ways in thought and form and language, on the other the pleasures and dangers of originality and novelty, the confidence of youth, impatient at the lethargy of custom, eager to make all things new, and sure that making them new is the same thing as making them better. . . .
>
> " Poets have their natural temperaments, like other men, and that word covers all the varieties which lie between its opposite kinsfolk, temper and temperance. Anyhow, there the division lies—one sort on one side and one on the other ; each, perhaps, partaking a little of the qualities of its opposite, but still being itself and not its opposite ; letting the balance lean decidedly on

> the side of form and craftsmanship and tradition, and that temperance which for the Greeks was no negation, but an active and positive virtue; or, again, on the other side, the side of defiance and experiment, originality and rebellion. There they confront each other down the centuries. . . . Of course, the craftsmen have much more than craftsmanship, and the iconoclasts are not without form, or they would not be remembered at all. But there is a wall, however thin, between them, and neither the greatest nor the most cherished and read are all on one side of it." [1]

There is, then, abundant evidence of the existence of two temperaments, and although there has been a certain amount of criticism of the words used to express them it seems that these may well stand, at any rate until two better antithetical terms are suggested. My reason for including the above rather lengthy quotation is that it well expresses the experience of everyday life, that few individuals are all extravert or all introvert, so that to form a correct diagnosis even of friends may require years of watching and patient consideration. Especially is this the case where in self-defence the introvert learns the trick of extraversion. Again, it is reasonable to suppose that while those temperaments leading to clear-cut introversion or extraversion are innate, in many individuals of somewhat mixed temperament we may

[1] "Acceptance and Adventure," *Times Literary Supplement*, vol. xxii, 1923, pp. 757, 758.

conjecture that environment, especially during the early years, may modify behaviour in the direction of either temperament.[1]

Again, although I have spoken of the temperaments as innate, I do not wish it to be thought that I regard them as determined by simple allelomorphic genes or even by a group of multiple factors, though, as I shall immediately indicate, I think a case can be made for the segregation in certain instances of one or other temperament.

In this belief I shall now try to indicate how, in my opinion, the conception of the two temperaments helps us to understand or explain the differences between various peoples, which we believe to be innate and therefore at least potentially of racial significance.

As to the relation between temperament and physical type as exhibited by individuals, some theoretical considerations will not be amiss. The great and essential differences between the two types must, I believe, be ultimately attributed to the cerebral hemispheres.[2] The central nervous system is

[1] Even Jung, who considers the temperaments innate (private communication), has pointed out the tendency that each type has to compensate and admitted the difficulty of classification (*Psychological Types*, 1923, p. 10).

[2] I do not deny that the internal secretions may exert a considerable influence on the psychical make-up of the individual, but pathology apart I doubt whether such relatively small excess or diminution in the secretions of the ductless glands as not to influence the general health can determine the "type" of the individual, though it may well be that such minor deviations determine whether within the type he shall be a success or failure.

derived from that layer of the embryo termed epiblast, as is the skin with its appendages, the hair and nails (but not the iris of the eye). It will therefore be justifiable to suggest that the offspring of parents of differing dispositions, who also have distinct skin and hair colour, showing alternate inheritance, i.e. resembling one of their dissimilar parents or, as the distribution of the genes may dictate, a more remote ancestor, in skin and hair colour, may also resemble that parent—or ancestor—in disposition.

The study of such correlated differences can scarcely be said to have begun, but in certain horses there does appear to be evidence that colour and temperament are correlated: thus chestnut horses are so commonly regarded as nervous and excitable that this may be accepted as generally true;[1] indeed, the late Professor Ridgway has put forward a genetic theory accounting for the fact. His argument is long and somewhat discursive, but once it is admitted that the Asiatic horse is savage and intractable in comparison with the docile African, the following paragraph gives a fair summary:

> "We have noted the well-known belief that chestnut horses are frequently bad-tempered, even when well bred, and reason has been given for thinking that chestnut colour in Eng-

[1] This is confirmed by Sir Frederick Hobday, who has kindly written to me as follows: "Although I have met with chestnut horses of placid temperament, I consider that one finds a higher proportion of highly nervous and excitable individuals among them than those of other colours."

lish thoroughbreds and even in Anazah horses is the outcome of a small strain of Asiatic blood. Now that we realize the fundamental difference in temper between the Asiatic and the Libyan horses, we at once understand why a cross temper should be a concomitant of chestnut colour." [1]

Here is an example of correlation between a physical and a psychical quality in animals. In *Homo* I know of no such example, unless, as is probable enough, there is some truth in the saying, " Ginger for pluck," but within the smaller group of the family I suppose many of us may have observed instances of correlated segregation of a physical and a psychical—in this case a temperamental—quality.[2]

The chestnut horse, and such families as I have alluded to, do then suggest a definite genetic basis for race psychology. In practice there is the constant difficulty of attempting to disentangle genetic and environmental factors, nor is there any objective method of judging the relative part played by these two factors in any particular instance. In my opinion inquiries seeking to link these two qualities, except in the subspecies of mankind, should not in our present state of knowledge (or ignorance) work with such large groups as Nordics, Mediterraneans,

[1] *The Origin and Influence of the Thoroughbred Horse*, 1905, p. 274.

[2] I have published an example of such a family. See : " Anthropology and Psychology : a Study of some Points of Contact," *Journ. Roy. Anthrop. Inst.*, vol. liv, 1924, pp. 24–5.

etc., but more modestly begin with smaller groups. It is in any case certain that so-called " national character " is the product of environment to a very high degree. Another difficulty is the constant tendency to judge a people by a preconceived standard based on a few individuals of outstanding character, and on remarkable actions. Yet, as we have seen, every people throws up outstanding individuals. On this matter we may still agree with Hume :

> " The vulgar are apt to carry all *national characters* to extremes ; and having once established it as a principle, that any people are knavish, or cowardly, or ignorant, they will admit of no exception, but comprehend every individual under the same censure. Men of sense condemn these undistinguishing judgments : though at the same time, they allow, that each nation has a peculiar set of manners, and that some particular qualities are more frequently to be met with among one people than among their neighbours. . . . We have reason to expect greater wit and gaiety in a Frenchman than in a Spaniard ; though Cervantes was born in Spain." [1]

Again, ethnic psychology has generally not troubled to ascertain to which physical group in a mixed people

[1] Hume, *Essays, Moral, Political and Literary*, vol. i, 1875, p. 244.

—and all actual peoples are mixed to a greater or less extent—particular outstanding individuals or artificially selected groups belong.

This aspect has been well put by Professor Ginsberg,[1] who points out the tendency

> " to ascribe to racial groups characteristics inferred from the behaviour of individuals who belong to racially mixed peoples without any effort being made to identify the racial [physical] characteristics of the individuals in question. When, for example, it is asserted that the founding of the American republic was due to the vigour and leadership of Nordic immigrants, is there any evidence that the individuals in question were especially Nordic, at any rate in respect of physical characters ? . . . Such investigations as have been made into the physical characters of the Old Americans suggest that only a few of them were blond and that the round-headed were distinctly more numerous than the long-headed (cf. Hrdlicka, *The Old Americans*, p. 54). Similarly, when we test the statement so often made that the Nordics are the finest explorers in the world we find no evidence given of the physical type of the explorers. So far as English explorers are concerned, Havelock Ellis's study shows that ' our most eminent and experienced explorers are mostly men of dark eyes and hair.' "

[1] *Sociology*, 1934, pp. 72–3.

Professor Charles Singer has suggested to me that to some extent the differences ascribed to diverse European types may present analogies with the cultural differences we find in the sexes, due largely to upbringing and varying economic status, citing as an amusing example of how points of view may change, the exclamation of a third-century Greek gossip writer, Athenæus, " Whoever heard of a woman cook ! "

Further, with regard to national and even racial character, at least as it applies to Europe, different qualities are exhibited in the same nation and perhaps race at different periods of their history—not associated with any great immigration and, as I hold, far too recent for any considerable genetic change to have taken place. Once upon a time—I hope you will forgive the phrase, the facts almost suggest a fairy tale—England was habitually called " merry," and in later Tudor times the English were held one of the most musical people in Europe. Neither epithet would be applicable from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. Again, as Hume tells us, the Spaniards, once one of the most aggressive people in Europe, could in the eighteenth century hardly be induced to fight :

> " The old Spaniards were restless, turbulent, and so addicted to war, that many of them killed themselves, when deprived of their arms by the Romans. One would find an equal difficulty at present (at least one would have found it fifty

years ago) to rouse up the modern Spaniards to arms."

Here it seems far more likely that the change is due to social than to genetic change, which can certainly be excluded from any effective share in the difference between mid-Victorian Germany and Germany of the present day. Then the German national character was taken to be philosophic and kindly, particularly in the south, where *Gemütlichkeit* was proverbial. Success in the Franco-Prussian War led to an aggressive militarism, culminating at the present day in an exaltation of the State and an extreme Pan-Germanism, with a reversion to the intolerance of the Middle Ages.

All this bears on the legend of the Nordic character[2]

[1] Hume, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

[2] In my earlier paper, already referred to, I discussed at some length what I then thought might be the temperamental characteristics of the Nordic, Alpine, and Mediterranean types. On again examining what I have written, especially having regard to the time I wrote it, I am struck by the extent to which I have fallen into the error noted by Hume, viz. attributing the character of particular individuals to much larger groups. Independence, recklessness, and disregard for others are not limited to Nordics, and my friend Miss Edith Durham has provided me with extreme examples of just this reckless disregard among the Slavs. Nevertheless I consider it correct to regard the Nordic as introvert as compared with the Mediterraneans, who are extravert, and, as Havelock Ellis has so clearly pointed out, there are well-marked differences in the literary form and content (by "content" I do not mean plot) of the Norse sagas and such "Celtic" romances as the *Mabinogion*, the term Celtic in this context being used in a common conventional sense to indicate the general population, very mixed in race, in particular regions once of Celtic language and culture. (*A Study of British Genius*. New Edition, n.d., Chap. XIII.)

with its alleged unique originality and initiative, some having gone so far as to postulate a Nordic origin wherever these qualities are found. Nothing is less likely to be true. Neglecting for the moment India and the Far East as somewhat outside our picture, the arts and crafts upon which civilization is built are known to have originated in non-Nordic lands—no doubt in the Near East—and this applies to the discovery of metals, building in stone and brick, writing, and the cultivation of cereals. It is almost equally certain that the wheel and the use of the horse as a pack and riding animal (including cavalry) also arose in the Near East, while we know that printing and paper reached us much later from China. That the ancient Greeks looked upon the Northern barbarians, which presumably included the vast majority of Nordics, as incapable of any considerable state-building, is interesting if not very important, but coming to more modern times there is actually a considerable body of fact negativing the legend of preponderant Nordic initiative. Exploration is often regarded as a particularly Nordic domain, but, as already stated, Havelock Ellis has shown that so far as British explorers are concerned this is not the case.[1] Again, with regard to the founding of the American Republic, concerning which I have already cited Professor Ginsberg, investigation by Professor Hrdlicka reveals the striking fact that the "Old American" type (the type which may legitimately be taken to represent as nearly as may be the early

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 304.

colonists) is in pigmentation very distinct and far apart from the Nordic, for although they show Nordic admixture they cannot be classed as Nordics, while the cephalic index shows a great range of variation.

Finally let me mention some of the great men of Germany, premising that one of the Nordic characters is long-headedness (dolichocephaly), i.e. a cranial index not greater than 75, the equivalent of a cephalic index of about 77 in the living.

Leibnitz, Schopenhauer, Goethe, and Kant were all hyperbrachycephalic, with cephalic indices of 92, 90, 88, 85 respectively; Schiller was certainly not long-headed, though his C.I., estimated at about 84, cannot be certainly given, and this holds of Beethoven, whose C.I. may have been about 85. This result is, after all, not very remarkable, considering that as shown by Ripley's map only a relatively small number of Germans are long-headed.

Thus the Nordic legend cannot be said to be borne out in the country of its maximum development, even if we leave aside the almost total absence of Nordic physical characters in the three men who rule Germany at the present day.

CONCLUSIONS

(1) Both macroscopic and microscopic evidence points to there being qualitative differences in the brains of Australians and those of certain of the more culturally advanced races.

(2) Examination of Australian culture, and intelligence tests so far as they are applicable, furnish

indications of intellectual differences between the less and more advanced of the primary subspecies (races) which may fairly be regarded as correlated with differences in brain structure and hence as " racial."

(3) As between large groups of the same primary subspecies, in this instance the " white race," the difficulty of differentiating between congenital and environmental factors is pointed out. Moreover, the inadequacy of intelligence tests and of particular types of temperament, real or alleged, as constituting unique and definite psychological criteria of race is emphasized.

APPENDIX

The mental capacity of Australian Aborigines.[1]

> " Since our population was a random sample and contained many adults of various ages, and some quite illiterate, we tried the so-called common-sense method. Moreover, by interrogations referring to their immediate activities we thought that many objections might be met, such as lack of interest, or experience. Finally, it was possible to corroborate our conclusions by comparing them with those arrived at by the various members of the administrative staff. The able-bodied men about the place are for the most part engaged in some way in farm work.

[1] Reprinted from the paper by Pulleine and Woollard in *Trans. & Proc. Roy. Soc., South Australia,* vol. liv, 1930, pp. 71–4.

The younger members have formed a very enthusiastic football team.

" The young women who are unmarried carry out various activities arising in the hostel. Cooking, dressmaking, housekeeping command their attention and industry. The boys and girls attend the school. The farm, some 4,000 acres, is under the management of a practical farmer who happens to be especially skilled, since in open competition the cleverness of his methods has brought him several silver cups. The present harvest (1928) has been a poor one. Nevertheless, the highest yield of wheat per acre in the district has been obtained from the mission farm. The farm manager is very well disposed towards the natives, and we witnessed many incidents which showed his consideration for them, and, on the other hand, their regard for him. We feel confident that his opinions on the capability of the aborigine as a farm labourer are worthy of the highest consideration.

" The aborigines were poor labour in the sense of bringing little skill and understanding to the task. Their industry has little persistence and a task set them must be watched until its completion. In the handling of animals, in the care of material, and the adjustment of the means to the end in the usual farm operations, they cannot be left to themselves. . . .

" The schoolmaster was of the opinion that the aboriginal child exhibited a fair degree of

competence in mastering and producing that sort of learning in which the exercise of the memory was the most important factor. However, in subjects, and in particular arithmetic, where progress depended far more on the ability to solve problems, they were very slow and, in fact, never proceeded far.

"The matron of the hostel, a most kindly lady, had never seen a native girl who was able to cut out a dress from a pattern, though many of them sewed quite well. Their standards in dress and colour, judged by the standards they tried to imitate, remained very rudimentary. In cooking, by constant practice, they achieved a fair measure of success, as in baking bread, for instance, but any kind of planning or provision beyond the immediate object seemed never to occur. . . .

"The football team drawn from the mission station is keen, skilful, and often successful. In addition to their skill, the other feature which has impressed impartial observers is the excellent team spirit. . . .

"We shall now describe a few group tests. We think games provide one kind of test of what we are trying to get at, the ability of aborigines, because the aborigine is fond of games and plays them with keenness. . . . One simple game we played with them was passing the peg. Two rows, one of aborigines and one of white, were formed, and each row passed a peg from indivi-

dual to individual. The game was won by the row which passed it the faster. This game is played very often at the hostel by natives in the station. The whites won the game for this reason. Though we had never played it before, it was immediately apparent that if we watched our immediate neighbour so that our eyes were on the peg, and if each did this we conformed to the fundamental principle of all games, viz. 'keep your eye on the ball.' The aborigines had not discovered this, for they turned to pass the peg and thus kept losing sight of it.

"Another group test used was to arrange three rows of candles, one behind the other, each row containing seven candles. The object was to light as many candles as possible with one match. Obviously the angle at which the match is held will be a factor determining the rate at which the wood is consumed. And again, if the back row is lighted first the succeeding rows can be lighted without the hand being scorched. Repeated attempts failed to bring home to the native contestants either of these points, and their performance in the best cases was less than half that usually achieved at children's parties. (The highest three scores of aboriginal girls averaged six. Fifteen is a common score at a party.)

". . . One other test we participated in along with the aborigines. The test might be ranked as a scientific one, except that certain elements

should have been more rigidly guarded. The test consisted of the exhibition of thirty common articles, e.g. bottle, cork, corkscrew, and so on. Each article was held up so that all could plainly see it for about five seconds, and then covered up. When the series had been exhibited in this way, we were all required to write down the names of as many articles as we could remember. The highest score was 26 obtained by a half-caste. Several girls scored 20 to 23. The scientific expedition averaged about 19, and one of their members, with 8, got the booby prize. This test, we consider, is largely one of reproduction, and ability only comes in when one arranges a classification of the articles in one's mind as one sees them held up. Practice would facilitate the introduction of the associative element. Our subsequent inquiries led us to infer that the aborigines relied entirely on memory, and the test is of interest in that it confirms the opinion that the power of memory amongst the aborigines would be of the same average order as amongst ourselves.

" We now present a few illustrative cases of our interrogations. A female aborigine, aged eighteen, had been educated at the mission station and had reached the third grade of the school. These grades correspond to the numbers in the State elementary schools. She had ceased to attend the school two years ago. She

can describe the process of baking bread and can give a very good account of the procedure carried out when preparing yeast. When asked how she would prepare a rabbit for eating, she replied that she would fry it. She has some knowledge of geography and can say in general where Japan is, and how you would proceed if you wished to go to Melbourne or to the city of Adelaide. She does not know the simple arithmetical tables and cannot tell how many shillings go to the pound. In the candle test she averaged less than eight candles in three successive tests. In the memory test, reproducing the names of the articles shown, she scored 19, which was very good. The girl was among the more intelligent. Others who had been as long in the school were unable to recite the alphabet or to give the succession of numbers from twenty onwards. Any arithmetical problem, such as the value of twelve articles when one cost threepence, none of them succeeded in solving. The meaning of words such as religion, present, gift, moment, etc., they were unable to explain.

" An aboriginal male aged 25 reached the fifth grade of the school and was considered a very good pupil. At the selection of the coloured wools he performed moderately, getting less than half the skeins of the corresponding colour. On the farm he has tried to learn to shear, but has not become even tolerably proficient. He has learnt no trade. His work is ploughing, but

he does not know how many acres a day he can plough (some were able to tell us this). He does not know what becomes of the wheat when harvested. He does not know the meaning of the word ' bushel,' and can give no idea of how much wheat there is in a bushel. He has no idea of the monetary value of wheat. He can recognize on the map such countries as England, but can suggest no reason why wheat should be sent to England. He can give no reason why some countries are hot and some cold, etc. This is a fairly typical investigation.

" . . . We found that practically none of them had what might be called ' money sense.' Calculations of the order of one article costs threepence, how much would twelve cost ? were too difficult for them. Arithmetic, even of the most elementary kind, does seem to present them with very great difficulty. A group of six girls, all of them either attending the school or just left the school, were examined on the multiplication tables. Only one attempted the twelve times table, and she made several mistakes in the attempt. To two young men who had attended the mission school and who were enthusiastic and skilled members of the football team, the problem was put : If one side scores seven goals and the other scores six goals six points, what would be the result ? They were extremely puzzled and tried hard to get an answer. It was clear they had the relevant information and

even some idea of how an answer might be got, but they were unable to get the correct result. When the problem was explained, they seemed to appreciate the way in which it could be solved.

". . . We noticed among the young married women this same inability to think in numbers. A store is kept at the station, and it is customary for the families to make purchases there. These aboriginal women would purchase constantly at the store, but they never had any idea of the price of the articles they purchased. They brought whatever money they had, asked for what they wanted, and tendered all their money. They took whatever change might be given them. The store was looked after by the schoolmaster. He confirmed our own observations, and remarked that none of them had any idea of money."

LIBERTY, AUTHORITY, DEMOCRACY

RAMSAY MUIR

LIBERTY, AUTHORITY, DEMOCRACY

By RAMSAY MUIR

LET me begin by stating the question which we are to discuss. We are to discuss the relations between liberty and authority, between the individual and the State, in the light of the violent reaction against liberty which is so marked a feature of our time. We are to consider whether, in the modern world, we have not carried the worship of liberty too far; whether the present reaction is merely a temporary outcome of disillusionment or distress, or is a response to a too-much-neglected need of men for more vigorous and authoritative leadership; and whether the democratic system, to which all the world seemed to have been converted only a few years ago, does or does not represent a mistaken idea as to the right way of organizing and holding together the vast and complex societies which constitute our modern States.

This is a profound and momentous subject of inquiry. It can be dealt with either in the light of history or in the light of philosophy and psychology. I make no apology for attempting a mixture of these two modes of approach to the problem.

Lord Acton used to maintain that the core and essence of human history is the development of human freedom—the progressive emancipation of the individual mind and spirit from the chains of

custom and established authority. He would, I think, have contended that the advance of man towards greater liberty is more important than his advance in material efficiency and power, both because the winning of liberty is a spiritual advance and therefore more significant than merely material progress, and also because, in fact, the whole of man's material progress has been due to the freeing of the immeasurable potency of individual minds.

Man, as Aristotle long ago observed, is a social animal. It is only as a member of a society that he can develop and exercise the faculties that distinguish him from the beasts—the faculty of speech, for example, which alone makes possible the exercise of abstract reasoning; or the power to co-operate by the division of labour so as to make the most of his environment. In a hundred ways the individual is shaped and moulded by the society into which he is born; and not merely the material conditions of his life, but the very texture of his thoughts depend upon the character of the society of which he is a member. For that reason it is very difficult to define the relations between Society and the individual, or to determine how far the individual *can* enjoy personal freedom, and how far he is necessarily subject to social authority.

But it is safe to say that the subordination of the individual to the group is most absolute in the most primitive societies, and most elastic in the most advanced. In other words, the development of individual freedom and variety is the proof of development

in civilization. In primitive societies the whole life of the individual is almost as completely determined by the will or the customs of the clan or the horde as the life of a bee is determined by the customs of the hive. He thinks as his fellows think; he must observe the *tabus* his fellows observe; his life belongs to the clan; his place and his function are unalterably determined for him by the status into which he is born; and any transgression will be visited with dire penalties. It has been contended, probably with truth, that this hard crust of unchanging status and custom was necessary to preserve primitive societies in their incessant conflicts with Nature and with one another. But until the crust could be broken, so as to release the energy and inventiveness of individuals, no progress was possible. Only then could the beginnings of civilization appear. In the vast majority of human societies, the crust was never broken at all, except by the forcible impact of more developed societies from without. Even when it was broken, and the complicated organization of life which we call civilization began to arise, there must always have been a difficult struggle between freedom and authority, and the path of progress is strewn with the bodies of the martyrs of freedom who died fighting against traditional authority. It must always have been a difficult problem to reconcile the maintenance of the communal authority that was necessary for preservation with the allowance of that explosive freedom which pioneers demanded. To find the right adjustment between liberty and auth-

ority has always been the most difficult of political problems. In most of the great civilizations which have grown up among men, vitality was sooner or later destroyed by the too complete victory of authority, custom, caste, and rigid status; and the result was stagnation and decay. This is the main reason why great civilizations like those of Egypt, of China, of India, of Rome either died out or were ossified: they lost their vitality when they ceased to cherish an expanding freedom.

Hitherto, in human history, the European or Western civilization has been the only one in which the process of emancipation, and the release of the vast potency of individual energy, have (in spite of many setbacks) gone forward with growing success. It may be that Western civilization in its turn will fall into stagnation and decay like its predecessors. If it does, it will not be because of any attack from without; it will be for the same reason that led to the failure of its predecessors—neglect to cherish the vitalizing power of freedom. The power which has been derived from the progressive emancipation of the Western peoples has already produced astounding results. It has given to them and their civilization the domination of the world. It has brought all the races and peoples of the earth into a single political and a single economic system. It has explored and made available for human use the resources of the whole planet, and has thus offered to humanity an opportunity of banishing from the face of the earth the poverty and drudgery which have always

haunted the lives of the mass of men. This amazing achievement, which opens, or ought to open, a new era in human history, has mainly been the work of the last four centuries, and pre-eminently of the last century. It has been due to two things : first, to the enlargement of human liberty in the Western lands during the modern era ; and secondly, to the fact that the Western world, after many false starts, has found its way to an adjustment of the claims of liberty and authority such as no earlier civilization ever attained.

Let us consider first the nature of this adjustment ; and then the principal aspects of this expansion of liberty, and the ways in which it has rendered possible these tremendous achievements.

The adjustment which the modern world has made between the claims of liberty and the claims of authority has not involved any restriction of the power or functions of government. On the contrary, the powers which the Governments of modern free States exercise are immeasurably greater, and affect the daily lives of their subjects far more intimately, than the powers of any of the great despots of the past, Darius or Tiberius, Louis XIV or Napoleon. But it *has* implied a profound change of outlook regarding the purposes which Governments exist to serve. Their function on this view is not merely to preserve or extend the power, wealth, or glory of their realms, or to forward the ideas and ambitions cherished by their rulers. Their primary function is conceived to be the securing of peace,

justice, and liberty for *all* their subjects, the provision of safeguards against the abuse of liberty by the strong at the expense of the weak, and the creation of the positive conditions within which freedom can be made more real for all, so that *all* men may be free to make the most and the best of their powers. In other words, authority exists to secure liberty. In the Western communities, as in no earlier societies, the principle has been widely accepted that the State exists for the benefit of all its individual citizens, not the citizens for the sake of the State. And the security for this view is afforded by the way in which the State is organized, ultimate control being placed in the hands not of any individual or of any special interest, but in the hands of the whole body of citizens. This is the ultimate justification of democracy —not that it secures efficiency, but that by putting power into the hands of the whole body of citizens, it secures that the freedom and well-being of *all* shall be kept in mind. Democracy is as yet a very imperfect instrument, as we shall presently have to point out. But it is the necessary machinery of the new adjustment between liberty and authority which distinguishes Western civilization from all others. Liberty depends upon law, and can only exist in any true sense under the protection and regulation of law. But the law that is to make liberty real for all can perhaps best be made with the consent of all; and is likely to be best obeyed when it is so made. This, at all events, is the idea of the right way of adjusting Law and Liberty, Authority and Freedom,

towards which Western civilization has been painfully and half-blindly groping. The idea seemed to have won general acceptance, and to have almost come to realization, when the troubles of our time—the war and the economic crisis—brought about a sudden, unreasoning revulsion, which it is to be my business to analyse.

The reasons why Western civilization has been able to win the domination of the world become apparent when we analyse the different forms of freedom which the peoples of the West have been able to achieve.

The most rudimentary aspect of liberty is freedom of the person. Yet, until yesterday, in all lands and throughout the whole course of human history, slavery, the ownership of one man by another, has been regarded as part of the order of nature. Western civilization has abolished it, not only in its own proper realms, but practically throughout the world. It was only last year that we celebrated the centenary of the emancipation of all the slaves in the British Empire. That was the first result of the first stage in the establishment of democracy. To-day slavery has almost vanished from the face of the earth. The disappearance of this ancient abomination, which is as old as the human race, is surely a real sign of progress. Moreover, throughout the Western world it has been established as one of the essential marks of a civilized society that every man should be secure against any infringement of his life, liberty or property otherwise than by process of law. This guarantee of personal freedom under the protection

of law is the essential foundation of liberty. It had never been made secure in any human society before the modern age in Western civilization.

Not less important than freedom of the person, and even more vital as a source of progress, is freedom of the mind, of thought, belief, speech, publication, and association. Not until men are protected by law in the right to speak freely what they believe to be true can progress be practicable. After long struggles this freedom also had become an essential mark of a civilized State during the last fifty years. We owe to it all the advance of science, which has given to man a growing command over the forces of Nature and the resources of his planet.

The amazing progress of the modern world has been yet more directly due to a third aspect of freedom—freedom of enterprise, freedom for every man to develop his own ideas and to seek out ways of using his powers. This freedom has been made possible by the destruction of caste privileges and restrictive usages, especially during the last century. It has been the chief means by which the resources of the world have been made available, and the discoveries of science have been utilized. But this freedom, like other freedoms, needs to be brought under the protection and regulation of law, without which the strong may abuse their liberty to tyrannize over the weak, and thereby restrict *their* freedom of enterprise. The development of a system of regulation for the prevention of these abuses has not yet been carried far enough, but it represents one of

the most striking ways in which law and authority can be the means not of restricting but of enlarging liberty. Nevertheless, despite its imperfectly corrected defects, free enterprise has been the main motive force of human progress; and this progress has been most rapid in the modern age precisely because enterprise has been most free in the modern age.

Freedom of intercourse between people and people —freedom of movement for ideas, for men, and for goods—is a fourth form of freedom which has advanced greatly in the modern age; so greatly that it has made the intellectual and material wealth of the whole globe the common heritage of all its peoples. This freedom has, indeed, always been jealously regarded, and often narrowly restricted, by Governments anxious to maintain the separate entity of their peoples. Thus China and Japan long strove to keep the rest of the world at arm's length. But jealous Governments have appeared to be fighting a losing battle against the swiftly increasing facilities of communication which freedom of thought and freedom of enterprise have brought into being, thereby knitting together all the peoples of the earth, and creating that political and economic interdependence of the whole human race which is the most impressive phenomenon of this age.

Finally, the system of free government, under which the body of citizens are consulted as to the framing of the laws they have to obey, and the problems of Government are settled not by dictation

but by discussion, not by force but by reason, seemed during the last generation to have become the recognized form of government throughout the realm of Western civilization, and the non-Western peoples were demanding its establishment as one of the essential features of a civilized State. The war seemed at first to have ensured the triumph of this system: it was, we were told, a war to make the world safe for democracy. The war was followed by a great attempt to extend the method of settlement by discussion instead of by force into the international sphere, by the establishment of the League of Nations; and nearly all the nations of the world pledged themselves to use this method. This seemed to be the culmination of that many-sided extension of liberty under the protection of law which has achieved such marvellous things during the modern age. The civilized world as a whole seemed to have resolved that henceforth every developed human society should be organized upon a basis of individual liberty protected and regulated by laws which would be subject to the control of the whole body of citizens, and that all these societies should have security in the enjoyment of their freedom under the protection of laws made and upheld by the whole society of nations.

But this triumph of the principle of liberty had no sooner been won than there was a sudden and violent reaction, which has affected almost every part of the world. The climax of this revulsion has coincided with, and perhaps been caused by, the acute econo-

mic crisis of the last few years. What is more, it seems to be welcomed, or at any rate readily accepted, by great masses of people in many countries: evidently the belief in liberty was not very deeply rooted. Now, quite suddenly, we find ourselves challenged by a tremendous question: Is civilization to continue to pursue the ideal of liberty, which has been the cause of all its greatest achievements? Or is it to abandon this ideal, and to look upon it as a will-o'-the-wisp, which has led us along false tracks into dangerous places?

Most of us realize to-day that liberty is endangered. But to the majority of those who use this phrase, "liberty" seems to mean no more than the democratic system of government, which has not been working too well. They think that the only issue is the question whether dictatorship is to displace parliamentary government. They do not realize that all the aspects of liberty which I have catalogued are equally and simultaneously challenged. Nor do they realize that all these elements of liberty are mutually dependent: they are like the converging stones of an arch, which are locked together by the keystone of free government. The dictators who have overthrown free government have found it necessary, for their own security, to destroy freedom of speech and of the Press, and to enforce their will by arbitrary imprisonment and even death without trial. Again, it is impossible, as we are now seeing, to put a stop to freedom of intercourse without being compelled as a consequence to invade freedom of enterprise. And

if a Government supported by a casual majority created by the swing of the pendulum were to endeavour to carry through the destruction of free enterprise, it would probably find that the process of discussion stimulated by such revolutionary proposals would create such a panic that, if it really meant to carry out its proposals, the Government would have to muzzle Parliament and silence criticism in the Press. All the elements of the system of liberty are in fact mutually dependent. And all alike are now being challenged; not only the keystone, but all the supporting stones of the arch of liberty are being loosened, and the whole social structure which has been built upon this arch may collapse.

In half the countries of Europe freedom of the person and freedom of the mind have been all but destroyed; arbitrary imprisonment, and death without trial, have been reintroduced; freedom of thought, belief, speech, publication, and association has been proscribed. Even in our own country, we have seen the preventive imprisonment of Mr. Tom Mann lest he should say things that would cause trouble. We have departed from the practice of our fathers, who held that the best way to deal with "dangerous" opinions was to let them be freely discussed and refuted, since, if driven underground, they might generate explosive gases. We have seen a British Government reintroducing general warrants, which were abolished as a violation of liberty more than a hundred and sixty years ago, and seeking

powers for the police to search any man's house for literature which, if read by soldiers, might persuade them that it is wrong for them to fight. Most of us possess such literature : I, for example, own several copies of the Sermon on the Mount.

Again, it has almost become the fashion to regard free enterprise as an evil thing, which ought to be not merely regulated but brought to an end. We are told that we must no longer trust to the spontaneous and ebullient energy of individuals for the pioneering work of progress ; but that all must be brought under a " planned economy," in which the part to be played by individuals or by groups will be defined by Government. This process has been carried farthest in Russia : with the result that that country, which used to be one of the granaries of the world, is no longer able to feed its own people. The process has been carried far also in Germany and in Italy. It is actively at work in America ; and even in this country, the advocates of a " planned economy," in which every activity will be controlled by Government, and free enterprise will have to work in shackles, have captured both of the two largest political parties.

Yet again, freedom of intercourse between country and country has almost been destroyed by the combined action of all the Governments in the world. The movement of population by emigration is severely and arbitrarily restricted. Harsh Aliens Acts and stringent passport regulations make travel as difficult as possible ; and some Governments even

define the limited amount of money which their tourists may carry with them. International trade has been so throttled by tariffs, quotas, prohibitions, and exchange restrictions that it has almost been brought to a standstill: with the result that, amid unprecedented plenty, all the peoples of the earth are suffering unprecedented distress. Tens of millions of workers are suffering the miseries of unemployment, and adding to the burdens of their fellows, when they might be producing, for exchange with one another (if such exchange were permitted), the abundance that would banish poverty and drudgery from the face of the earth.

Finally, the world is rapidly abandoning its faith in free government, and the substitution of discussion for force: everywhere there is a growing readiness to resort to the use of force. Down to 1931 the idea that discussion could be used instead of force in the settlement of international differences seemed to be rapidly gaining strength; since that date the world has lost faith in the League of Nations, and is making ready for war. The democratic form of government, which was so eagerly expanded immediately after the war, has now been overthrown in half the countries of Europe. It has been replaced by Party Dictatorship —a new form of despotism, wherein the despot enforces his authority by means of a highly organized and disciplined party, which refuses to allow any opinions but its own to be expressed, and imposes its will upon the docile herd by more ruthless methods than the old despotisms used to employ. Even in

our own country we seem to be content with party dictatorship, qualified only by public criticism, and by periodical oscillations between violently opposed parties, which forbid continuity of policy. For it is apparently accepted as an axiom that a party Government, even if supported (as most Governments are) only by a minority in the country, ought to be in a position to override all criticism and to force through Parliament, by the use of a disciplined majority, whatever measures it desires. Moreover, the majority is generally unreal: a parliamentary majority of 100 can be, and has been, obtained by 38 per cent. of the votes actually cast; and of these 38 per cent. a large proportion have been given not because the voters approve of or understand the proposals of the party to which they are given, but because they dislike or fear another party. Furthermore, under the cloak of this semblance of government by discussion, there has grown up a very powerful and largely uncontrolled bureaucracy, which exercises independently legislative and judicial as well as executive powers without any real supervision. Bureaucracy is indispensable in the government of a modern State; but it needs effective and watchful criticism, which in this country it never receives. Yet those who insist upon maintaining, and refuse to modify, this system of imperfectly controlled bureaucracy and of oscillating party dictatorships wielded by minority Governments, are loud in their protestations of devotion to the cause of liberty and of government by free discussion.

It is evident that the reaction against liberty is widespread and formidable. It is not limited to a few countries; it is visible even in Britain, the protagonist in the movement towards liberty. It is not due to conspiracies hatched by small knots of reactionaries; it has widespread popular support. It is not merely an expression of discontent with the working of democracy and representative government—a discontent for which there is much justification; it is a repudiation of the whole system of liberty that has guided the world's advance during the last four centuries. Its leaders, its Mussolinis and its Hitlers, frankly confess that this is so: they believe that the mass of men do not want freedom, and do not know how to use it. The revolt against freedom of intercourse and trade is almost universal. The revolt against freedom of enterprise has its supporters both in parties of the right and in parties of the left. The repudiation of freedom of the person and freedom of thought and speech is of course most effective in the countries where dictatorships have been established, because the dictators have found it necessary to suppress these liberties in order to make their own power secure. But their subjects have submitted to the loss of these liberties with remarkable docility; and even in the countries, such as Britain, where formal dictatorships have not yet been established, there is a strange apathy about the preservation of liberty which would have puzzled our fathers. The appeal to defend our threatened liberties has in fact become a party cry; and each of

the two main parties in this country can justly point to the danger to liberty which is implicit in the policy of the other.

Faced by this strong and widespread reaction, we are bound to ask ourselves whether we may not have put too high a value upon liberty, and whether the nature of man does not demand masterful leadership and authoritative control. The philosophy of the Liberal movement was developed mainly in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when it was universally assumed that man is governed by reason, and the arguments for liberty all rest upon an appeal to reason. We now know, thanks to the teaching of modern psychology, that men's actions and even their thoughts are governed by instincts and emotions even more than by reason. Our modern dictators, and indeed our modern demagogues, are aware of this, and make use of it. The dictators of to-day have secured their power mainly by an appeal to the emotions of fear and hatred, which are of all the emotions the least easily controlled by reason, the most capable of overpowering and swamping it, and the most easily employed to influence mass-psychology, and to bring into action the instinct of pugnacity, to which all the dictators habitually make appeal. It is well to recognize the potency of these instincts and emotions; but it is not well to be governed by them. They are what we share with the animals of the jungle; it is the capacity to bring them under the control of reason that makes us men, and it is the gradual control of

the instincts and emotions by the reason which has been the essence of human progress. If we are going to throw the reins upon the neck of these animal passions, we shall fall back out of civilization into the jungle. But this is what the dictators are doing, using all the resources of science to create dangerous mass-emotions: witness Hitler, with his persecution of the Jews, and Stalin, with his crusade against the bourgeoisie, and Mussolini, with his demand that all Italians shall be trained for war from the age of seven—which inspired Mr. Lloyd George to make the caustic comment that all Italian schools should have painted on their walls the text, "Little children, kill one another!" Dictators, indeed, must always be tempted to use this kind of appeal for their own purposes; and how easy and how terrible it can be, when all criticism is forcibly silenced, and all the resources of the Press, the radio, and the cinema can be employed to stir up the wild beast that is sleeping in all of us! These methods can, of course, be used also under the democratic system, and they *are* used: in the clamour of a popular election, it is often hard for the still small voice of reason to make itself heard through the thunder and the fire of appeals to fear, hatred, and greed. But at least, in a democratic system, criticism is not silent; the rival appeals often drown one another. And, in a civilized and educated society, the still small voice *is* hearkened to by many: there are always myriads who will recognize sincerity, reason, and knowledge, and support them. Unhappily, under our system

of voting, such groups count for nothing, unless (as seldom happens) they constitute a clear majority at a particular time in a particular place : otherwise their votes have no effect. Still, in a democratic system the danger that reason will be swept aside by passion is not so great as in other systems. If we desire that in our social life reason should be heard as well as mass-emotion, we must put our faith in the democratic system, and strive to improve it.

Most men, according to Aristotle, are φύσει δουλοί, slaves by nature ; and this would seem to be true of those who enrol themselves in the brigades of shirted puppets, vowed to the destruction of liberty. The majority of men shirk the responsibility of making up their own minds ; they prefer to take their opinions ready-made, from a party caucus or a penny paper. They need leadership, and, so long as they are well treated, are likely to be happiest and to be most useful to the world if they act under orders. Undeniably there is a great deal of truth in this. The great majority of men do want to be led, and are capable of a wonderful loyalty to any leader whom they can respect and trust. And they can recognize and respect sincerity, courage, ability, and knowledge. But these are not arguments for dictatorship, whereby a " leader " is imposed by force upon passive subjects. They are arguments for democracy, for leaving men free to choose their own leaders. But they are not arguments for the kind of democratic choice which alone is offered to us to-day, wherein the elector is told that he must choose

between two men, one of whom may be a wealthy nincompoop, and the other a dishonest careerist, and that if he does not choose the winner, his vote will not count. Before a democratic electorate can be trained to choose its leaders intelligently, we must have a system in which there will be in every election a real latitude of choice, in which the mechanical dragooning of party followers will be qualified, and in which the voter will have his responsibility brought home to him by the knowledge that his vote will not be wasted, but will help to place somebody in Parliament. Under such a system the educative influence of democracy would have free play; and the democratic system might be made the means of establishing a real aristocracy, a government by the best men irrespective of birth or wealth or class. As things are, democracy is merely the mechanism through which the system of oscillating party dictatorships is worked; and its tendency is to exclude from any opportunity of public service men who think for themselves and are unwilling to sign on the dotted line for any party. And if it be said that once democracy was made real by such means it would become unworkable; that an assembly of the best men could not govern, the art of government being a mystery known only to those second-best men who are ready to abdicate the duty of thinking for themselves in order to win power; that representative government is only workable so long as it is not truly representative, and parliamentary supremacy only practicable so long as it is reduced to a sham; and

that, in short, party dictatorship is the only efficient form of government—if this is said, as it is commonly said, the answer is, first, that these theories are nonsensical on the face of them, that a genuinely democratic system has been proved in practice to be workable, and that democracy is losing the respect of the world precisely because it has been made unreal by means of oscillating party dictatorships, and will not long survive unless this system disappears and is succeeded by a genuine system of government by discussion.

The conclusion of the whole matter, as I see it, is this. The progressive emancipation of individuality has been the main cause of progress since civilization began; and the amazing triumphs of Western civilization during the last four centuries, which have culminated in the conquest of the whole world by its ideas and methods, have been due to the unprecedented expansion of liberty which that period saw, and to the fact that, in representative government, Western civilization found a means of adjusting the claims of liberty and authority, which no earlier civilization had ever reached. To reverse this liberating movement would be to sentence civilization either to stagnation or to ruinous collapse. The world is at this moment striving to reverse it, and the result is that the world is overwhelmed by distress and fear at a time when it might be enjoying secure peace and diffused prosperity. If civilization is to be saved from wreck, we must return to the paths of freedom which we have for the time deserted.

And we must realize that freedom means much more than the mere maintenance of a not very efficient parliamentary regime, distorted into a system of alternating party dictatorships. We must defend freedom of the person and freedom of the mind against every attack, however plausible. We must maintain freedom of enterprise, while getting rid of the defects by which it is attended. We must restore and extend freedom of intercourse. We must make freedom of government, both in the national and in the international spheres, effective and genuine. If we can do these things, the forward march of humanity will be yet more wonderful than its past advance. If we cannot, our civilization will decay as others have done before it.

EDUCATIONAL IDEALS AND THE DESTINIES OF PEOPLES

H. CRICHTON-MILLER

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By H. CRICHTON-MILLER

IT must be obvious to us all that the destiny of the individual is to a certain extent wrapped up in the destiny of the people to which he belongs. The destiny of the people has to be considered, partly from the point of view of Nature and circumstances, and partly from the point of view of its own choice. Certain results follow from that. You need not teach children certain things for a future in one environment and you need not teach them other things for a different future in another environment. If you know a boy in an English school who is certain to lead the rest of his life in Spain, it is not necessary that you should trouble him with Imperial weights and measures. If a youth is being brought up to live in a country where child marriage exists or, shall we say, if he is already married and at an English Public School, some of the elaborate courses upon sex and biology which are provided for our own children would be uncalled for. And similarly, it is obvious that in some countries technical education will take a different form from that in other countries. Swiss universities provide excellent courses upon hydro-electrics but not upon coal-mining. Another less obvious aspect is the cultural level of the people among whom the individual is to lead his life. In

this connection I would ask you to consider that very admirable experiment of our Colonial Office at Achimota, in Nigeria. There they have done what I think has never been done by any country in any place before—they have tried to reconstruct an education based upon Western ideals with a minimum of Western tradition. They are bringing up young people of school and university age and of both sexes. These young people come from villages of a very primitive character in the interior of the country. They are intended to go back and live the rest of their lives in these villages as school-teachers. They undergo a curriculum which has absorbed as far as possible the primitive culture of the actual villages from which they come. And thus their music and dancing are not the music and dancing our children are taught in this country, but are derived from their own environment.

Again, the cultural status of any people must influence the nature of education in that country. Quite recently I saw an interesting article about the condition of education in Egypt. The system of State education as at present developed has been compared with an inverted pyramid, since the provision for higher instruction is on a scale as elaborate as that for elementary instruction is slender. The result of this is that at present there is a large number of undergraduates and qualified teachers who can find no employment. The problem of what to do with its rapidly increasing numbers of " educated unemployables " is one of the most difficult with

which the Egyptian Government is faced. I commend that situation to your serious consideration. Here is a country which has misconceived the cultural ideal in such a way as to develop higher education out of all proportion to elementary education.

Another aspect of the problem demands consideration. If an individual is bound to drag out his existence in a despotic State where his freedom of thought and word will be restricted, it is unnecessary and perhaps even unkind to allow him to develop interests that he will not be permitted to pursue. If you know that a person is going to live all his life in Germany, it is not kind to encourage him to develop a keen interest in the music of Strauss or the philosophy of Bergson, because he will be discouraged from pursuing either of these interests if Germany continues to be as it is to-day.

Then there is a personal aspect, namely, whether an individual's destiny is to be industrial or agrarian. Here there is, I am convinced, a call for profound changes in educational technique. I am not enough of an educationist to formulate it, but I know that there should be a wide difference in the education offered to a person who is going to be a shepherd and that offered to one who is going to be a mechanic, to one who is going to be a tiller of the soil and to one who is going to be a robot in an industrial community. Part of that difference depends upon the fact that the industrial worker is destined to have leisure, and to have it increasingly (quite apart from the fact that at the present moment it is very ill distributed). But

that leisure has to come in the wake of mechanization, and the tragedy of our great urban populations to-day is largely this—that we have hordes of people who have a great deal of leisure on their hands, and are completely incapable of making any profitable use of it. That seems to me a particular problem for popular education.

On the other hand, with an agrarian destiny there never will be, as far as one can see, the same problem of leisure. Agrarian needs are different. The individual who is to live with Nature ought to be given a different equipment from that which is needed for the industrial life.

So much, then, for the general principles of the way in which the destiny, and therefore the education, of the individual is bound up with the destiny of his people.

Now let us turn for a moment to the important question of the duties of Governments, discussed by Professor Ramsay Muir. Governments have to provide for internal security or order in the first place and external relations, military and economic, in the second place. They are expected to safeguard life, property, and marriage, and in so doing they are expected by the optimists to allow freedom of the person, freedom of speech, and freedom of enterprise. These are three points that Professor Muir made, and we know how unsuccessful are some Governments of to-day in providing these three forms of freedom—of person, speech, and enterprise.

If a Government is forced to make a compromise

between the necessary safeguards of internal and external relations on the one hand, and on the other, limitation of the freedom of its subjects, it is obvious that it must offer, as all Governments in point of fact do offer, certain benefits in exchange for the renunciation of freedom. This renunciation of freedom is both negative and positive; negative in the sense that the citizen is not allowed to do all that he would like to do, and positive in the sense that he has to make contributions, either in wealth or in service, be it military or otherwise.

The benefits that a Government offers in exchange for renunciation are varied. It is, of course, arguable, as Professor Ramsay Muir reminds us, that most men are happiest when they are not asked to think or participate in their government in any way, because, as Aristotle said, they are "slaves by nature." That brings us to the first question, namely, How far the temperament of a people leads that people to be either slaves or the reverse? It is interesting to study the temperamental aptitudes shown by different peoples for self-government or authoritarian government, for democracy or autocracy, for active or passive citizenship.

I think if one looks round, certainly in Western civilization, one comes to the conclusion that the Nordic people are those who are most docile from the temperamental point of view. Indeed, the truly Teutonic herd only asks to hear a stentorian voice telling it what to do and it is happy. At the other end of the scale you have the Celt. The Celt is

rarely happy unless he is, in some way or other, " agin' the Government." These things are deeper than education. These things are temperamental, and the intuitive genius of the Celt shows itself in its restlessness under any yoke, real or imaginary. The more slow-minded, rational, and introverted nature of the Teuton shows itself in this readiness to accept regimentation in any shape or form.

But I would not have you to imagine that temperament is the only factor in this important problem, because, obviously, education enters to a great extent. You can educate a people to be docile and you can educate them to participate in their government. As an example of how far that can be done, I would suggest that the influence of the Church of Rome in Southern Ireland up to 1926 is worth considering. Here there seemed little promise of social solidarity; the centripetal elements seemed few; the Church of Rome was the single integrating force to which alone Southern Ireland owed its unity. It is true that Great Britain unconsciously but determinedly presented a grievance all the time, and that without that grievance the Church of Rome would not have been able to co-ordinate so unruly a group as the true Irish constitute. Nevertheless, this was successfully accomplished, and largely through the channels of religion and education. We shall see in a moment how the problem of religious education has worked positively or negatively in other environments.

When a Government approaches its subjects with

this necessity of offering benefits as an inducement to renounce freedom or to contribute, it has two possible lines of approach. One is rational and the other is affective. Each of these can be more successfully, more permanently, and, shall we say, more unscrupulously applied to the young (that is, in education) than to the adult (that is, on the political platform or in the newspaper). The first is rational —that is, the appeal to self-interest; and the second is the herd ideal—that is, affective. The herd ideal is the mobilization of emotions round some form of patriotism, round some ideal or idea for which the country stands. These methods, both rational and affective, can be either positive or negative and—mark this, which is still more important—they can be both temporal and eternal. For instance, if it is desired to induce individuals to pay sixpence more upon the income-tax, it is generally necessary to base this upon an appeal which is at any rate rational in form. It is necessary to represent as a logical proposition that the extra sixpence is going to make more warships in order to keep us safe and to protect us from invasion. With that method, the ostensibly rational appeal, education is not directly concerned; yet I shall hope to show that it is not without its indirect and ultimate effect upon education.

On the affective side we deal with all sorts of symbols, whether it be royal privilege or German Kultur, or "Italianità" or "The Proletariat." These symbols or abstractions are offered to the

young, who know very little about them, and they are surrounded by dogmatic teaching, and the young accept them as part of the traditional background of their homes, of their schools, of their youth. Thus, an individual reaches adult years with a strong affective bias which will make clear and objective thinking well-nigh impossible in after-life.

When the Government attempts to make a rational approach to the child in education, it is done for the most part by one method, which is the distortion of history, the *ex parte* presentation of history. It is usual to disclaim such methods, but there is one exception which I shall presently point out. I suppose I am myself biased in thinking that in this country we present history to children with greater objectivity than in any other country. Perhaps some of us differ, perhaps we are all biased; I don't know. At any rate, it is just as well to remember that the children of Great Britain hear much less about Bunker Hill than do American schoolchildren. English travellers in America are surprised to find how important an incident that was. That shows that, with the best will in the world, teachers are apt, possibly with a certain amount of governmental pressure behind them, to regard the past of their own country in a more favourable light than do outsiders.

I said there was an exception: here it is. Not very long ago there was a large Congress in Germany of the National Socialist Teachers' League. Three thousand teachers, it is said, were present. One

brave member read a paper on the conquest of Saxony by Charlemagne. This was not well received. It was pointed out to him that the Saxon chief, Widekund, was "racially more valuable." There was an acrimonious discussion, and the reader of the paper was accused of "lack of subjective decision." Now this, I would impress upon you, is very important. When one teacher can say that another has a "lack of subjective decision" things have gone a very long way. I cannot see it happening in Great Britain. They went on to say after that —and this is important: "National socialism is strictly opposed to pure objectivity."

Theoretically, then, no country is purely objective in the teaching of history, but on the other hand, I think no country has yet repudiated the intention of being purely objective and claimed that "subjective decision" was requisite.

Another incident reported concerns Germany. In a letter to *The Times* it was said that a Professor of Ethnology in a German university received a hint that he was to teach in future that the Japanese were an Aryan race, and he smiled and did nothing about it. Then he received a second and finally a third warning, and having ignored three warnings, he was dismissed, and is now in England. That may not be correct, but the statement appeared in *The Times*. Whatever we may think of the Japanese, I am sure they themselves are too objective to want to claim Aryan descent. I think they would be perfectly pleased to accept their own ethnology.

Yet, for purposes of political propaganda, German professors have to proclaim this astounding nonsense.

I would therefore suggest that it is easier to train children to be members of a nation that is led, that is dictated to, that is oppressed, than it is to train young people to be citizens, in any broad and true sense of the word, and to partake in any way in the government of their country. Some Governments refuse to their subjects a share in the government, but exact from them a positive contribution, perhaps in service. The citizens will make their contribution willingly if, and only if, they can understand and appreciate the benefits which they derive from the Government.

Now, none of us know very much about the Russian timber camps. We have all, no doubt, read a great deal about them. It is possible that the labour in Russian timber camps is voluntary; it is also possible that it resembles the labour we read about in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. The question is, How far the individual has ever learned or how far anybody has taught him why he is called upon to make a contribution as great as these people whom few of us are inclined to envy, who seem to spend many years of their lives in timber camps? I take it that it is very difficult to make the Kaffir understand why he has to pay a hut tax. On the other hand, I think the fellah in Egypt understands why he has to give so many days of labour or corvée. He has always, from his childhood, realized that his whole subsistence depends

upon the Nile, and that if the Nile at flood time breaks its banks and irrigation fails, there will be destruction and ultimate famine. He can understand why he has to come out for so many days every year, until he is of a certain age, and stand by, prepared to cope with flood conditions. The problem is one that comes home to him. He can realize how his subsistence, his future, his own safety, depend upon the work that he and the other men are doing, and are prepared to do, in the irrigation works on the Nile.

Now, the Kaffir with his hut tax has greater difficulty in understanding why he has to pay, because he does not use the roads, he has no public lighting, he does not want the police, and it is all a little mysterious to him. The task of the Government is to make him understand that the contribution is reasonable.

When it comes to the Russian in a concentration timber camp, I imagine it must be very difficult for anybody to make him understand why he has to live a life of apparent hardship, felling trees which are going to be exported to England; why he has to help his country to sell timber to England when he is not going to enjoy, as far as he is aware, any benefits of the contract.

Therefore, the ability of a country to make clear the grounds upon which it demands contribution from its subjects must count for a great deal. It follows that the more immoderate the demands made, the less can be done upon a rational basis, and the

more, therefore, must be done upon an affective basis.

If we turn from the examples we have taken to the Fascist example which is at present before us, we see some interesting manifestations. Just two or three months ago the Duce proclaimed a new scheme of military legislation. And this scheme, which is described in an excellent article in the *School Guardian*, describes how the teaching of military culture is to be obligatory. In the Fascist State the functions of a citizen and a soldier are inseparable. The young from the age of eight until they are called to arms at the age of twenty-one are prepared " spiritually, physically, and militarily " in their several organizations, Balilla, Avanguardie, and Dopolavoristi, corresponding roughly to our Cubs, Scouts, and Rovers. Balilla, you will remember, was the name of a small boy who in Genoa threw a stone at the Austrian General when the invading armies of Austria marched into the town.

I suppose that every country has these Balilla heroes, these Davids that are passed down to history. I suppose they deserve to be made into heroes, but one wonders whether it is altogether a wholesome element in education. At any rate, the Duce has no doubt about it whatever. " From eight years of age preparation will be of specially martial character, developing the military spirit of the nation. The aim is to impassion children with military life by frequent contact with the armed forces, reviving their glories and their war-like traditions."

I referred to the affective approach to the young in education. There you have it, and you may see at the same time that the rational approach to the adult on a political basis is inadequate. It has to be supplemented by catching the young early, and creating an affective bias in them. It is appropriate to compare this with religion. The more dogmatic is any system of religion, the greater the need to catch the young early ; the more philosophic the system, the less is this need. The less rational the requirements of a Government are, the greater is the necessity to catch the children early with political and dogmatic teaching. They have to be " appassionati." They have to be impassioned from the age of eight. Why? Simply because if they were left to grow up to think clearly for themselves, they would probably not see things just in the way in which it is hoped that they will see them. Therefore, we come to the point at which we see that Governments are exploiting the suggestibility of the young as well as exploiting the suggestibility of the adult.

I say that it is much easier to train people to be members of, say, a Communist or Fascist State, where everyone is disciplined and everyone has to do exactly what he is told, than to train them to belong to that Party which, I daresay, most of us would support in theory if not in practice. The liberal tradition and conception are lofty and excellent. It is the failure of the liberal idea in practice that leaves room for all the dragooning and for all the regimentation of political life which Professor Muir deplores.

When a State undertakes to train young people to participate in the life of the State, the problem of suggestibility at once arises. It is obvious that if it is desired that they should respond in a given way, they should be so educated as to reach the voting age with the maximum of suggestibility. If, on the other hand, it is desired that they should reach the voting age with the minimum of suggestibility and the maximum capacity of rational discrimination, then they must be educated in quite a different way. If they are educated so that they shall think for themselves, there is always the risk of their developing views opposed to the established order.

You will observe that the German teachers, three thousand of them, are very sure that they are not going to allow that to happen. You will also observe that, as far as military life goes, the Duce is very certain that he is not going to let it happen. They are all seeing what they can do by catching the young to make sure that they will reach adult years with certain well-developed preconceptions, not with a capacity of rational and individual judgment to formulate views of their own.

And this brings us to the really weak spot in democracy. In all democracy, as Athens found out to her cost, the demagogue is parasitic. A demagogue need not necessarily be a person, he may be a press—we have our own megaphone press, the truest form of demagogue that you could want. It is not only from a platform but from an editor's desk that the methods of the demagogue can be pursued. Let

us hope that the ether will not become a medium for the methods of the demagogue, and let us realize how much it means to us that the B.B.C. still maintains a certain restriction upon propaganda activities.

Now, what is a demagogue? A person who works on the two principles of suppression of the truth and suggestion of the false, and depends on an *ex parte* presentation of fact and upon a feigned sincerity. That is to say, he attempts to persuade people that it is their interest or the interest of the State that he has at heart, when in point of fact it is either his own aggrandisement or his own cupidity that is his central motive.

The demagogue does not work solely upon ignorant people, as is often supposed, nor does he work only upon unintelligent people as is sometimes thought, but for the most part upon people who may be well informed, who need not be unintelligent, but who are suggestible—people who have no capacity of forming their own individual judgment. The suggestibles of life—these are the people whom the demagogue uses in every democracy, and through them, skilfully exploited, the demagogue rules.

If it is desired to rule a country in a certain way, the most important consideration is to maintain the suggestibility of children. Only thus can there be any assurance of a given political programme being accepted with acquiescence. The best way to maintain this suggestibility is to begin by imposing on children a favourable historical presentation of their own country. In this way, individual discrimination

and criticism are kept in abeyance. I submit that it is this suggestibility which is the real enemy of democracy. In a country where it has been fostered, perhaps in the interests of a Dictator, the demagogue finds that exact mentality among the voters that he desires to exploit, and it is his exploitation of the suggestible mass of voters which renders democracy feeble and fruitless. If we take two modern critics of democracy, writing from totally different standpoints, Dr. Inge and Signor Mussolini, we can trace in their allegations, not the necessary results of democracy, but the consequences of democratic rule in a people too suggestible to resist the leadership of the demagogue.

When Professor Muir speaks in his earnest and incontrovertible way about democracy and deplores its decadence as he does, one feels that it is not practical to deplore democracy until we are prepared to address ourselves to the problem of a universal education of character. It is only when we think of universal education as something that gives to individuals character and discrimination that the people will be ripe to participate in government. It is clear that the ability to read may or may not contribute to character growth. There are many whose judgment in adult life and whose wisdom in middle age would have been greater had they not been able to read the unwholesome literature that was available or preferred. It may be argued that elementary education, like higher education, constitutes an enrichment of life. Perhaps it would be more correct to regard

it as an extension of possibilities or an emancipation. In this sense it can, like any other aspect of freedom, be used or abused ; it may lead to self-realization or self-destruction ; it may make for growth of character or atrophy. It has been said that the popular press is an antidote to true education. Yet it is obvious that a considerable section of the community makes no use of the elementary education it has received, other than to read the popular press. It is time that education authorities set for themselves a higher aim. That aim should be training for citizenship in a democratic community. Such an aim would centre round the capacity for independent thought. And in so far as the aim was attained there would arise a generation capable of voting with discrimination, a generation that no Dictator could browbeat, a generation immune to the influence of the demagogue. As long as you have a completely illiterate electorate it may be admitted that the people is not yet ripe for democracy. But the question is, how far is any Government prepared to educate a generation that will be psychologically fit to govern itself? Most Governments do not want that. Most Governments, whether right or left, want to make sure that they will have people who reach voting age with their views made. Therefore, it is not only the Communists who have propagandist schools, the Tories who catch the young early, it is also the League of Nations Union that works to get the young early.

If democracy is to live or to revive at all, it has to

be upon a basis of recognizing that education for character is imperative, and not education for a particular political programme or particular national destiny.

If you think of that formula you will realize how far it is from the practice of modern States, both right and left. Let me put to you this problem. In this country funds are apportioned on no inconsiderable scale to provide not only secondary, but also university education for those who are clever enough to win grants, scholarships, and exhibitions. Let us suppose that there are two sons in an artisan family. The one becomes an artisan like his father, the other obtains a university education. At the end of it he is qualified to be a teacher or to enter some other profession. I ask, has he been qualified also to be a better voter ? I do not propose to offer any answer, but I suggest that if public money is expended on higher education, the public should be satisfied that that education is providing better voters. And if it is doing so, surely these " better voters " are entitled to a much larger responsibility in a democratic system. At present it takes only two ex-convicts to neutralize Professor Muir's vote. To me it seems a pity. It appears to be very much in favour of the demagogue, for it is clear that an unscrupulous demagogue would always find it a simple matter to catch the votes of two or three worthless citizens and so sterilize the civic worth of Professor Ramsay Muir. Democracy has always shown itself vulnerable to the parasitic growth that we call the dema-

gogue. To raise the general resistance of the community there must be a universal education which makes for character and eliminates as much as it can of suggestibility. But further, democracy, if it is to survive, must give greater opportunity to the more competent voters, and less opportunity to the less competent voters. Because it will always be difficult to discriminate between voters in this sense, this does not mean that it is entirely impossible. Modern psychology has addressed itself to more difficult problems already. Certainly we may agree that unless a community is educated for self-government, it is much more likely to profit from a dictatorship than from the semblance of democracy which permits the demagogue to achieve autocracy. And this is the democracy which is based on the outworn shibboleth of " one man, one vote."

If we turn from education in the narrower sense of schooling to the broader conception of social influence affecting the young, we encounter the basic problem of the home. It is not unreasonable to assert that the destiny of a people is greatly influenced by the home background of young children, quite apart from such teaching as they may or may not get in their schools. The home is, of course, a product of monogamy, and monogamy in this aspect becomes one of the determining factors in civilization. It may sound old-fashioned to say that monogamy is one of the bulwarks of civilization; but we may at any rate admit that recent experiments in Government have all found it necessary to deal

with the problem as one that is closely bound up with the future of a people. Let us glance for a moment at four different countries.

In Germany the woman is discouraged in every way from activities that would distract her from maternal and domestic functions. The reinforcement of home influences is promoted in all ways. In Russia the Soviet rule condemned the home, not by implication, but categorically. As far as possible the child was to be removed from its mother and committed to State care from the time it was weaned. Along with this limitation of parental upbringing, everything that could be done was done to break down monogamy—except the actual institution of polygamy. The home was rendered unstable to promote the institutional upbringing of infants. I understand that this policy has broken down to a considerable extent, partly for lack of adequate funds, and partly because of the persistence of fundamental human emotions. Note, however, that in Russia the destruction of the home was pursued as an integral part of the revolutionary programme.

In Italy a totally different phenomenon is to be observed. There two factors had to be dealt with. The first was the Duce's determination to repopulate the country. The falling birth-rate had to be corrected. Prizes and special privileges were accorded to parents of large families. The other factor was that divorce is probably more difficult to obtain in Italy than in any other country. Hence,

the stable home is promoted in Italy as a progressive item in a policy of national reconstruction.

In England we do things differently. Whereas half a century ago the stable home was recognized as the unit of national life, to-day we are drifting a long way from that attitude. Monogamy is depreciated on all hands; the theatres, the cinemas, and the press incessantly hold it up to ridicule. Our children learn from the very hoardings on the street that marital infidelity is the best of all possible jokes, and our divorce courts are working at a pressure never known before. That this change is partly the outcome of economic conditions cannot be doubted, but what is certain is that it cannot be regarded except as a powerful factor in relation to the country's future.

I submit, therefore, that not only scholastic education, but also the home background have a direct bearing on the destiny of a people. That home background may be subjected to political and legislative pressure, or it may be left to the casual forces of social change, but it will always exercise a subtle and powerful influence on the destiny of the people.

The question of the home background is inextricably associated with that of religion. In Russia the primary necessity for breaking up the home was admittedly the need for bringing to an end the power of the Orthodox Church. In Italy, Fascismo began by being strictly secular. After some years the Duce saw that complete national unity could not be achieved except by an alliance

with the Roman Church. So far, it would seem that the alliance is achieving the desired end. From the standpoint of theoretical psychology all dogmatic presentation of religion must be subversive of effective democracy. To put the same truth in other words ; if the suggestibility of children has been exploited in the interests of dogmatic religion, there is liable to remain a residual suggestibility which the demagogue may subsequently exploit in political life. It would appear that this principle has been valid in Italy, but not in Russia.

Religion and home training are frequently bound up in a very intimate way with the problem of language. All these three factors owe their importance to the plasticity of the child's mind in the first five years. The security and love that a child has experienced in its home ; the religious dogmas that have been presented to it ; the first language in which it has learned to express itself—all these are decisive factors in the making of the citizen. If these factors have given the child a bias towards individual discrimination and personal choice, they have been favourable to a valid democratic citizenship. If they have prejudiced him for or against an established rule, they have made him a good or a bad subject, but an indifferent democrat. Language is immensely interesting in the way in which it contributes to the solidarity of a country. Think what language means in terms of Southern Ireland, where they have been trying for some years to learn a new language called Erse. The object of developing Erse is separatism. In India

three or four million peoples are slowly learning a language called English, and the use they are making of that language is to make it the *Lingua franca* of their large Congress to enable Moslems and Hindus to join together in one solid group, incidentally against the Government. You see, therefore, that language can be used either for separatism or for solidarity.

Another interesting question is the use of language solely for a religious purpose. Take the Jews. Their religion is bound up with the Hebrew language, which they are taught as part of their religion, and which is not used practically for any other purpose. Therefore the teaching of a religion in a special language may have an important traditional influence. On the other hand, in Malta you have a fanatically religious people who are under the Church of Rome : they have their own Maltese language, but the language of the Church is Italian. Therefore, their religion is promoting a language which is not native nor yet the language of their governors, the English. It is the language of their neighbours who appear to have a very jealous eye on Malta.

In conclusion, I would mention two minor points which, if they are not exactly educational, have much to do with the destinies of peoples. The one is dress and the other is music. Of dress we can say that there is no surer index of national and provincial spirit. If Gandhi went about in a frock-coat and top hat, Swaraj would be dead. Where the tarboosh gives way to the bowler, Islam is losing ground.

Children that have been brought up to respect and love their national or local costume are likely to make loyal traditionalists. And so it is with music. Hindu and Mohammedan animosities are rarely set aflame except to the sound of their appropriate music (if we may use the term with generous breadth). And on St. Andrew's Day there is celebrated the festival of a national saint—the only one of the twelve Apostles who knew where the loaves and the fishes were. From Perth to Penang, from Sydney to Skye there is music, which may lack æsthetic and educational value, but who would deny that it has been " racially valuable " to a people whose chief destiny has always been the export of " educated unemployables " ?

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY

J. C. FLÜGEL

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By J. C. FLÜGEL

IT would be hardly fair either to the reader or myself if I did not state frankly at the beginning that I am somewhat appalled at the scope of the theme that has been allotted me in this series. Both marriage and the family are subjects on which one could write volumes and on which volumes have been written. Some limitation is clearly necessary. It is true that I am to confine myself to the "*Psychological* Aspects of Marriage and the Family." But the field, even as thus restricted, is a little awe-inspiring. I myself once wrote a whole book dealing with the family from the point of view of one single school of psychology alone—and we all know how embarrassingly rich in schools psychology is at the present moment. In that book, too, I said extremely little about marriage. So I fear the task of dealing adequately with all the psychological aspects of my subject in the course of a single chapter is quite beyond me. I shall therefore make no attempt to cover the whole field, but shall limit myself in two ways—first, by confining myself rather rigorously to the "here" and "now" (i.e. marriage and the family as we know them in this country at the present time), thus restraining any tendency to wander into the attractive fields of

history, comparative sociology, or anthropology; and secondly, by being frankly eclectic.

We may perhaps appropriately begin with the rather unusual question—Why do people marry? Marriage is an institution which we take quite amazingly for granted; but if we are to try to understand the deeper motives for human conduct, it is often well to get behind well-recognized institutions such as marriage and ask why men and women conform to them. The marriage ceremony of the English Church tells us that marriage has three aims in view—the procreation of children, the satisfaction of sexual desire, and mutual society, help, and comfort. But none of these aims necessarily and biologically require that people should enter into a binding contract implying lifelong cohabitation and fidelity—a contract which differs from almost all other contracts, in that it can be terminated, according to English law, only by a long, cumbersome, degrading, expensive, and frankly cruel legal process, a process which is very liable to fail if one or other of its complicated but often quite ridiculous technicalities is not adroitly handled. I submit to you, by way of emphasizing the problem, that if we were truly reasonable beings, we should not marry—at any rate according to the present law.

Confronted with such a problem, we should, most of us, feel inclined to fall back on biology and sociology, and say that marriage is ultimately an institution which has been found useful to protect the economic rights of children and to provide for

their protection and sustenance during the long period of helplessness incidental to the very slow growth to maturity that is characteristic of the human race. Such an institution having been established, individuals conform to it because it seems the right and obvious thing to do, because social upbringing and social tradition have led them to expect marriage, and because failure to conform appears in consequence both wicked and absurd.

Such an answer in terms of biology and social psychology may be perfectly correct so far as it goes, but I think you will agree that it is scarcely complete so far as the psychology of the individual is concerned. A hint as to certain additional factors is afforded by the fact that, though officially we may shower congratulations and blessings alike on bride and bridegroom, unofficially and confidentially we often show that in our opinion the bridegroom is more in need of our good wishes than the bride. We tend to believe, in fact, that marriage is a greater benefit to the woman than the man. If we are frank, we may go on to admit that this is partly because we think that it is easier for the man to gratify his sexual needs outside marriage and without assuming responsibilities than it is for the woman; and partly because marriage is itself a career or profession for the woman, inasmuch as in return for her services it is the duty of the husband to provide for the economic needs of the wife—a career, too, which is regarded as an honourable one, and the adoption of which we look upon as so significant as actually to require a change

in title from " Miss " to " Mrs." Now, in so far as this admission is correct, we have to add another motive for marriage, one that is peculiar in the female sex, and in virtue of which women have exploited the sociological institution of marriage in order to bargain their sexual attractiveness against economic provision and security. Few, I think, will deny that this factor is a *vera causa.* We may note, however, that it is declining in importance. In so far as women in the modern world have succeeded in acquiring sexual, legal, and economic independence, the attractions of marriage from this standpoint are declining. Women are in fact realizing more and more that the advantages of marriage are very far from being all upon their side. Apart from the drudgery of domestic work, which in some cases is very severe and to certain temperaments is far from being a labour of love, it is clear that marriage may entail great sacrifices to women who are already launched on a professional career of their own. It is a realization of this fact, together with an increased sense of the worth and value of their own personalities as individuals, that is leading many women of the more intellectual classes to keep their own names after marriage, or to add them to those of their husbands, to resent rather than rejoice in the title of " Mrs." and even in some cases to refuse marriage altogether, especially when they find means of enjoying a satisfactory sexual life without it.

But even if we discount this important modern tendency and make the fullest possible allowance for

the factors we have mentioned—for the sexual desires and gullibility of men, the machinations of women, the force of social tradition and the docility of individuals in the face of it—even if we add thereto the desire for children and the comforts of domesticity, this surely leaves much of the positive attraction of marriage still unaccounted for. If these were the only incentives to marriage, even the most sentimental or the least intelligent of us would hardly idealize it in the way we do. For there is no denying that we are most of us inclined to be sentimental about marriage. The fact that so many of us flock to see a wedding and—as recently happened—will even pay high prices for the privilege of watching a wedding cortège from the windows of a busy London hospital, the fact that even in our present somewhat disillusioned age thousands of stories are written annually all ending with the marriage of the chief characters and the presumption of their "living happily ever afterwards"—these and many other circumstances testify to the romance with which marriage still appears invested. The bliss that, at the bottom of our hearts, we expect to enjoy in the married state points, I believe, to the existence of some fundamental desire in all of us that we hope, however unreasonably, to gratify in marriage.

I am inclined to think that the secret of this attraction of marriage is at bottom a very simple one, though it was not till a few years ago that it was clearly pointed out—by a woman psychologist—

Karen Horney.[1] In marriage we identify ourselves with our parents, and hope to enjoy all the privileges which in our childhood days we believed them to possess. When we were little children our parents seemed to be in the intensely enviable position of enjoying the right to those ultimate joys and expressions of affection which were forbidden to us and which, though but vaguely conceived (for our theories of sex were incomplete and usually erroneous), were greatly coveted. Father and Mother can really do the things which we were not allowed to do as children. To them the stern taboo on sex in all its manifestations does not apply, for are they not themselves the source of our commandments, the origin of conscience, the imposers of taboo? That of which we may have endeavoured to obtain some faint reflection, when in our early youth we played the fascinating game of "mothers and fathers," is in marriage, we believe, at length to be vouchsafed us in its full reality.

This, I think, to a considerable extent, explains two of the most important things about marriage. In the first place, the peculiar contentedness and happiness that it may actually bring in favourable cases, together with the still greater joy that in our sentimental moments we expect from it (for we most of us at bottom long to believe in the myth of "living happily ever afterwards"). In the second place, the fact that a social and moral régime that demands—

[1] "The Problem of the Monogamous Ideal," *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, 1928, vol. ix, p. 318.

in theory if not always in practice—the sternest suppression of our sexual desires, is nevertheless willing to make a single great and striking exception in the case of duly authorized and consecrated marriage, which lifts the taboo that extends to every other sphere. In some respects the marriage ceremony performs a similar function to the equally universal and widespread ceremonies of initiation. In initiation rituals, as represented, for instance, by the Christian sacrament of Confirmation and in innumerable other ceremonies, some serious, others playful, which give admission to other smaller and more specialized bodies, the younger members of society are accorded the general rights and privileges of adults ; while in the marriage ceremony they are accorded the privileges of the parents in particular—they themselves receive, as it were, a licence to become parents in their turn.

Society, by its whole attitude to marriage, tends to preserve and reinforce the child's notion that his parents enjoy some wondrous rights and experiences from which he is debarred. Society bids us restrain our sexual desires utterly, save in the one sphere of marriage, which it idealizes by all the means in its power, and in which it promises us ample recompense and almost complete freedom. Indeed, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that society has officially adopted and institutionalized the necessarily exaggerated and distorted conception of the child with regard to the blessings of marriage and of parenthood, and has used this conception as a bait

to gain acceptance of the restrictions which it has imposed in every other quarter.

Now, while on the one hand this unique process of lifting an otherwise universally prevalent taboo is calculated to go to our heads and make us a little dizzy at the prospect of the long-awaited bliss, on the other hand it often happens that—in spite of the magic inherent in a ceremony—the taboo is not lifted with entire success, and we are still, as it were, left wondering whether we are really entitled to behave as would our parents. From both these directions the success of marriage is endangered. Here, as in other matters, exaggerated expectations are apt to make us disappointed with what reality has to offer; so that, even if there are no other difficulties, the everyday life together, made up as it necessarily is to some extent of a succession of relatively trivial experiences, soon brings disillusion. But only too often there *are* other difficulties. I am here speaking not merely of economic worries or of the complications so often introduced by well-meaning but intrusive relatives, who will not leave the young couple alone. I have in mind also, and indeed chiefly, the internal difficulties due to incomplete removal of the taboo. Sociologically this taboo may have been removed; but psychologically it may in part persist. To impose a stern taboo for the first third or quarter of a lifetime and then to demand its sudden and complete disappearance on the strength of a magic formula, is asking much of the adaptability of any individual, even although—as is true of every case—

the taboo has never been obeyed completely. In very many instances the magic fails to some extent, and one or other member of the wedded pair finds it impossible to make full use of the freedom that has at length been granted; with the result that even the reality of marriage is far from being what it might be. And, paradoxical as it may seem at first, the fact (if it is one) that the marriage is a love match, often increases rather than diminishes the difficulties from this source. In marriage, as I have said, we identify ourselves with our parents; and in a love match in particular, our partner in marriage tends often to have some unconscious link with a beloved parent. Whether this be so or not, we have in any case in a love match to unite the feelings of tenderness and sexual joy. Now, these are just the elements of affection which we have learned to keep apart in our attitude towards our parents—in our relations with whom we are allowed and enjoined to express tenderness, but not sensuality. In a successful love marriage we have to fuse together these two elements that have been sundered, and herein lies perhaps the major difficulty of the task.

In so far as we can fully identify ourselves with the parent of our own sex, this may be possible, even when our partner is unconsciously identified with the other parent; for to the parents this fusion is—*ex hypothesi*, so to speak—allowed, and is therefore permitted to us also when we take the parent's place. But this identification of ourselves with a parent, important as it is, and much as I have stressed

it, seldom accounts for the whole attitude towards a partner in marriage, least of all perhaps in a love match. In the attitude of husbands and wives to each other, especially if there is genuine love between them, there is always something of the attitude of a child towards its parent. The husband expects care and solicitude from his wife; it is she who brings his slippers, cooks his favourite dishes, nurses him in illness, and generally sees to it that his intimate needs and little whims are satisfied, playing thus the role of mother. She on her part expects protection and provision from her husband, who thus stands to her in the place of father, and sometimes, we must add, in that of mother also. In so far as there exists this relic of the child-parent relationship in marriage, it becomes additionally hard to fuse the sensual and the tender elements in love, the tender part often driving out the sensual part in virtue of habits formed long ago in early childhood.

In a marriage of convenience, or one that is arranged principally by some third party, the expectations and demands are fewer and therefore easier to satisfy. The identification with the parents is generally less intense, both as regards the general marriage situation and the specific qualities of the partner; there is therefore less room for disillusionment, while at the same time the sexual inhibitions, in so far as they are connected with the parents, and through them with tenderness in general, are less called into play. Though there may be less conscious attraction, there may also be less unconscious

opposition. And these are in all probability the reasons why such marriages are often happier than might have been expected, and why in the long run their record seems to be little if at all inferior to that of marriages in which " love " is the primary motive. The partners in a marriage of convenience have one great advantage, in that at the start they can see each other as they really are ; or, if there is distortion, it is apt to be of such a kind as to make their bad qualities unduly prominent, so that any subsequent " disillusion " is pleasant rather than unpleasant.

In any kind of marriage, however, the sexual inhibitions resulting from upbringing, education, and tradition are not lightly to be overcome, as testified by the vast number of husbands who are partially or completely impotent and the even greater number of wives who suffer from frigidity in various degrees. Difficulties of this kind on the part of the man would seem to be very largely due to identification of wife with mother or else to the above-mentioned dissociation between tenderness and sensuality. As regards the former, there are, for instance, some men in whom the mother fixation or the tendency to identify wife and mother is so strong that it can be satisfactorily overcome only by the choice of a wife who is markedly unlike the mother, even to the extent of belonging to another branch of the human race. With regard to the other factor, the dissociation between the two major elements of love, this also is in its origin largely connected with the attitude towards the mother (and perhaps the sisters, too, if any),

though later on it may be reinforced by other feelings, notably those connected with masturbation and prostitution. The fact that such dissociation is found less frequently and less intensely in women may be due in the last resort to the circumstance that incestuous tendencies between son and mother are, in our society, more severely repressed than those between daughter and father. As a result of this incest prohibition, it would seem that often the only way open to a boy or man of rescuing his sensuality from repression is by means of this dissociation; that is, at the cost of never being able to love a woman both tenderly and sensually at once, and of being compelled to satisfy his sensuality with women who appear to him to be in some way "inferior"—morally, socially, intellectually, or otherwise. The girl on her part is often able to preserve a fuller and more integrated affection for her father, hence perhaps to some extent her liking for men considerably older than herself. But this greater integration may—frequently but by no means always—be itself bought at the cost of some general repression of sexual desire or satisfaction, particularly of the directly genital constituents of this desire.

The great incidence of frigidity among married women has often been remarked by modern investigators; and the fact that it was seldom noticed by earlier writers is probably due to the circumstance that some degree of frigidity was often considered normal and desirable. (Sometimes, indeed, the implication that women had sexual desires at all

was resented as a gross aspersion upon the purity and nobility of their sex.) Dr. G. V. Hamilton, in his very detailed study of 100 wives and 100 husbands in America,[1] found that no less than 46 wives out of the 100 enjoyed no sexual climax. In the face of figures such as these, it has recently been suggested that orgasm is biologically a predominantly or exclusively male characteristic, and that female orgasm (for which indeed it is difficult to find the precise physiological reason or accompaniment) is only beginning to make its appearance in the human race and perhaps a few others. Strong evidence against this view appears, however, to be afforded by further figures from Dr. Hamilton's research. For out of the above-mentioned 46 wives, no less than 20 were classified as " neurotic," whereas of the remaining 54 who were studied, only 1 was so classified. So very striking a difference between the two groups seems to show that the lack of ability to experience the sexual climax is, if not the cause of psychopathological disturbances, at any rate correlated with them. Although the lack of sexual climax in the woman does not necessarily prevent the marriage being classified as happy, it yet tends, according to Hamilton's results, to give rise to ill-health, weariness, and irritability, together with at least two other important manifestations, to wit, extravagance and infidelity. Money-spending, we are told, may be a relief from bafflement and dissatifaction, while indulgence in extra-marital love obviously suggests

[1] *A Research in Marriage.*

itself as a remedy for lack of satisfaction in marriage, though it is by no means always successful for this purpose. In searching for the cause of the lack of climax in so many of the wives examined, Hamilton is able, on the basis of his data, to dismiss as comparatively unimportant four factors to which we might at first be inclined to attribute much significance: the wife's love for her husband, the husband's skill and patience as a lover, fear of pregnancy, and the degree of conscious sexual freedom in the wife.

As regards the last-mentioned factor, it was even found that those who had consciously accepted the idea of adultery as entirely justifiable had an unusually small percentage of climaxes. On the other hand, there is much to show that unconscious inhibition was an important factor. Those who experienced climax had more often enjoyed encouragement in their early questions about sex, or had at least, as Dr. Hamilton puts it, " wisely kept their curiosity to themselves," fearing a rebuff; while the other class of women, who did not enjoy climax, had more often experienced rebuff or (worse still, if we may believe the figures) met with " embarrassment, evasion, lies, stiffness, or were given poetically inadequate information." Sex aggression in youth appeared to be another important factor, though aggression in this case sometimes meant no more than sexual invitation or solicitation. Such aggression, however, was more apt to have unfortunate effects if the previous sexual enlightenment had been defective.

Early sexual experience *after* puberty, say, between sixteen to twenty, appeared to be beneficial from the present point of view, especially when contrasted with experience after the age of thirty. Shock or disgust at puberty, at early sexual experience or on marriage, appeared to be less associated with climactic disability than was indifference. In Dr. Hamilton's words once again: "If the girl is alive enough to have vivid reactions, good or bad, she is comparatively safe. It is the inert who suffer"—all this and a good deal of other evidence pointing, in the investigator's opinion, to the fact that the lack of climax, with the various dangers and difficulties that it brings in its train, is due principally to inhibitions acquired quite early in life, largely as a result of parental attitudes.

I have dealt with this point perhaps at disproportionate length, both because of its own intrinsic interest and because it illustrates the way in which the purely clinical and qualitative findings of individual psycho-pathologists on a few patients are tending to be corroborated and supplemented by more extensive statistical research.

Having dealt with the incentives to marriage and some of the difficulties of the married state in general, I am reminded that I should perhaps before now have said something more as to the choice of partners in marriage. I cannot allow myself, however, to say more than a few words on this aspect of my subject, if only for the reason that I should find myself involved in the whole difficult but fascinating

problem of " falling in love." When we compare the disproportion between the space allotted to this theme in fiction and in psychological literature respectively, we realize how great is still the cleft in some directions between the interests of our official psychologists and the interests of our everyday lives. Unfortunately, it is quite impossible for me to attempt to bridge this cleft here. On this, however, as on so many other dark matters, Freud has cast a ray of light by his division of love choice into two main types—the so-called " anaclitic " or parent type, in which the love object attracts in virtue of a displacement of the lover's affect from one or other of his parents, and the " narcissistic " type, in which the love object stands in a similar relation to the lover's own self, the love given to the object being derived by a process of displacement from what was originally self-love. I have already referred incidentally to the first or parent type of love, and I ought perhaps to say no more about it here in view of the fact that the " Œdipus Complex " is a term that is nowadays almost as well known as the word " Psychology " itself. I will, indeed, only add by way of supplementation that the original trinity of father, mother, and child may be represented in marriage in any one or more of three forms. Thus, a husband may, as we have seen, identify himself with his father and his wife with his mother, so that the pair between them actually become, as it were, the parents. In the second place, as we have also seen, he may remain himself the child, while his wife becomes the

mother, the father being eliminated. In the third place—and this I have not yet mentioned—he may become the father, but regard his wife as a child who has to be taught, encouraged, helped, protected, and generally treated with parental care. And the same three forms are to be found—*mutatis mutandis* —in the case of the wife. The last of the three forms naturally implies a special kind of object choice. When the wife is thus loved as though she were a child, she is often considerably younger than the husband, often beautiful, and often somewhat stupid or helpless. Dora, the wife of David Copperfield, is perhaps the classical example of the type. When it is the wife who regards her husband as the child, the age difference is less often present, or if present may be of the opposite kind, the husband being perhaps considerably older than the wife. Marriages in which there is a great discrepancy of age, if they are to be successful, necessitate perhaps some degree of this parent-child attitude on the side of one partner or the other. The attitude is, however, sometimes to be found where it is inappropriate, i.e. where the partner who is looked upon as a child is in reality quite capable and experienced, and in this case there is nearly always trouble, due to the very natural irritation and resentment of this partner.

The narcissistic type of love has a variety of forms, some of which hardly concern us here, since they seldom enter into marriage. The two most important forms from our present point of view are

found: in the first place, when the loved person directly represents or resembles the self; and in the second place, when he or she is complementary to, and therefore in some way different from, the self.

The importance of the first form is illustrated by the researches of the Pearson school, which have shown that husbands and wives tend actually to resemble one another more than would be expected on the basis of a chance selection. Thus, contrary to an often-expressed opinion, men who are above the average in height tend to marry women who are also taller than the average of their sex, and *vice versa*; while another investigator, Hoffstatter, found that in happy marriages there is a tendency for husband and wife to have certain mental traits in common.

In the second form, the love object possesses (or is at least imagined to possess) some character or quality which is missing in the lover—a circumstance that reminds us of Plato's famous theory as developed in the *Symposium*. In this form of love are to be found many of the factors to which Adler has called attention in developing his doctrine of Inferiority. The loved person makes good in some direction the deficiencies (real or imagined) of the lover, who feels strengthened or comforted thereby. The loved person may even represent to some extent what the lover would like to be, and thus, as Freud has said, corresponds in a certain sense to the "ego-ideal" of the lover, who may feel himself humble

and unworthy in comparison. Such an attitude may give rise to a very exalted type of love, but one that cannot easily bear the strain of marriage, for it is naturally difficult for the partner to live up to the ideal. Nevertheless, marriages based on contrast, where the process of idealization has not gone quite so far, may be stable and happy, provided the partners are tolerant and allow each other a certain independence in attitude, opinions, and pursuits.

Of course, the distinction between the narcissistic and the parent types of love should not be taken to imply that the two types are mutually exclusive. Such a distinction can only indicate that the one mechanism or the other tends to predominate in any given case. In reality both types of love are usually operative in some degree. Thus it is clear that the idealization we have just referred to in connection with the narcissistic type easily permits of fusion with that other kind of idealization that results from identifying a wife or husband with a parent loved earlier in life.

Having now discussed some of the general factors that enter into marriage and some of those that influence our choice of a mate, I should like to add a few remarks about the difficulties of monogamy. As regards the question of faithfulness in marriage, we tend often to adopt one or other of two rather extreme positions. Our official moral code takes faithfulness for granted, and insists that, once married, we shall love no other person than our lawful wife or husband. Unofficially and in private, we

tend to believe that such a restriction is at bottom an extremely irksome one, and (as regards the male sex at least) may even be inclined to agree with the statement—I cannot now remember whose—that to forbid any couple to cohabit more than once would be more in accordance with human nature than the present insistence on monogamy. And yet, as Freud has pointed out, this tendency to promiscuity —if we accept the fact of its existence—is also perhaps in need of explanation. There are some forms of satisfaction of which we do not seem to tire. Many of us persistently admire the same landscape, enjoy the same drinks, cigarettes, and dishes. On the other hand, it might be replied that we soon tire even of the finest piece of music or of poetry, if we constantly hear it, and demand a contrast; though we may be glad to come back to it after a time. It is clear that the problem is a rather complicated one. To some extent, no doubt, we have to do with the general law of retention and habituation. Repeated actions and repeated situations tend to be dealt with more easily and automatically and arouse less interest and emotion : an immense advantage when it is a question of doing something with the minimum of trouble, but a disadvantage when the arousal of strong feeling and emotion is the very thing that is aimed at. It is generally agreed that sexual desire, even though its genital foundation may be relatively simple, is mixed up with a whole multitude of factors, some of them primarily physiological, others connected with the most manifold and complex

aspects of our mental being. These complex mental aspects of the sexual impulse cannot, it is often said, receive adequate stimulation in connection with any one partner, any more than our intellectual interests can be satisfied by conversation with one person, however well informed or entertaining; in both cases, for fullest satisfaction and development we require contact with a variety of persons. There is, I think, a very real element of truth in such a view, and, in so far as this is the case, a strict monogamy may entail a real sacrifice of precious experience. On the other hand, this must not blind us to the fact that there is very often a compulsive and unreasonable element in the desire for promiscuity. Among the factors of this kind that have been discovered by clinical psychology are the following:

(1) The fact, to which I have already alluded, that in the process of sexual attraction we are often seeking for an ideal, an ideal that by its very nature is in many cases essentially unrealizable. Hence one love object after another leads to disappointment, for the ideal man or woman does not in fact exist, though this does not prevent the Don Juans of this world from renewing their hopes and continuing their search.

(2) The fact that in certain persons sexual satisfaction, or for that matter almost any other kind of satisfaction, can only be enjoyed when obstacles have to be overcome or prohibitions infringed. In such persons the mere absence of obstacles and prohibitions in marriage may be sufficient to make relations

with their wives or husbands dull and uninteresting when compared with extra-marital adventure.

(3) The fact that in certain persons there is a compulsion to make ever fresh sexual conquests, to gratify their narcissism and to compensate for buried fears of inferiority and insufficiency. It is as though each fresh potential sexual object that presents itself arouses a challenge that must be taken up on pain of admission of defeat.

To these special factors we should perhaps add that there takes place a certain process of conditioning, which militates against the adoption of an erotic attitude on the part of husband and wife to one another. The mere fact of living together in a common household necessitates an attitude that is directed primarily to the unending sequence of small cares and worries that make up everyday life. It is not so easy to be erotic when you have just been discussing the butcher's bill, the smoky chimney, the leaky ceiling, or whether the children need to see the dentist. In extra-marital affairs, on the other hand, the erotic element is often the only or the chief one, and the participants are, as psychologists might say, echoing a well-known song of Marlene Dietrich's, " ' set ' for love and nothing else."

The question whether, and if so to what extent and in what way, women are more monogamous than men, is one that has not received the scientific consideration it deserves in view of its importance for our subject. The fact that woman's sexual life still, as Freud has put it, so much resembles " a dark

continent," is probably an unfortunate consequence of the disproportion between the number of men and women psychologists. It is, however, easy to point to certain factors tending to make women less prone to promiscuity than men, though some of these are relatively superficial. One of such a kind is of course the fear of conception, though this tends to diminish as the methods of birth control become more widely known and more efficient. Another is the greater moral censure attaching to infidelity of the wife, perhaps an inevitable feature of a patriarchally organized society. Of deeper significance, perhaps, is the fact, of which I have already spoken, that a girl tends to abandon the sensual elements of the attachment to her father less absolutely and completely than does a boy in the case of the similar elements in the love for his mother; and that for this and other reasons (notably the greater diffuseness of women's erotism in general as compared with the predominantly phallic erotism of the male) women are less liable to suffer from dissociation of tenderness and sensuality than are men—a fact which makes it easier for them to feel desire where they can also feel affection and respect.

To which may perhaps be added another factor, to which Freud drew attention in a well-known paper, and in virtue of which a woman is apt to feel a peculiar attachment to and dependence on the man to whom she has lost her virginity. But in spite of all this, I think we shall do well to be careful not to be too cocksure on the subject of women's supposed

greater adaptation to the monogamous state. Prostitution has flourished in all ages, and the fact that in large communities prostitution seems only to decline in proportion as the prostitute's business is ruined by the so-called " amateur," would make it appear that women's objections to promiscuity, from whatever source they are derived, are in certain circumstances not so very difficult to overcome.

No psychological treatment of marriage is really complete without a study of jealousy, which is to some extent an inevitable by-product of the monogamous ideal. Nevertheless, I must abandon the attempt to deal with this aspect of the subject, which indeed I have treated elsewhere.[1] It must suffice to say here that, upon examination, jealousy reveals itself to bevery complex in nature, and to contain elements of hate and aggressiveness which themselves are often built upon delusions, and which are often far from being ethically respectable, but which become permissible in virtue of the fact that they are here enlisted in the service of an ideal. Even murder may in some countries be condoned if only it is carried out under the influence of righteous indignation by an outraged spouse. One is reminded here of the way in which an even more extreme relaxation of the ordinary taboos on violence and aggression is not only permitted but enjoined, when sanctified by the ideals of war.

I have already used most of my allotted space and have as yet said little about the second part of

[1] *Men and Their Motives.*

my subject—the family. This matter of hate and aggressiveness on which I have just touched may serve me as a means of transition to a few final remarks upon this wider theme. For one of the principal facts about all family relations is that they are ambivalent—that is, contain elements both of love and hate. We are so much more willing to recognize the love elements that it is almost inevitable that the psychologist, when he talks about the family, should appear to be laying undue emphasis on those of hate. Ambivalence is indeed present from the very beginning. Even the unborn child is an object both of love and hate; and we have to harden our hearts to the fact that, even in the case of a deliberate and desired conception, a mother may feel hostility to the child within her womb—perhaps always feel it. We have to recognize, too, that neither the mother's nor the father's love for the child is purely altruistic. In both cases the love is tinged with possessiveness and self-feeling, as is shown by the fact that even the father, in spite of his relatively small (though of course essential) part in the total reproductive process, often considers himself a fine fellow to have produced a child at all; and also by the fact that both parents feel personally exalted by the success of their children and personally disgraced by their failures. Our children, in fact, may help us to surmount our own feelings of failure, inferiority, and insufficiency, and through our children we may enjoy a kind of immortality that is otherwise denied to us. On the other hand, our children, almost from

the moment of conception onwards, and still more so after birth, impose restrictions on us, and are therefore in some sense also rivals. The mother is the first to feel this restriction, and it is for this reason that she hates as well as loves her unborn child. After birth, however, her love usually increases, partly because there is something visible to love, partly, too, perhaps, on the general principle that we are most pleased with those achievements that have cost us the most toil and trouble. The father's hate, however, is apt to undergo a brief intensification when the threatened rival has at length made his appearance.

In the case of both parents the hate elements are of course intensified when the child in question is unwanted. The unwanted child is indeed born with a legacy of hate which is often liquidated only at the cost of much sorrow to all parties; the child in particular may sometimes be oppressed throughout his life by the feeling that he is not loved, a feeling that is composed of a very stable combination of resentment and inferiority. The same may apply in lesser degree to a child who is not of the desired sex. In this latter case the feelings of the parents perhaps inevitably affect their treatment of the child, and this in turn may be reflected in the child's behaviour, so that he adopts some of the characteristics or ideals of the opposite sex—with resulting conflicts in later life.

Earlier in this chapter I referred to the "Œdipus Complex," and excused myself from dealing with it.

I now find that I have led up to it again, and if I were to pursue the present theme farther, I should inevitably have to discuss it. Indeed, I have of course already touched upon it more than once, though without acknowledging the fact. At this stage, however, it is clearly impossible to deal with it in further detail, though in having shirked the subject I feel that I have perhaps been guilty of attempting to present *Hamlet* without allowing the Prince of Denmark to enjoy more than a few fleeting moments on the stage.

I can only comfort myself with the frank admission I made at the beginning that I should be eclectic. In choosing what subjects I should deal with, I have on the whole endeavoured to deal with certain aspects which are perhaps less fully treated than others in what might be called the present text-book literature. I can only hope that in so doing I have not given you an impression of mere patchiness.

I have also, I fear, been guilty of saying little about " Psychology and Modern Problems," which is the general title of this series. We are most of us, I think, agreed that the general drift of the modern world is tending to loosen rather than strengthen the ties of the family, to lessen the influence of the family, and to increase the influences that reach the individual from the wider and more complex social life outside the home. But in whatever I have said I have at least kept my resolution to confine myself to the " here " and " now " ; and in this country at the present time the increasing

influence of wider social factors has, I think, merely decreased slightly the *relative* importance of family problems without altering their essential character. It is still true that the family is the ultimate social unit; and the problems of society can still be regarded as to a large extent the problems of the family projected on to an immeasurably vaster canvas. And in so far as this is true, such light as psychology has, in its comparatively brief history as an independent science, succeeded in throwing on the problems of the family is still of the utmost importance to the modern world.

THE ARTIST IN MODERN CIVILIZATION

EMANUEL MILLER

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By EMANUEL MILLER

THE estimation of the spiritual contributions of one's own age is not only a dangerous procedure, but is calculated to offend against our sense of historical perspective. In surveying the scientific contributions of an epoch, the inquirer is confronted by objects, facts, and achievements which visibly affect the life and opinions of human beings. But even in this field, if one were to attempt to assess the psychological effects of scientific advances, one would be for ever applying historic tests relating present achievements to their analogues in the past, or arguing by inference, prophesying as science claims to do, their effects in the future. Scientific advance has been a progressive history of conquest on the basis of man's intellectual grasp of reality and his imaginative power of seeing relationships which have been thrown up or presented to him in seemingly a new way. The history of art, on the contrary, illustrates processes which have not depended in the same measure on man's intellectual equipment. The world of artistic activity and expression has by no means been a conquest of reality for the shaping of an ordered world which can be handled, and behaviour of which can be predicted. It possesses qualities which spring largely from man's emotional

dispositions—themselves but aspects of his instinctual needs.

Art is singularly human in this respect and peculiarly primitive in its allegiance and dependence upon fundamental processes which the intellectual life has always attempted to control, if not necessarily to overthrow.

This humanistic perception of the world, which is the essential attitude of the artist, is ours by right, the intellectual conception of the world, the essential attitude of the scientist, is ours by compulsion. In pursuit of instinctual satisfaction, man is obliged to go out to meet his world, to attack it with his own instruments, and to colour his efforts at adjustment and his constructions by the emotional disturbances which the instincts, not always satisfied, produce. The intellectual equipment of man is designed like the instincts to make of the world a habitable place and a place which can be economically handled ; one in which the future can be predicted with a reasonable amount of certainty. By its means the intellect, or rather our intelligence, produces a reality which all men can share, in which both conformity and uniformity go hand in hand. Where men prefer to be governed by principles which satisfy emotional needs, the world they see and the world that they construct is coloured by that individual perspective which our emotional experiences produce. To produce a uniform reality we must ourselves encourage in ourselves a uniformity of response, and such responses give rise to concepts which in word and

ieed conform with the universe of discourse of ɔthers. Coherence, therefore, is not for the individual man, but for men in general over wide cultural periods. One might almost say that, from the point of view of intelligence, our cultural period embraces the whole history of man from the day when some mythical Prometheus, stealing fire from the gods, established man's essential mastery over inanimate nature.

The artistic achievements of man, deriving their impulse from his emotional and instinctual nature rather than from his intelligence, are always in contact with concrete situations and particular instances, and whatever general moods or dispositions are created by the long practice of emotional and instinctual living, the mind is for ever seeking rehabilitation in particular moods of men : it is as if any period of living has worth in its own right and not in virtue of some general scheme for understanding reality which intelligence is for ever creating. It might be said, in retrospecting views of human history, that artistic achievements seem to have fallen into epochs in which definite lines of development are visible. If we, for example, view the history of Chinese porcelain, we would notice periods in which particular techniques are dominant, in which materials are handled in a certain way, and in which a special design makes possible recognition of that epoch ; but a closer historical inspection will show us that, while intelligence has, of course, been in operation in the production of every specimen, it has been

subservient to some emotional need; and it is this emotional need and its expression which have given character to the technique and quality to the design. Moreover, we are quite in the dark as to the individual craftsmen who were responsible for these works, except that they have become identified with some imperial line or with some imperial master sensitive enough to recognize beauty and technique worthy of encouragement, repetition, and perpetuation.

Continuity there certainly has been in the whole history of Chinese art—a period covering approximately two thousand years—a continuity, however, which has been characterized by growing refinement with the usual emergence of decadent tendencies suggesting fatigue if not actual death; but throughout this continuity and development we do not notice any process which can be described in terms of conquest except in so far as there has been a refinement of technique. What we notice from the point of view of ceramic art is the continuity of a tradition, an emotional tradition, the perpetuation of a racial feeling that could only be satisfied by objects of a certain kind having only incidental relationship to nature. It is as if pieces of nature were dragged from their context, reshaped, and modelled to satisfy some psychological function, undoubtedly a complex one, of construction and æsthetic appetite. What may be the nature of this æsthetic appetite it is not our duty to consider in this lecture: suffice it to say that it is one's belief that the æsthetic appetite and the activity which it sets in motion are a type of ex-

perience. It is a way in which experience is handled by the emotions, an attempt to give wholeness and finality to pieces of our everyday world of living which would otherwise pass into limbo as nothing more than fleeting efforts to pass from the now to what will be. The artistic activity, which is the form of expression of the æsthetic appetite, does what pure intelligence also does in creating permanent concepts out of the events of the real world ; it makes of concrete experiences individual wholes which exist in their own right because the emotional moods to which certain experiences give rise in us also exist in their own right.

To revert to the example of Chinese art, one finds, however, that though each separate work of art exists in its own right, and can be contemplated entirely apart from its relationship to other works, existing for the sole purpose of a communion between itself and its creator or its observer, it can be viewed in the light of the psychological disposition of the age in which it has been born, for it must be considered that every work of art worthy of the name is like a creature born into the world, organic and whole. As a part of its age a really precious work of art is regarded as typifying its age or epoch. It springs from the mind of an artist who cannot be disassociated from his time, and in so far that he, the artist, is in some measure coloured by his time, his work, too, betrays both a particular and a general emotional disposition. It may well be that artistic achievements are better measures of the psychology of an

epoch than are its intellectual achievements, or at least are no less worthy of being regarded as indicators of the life of the times. In taking as an example the art of China, one is selecting a form of artistic expression born of a singularly stable social life, self-contained, and subject to very rigid traditions. But it is an example well worth selecting because of its very stability, in that it illustrates the relationship between so individual an achievement as a porcelain jar and the social setting which has made it almost necessary. Most students of Chinese culture have noticed the characteristic unity existing between, not only various forms of artistic activity, ceramics, bronzes, sculpture, and architecture, but between all these forms of expression and the ethics of Chinese philosophy and of Chinese social life in its highest manifestations. Can the same be said of other epochs in human history and of other cultures? Can we say the same of art in its relation to modern civilization?

The history of Greek civilization is surely a brilliant example of the cohesion of social and artistic life: in the Greek world religion, art, and social practices were closely interwoven. The Temple was not merely the abode of this or that god or goddess, it was the convergent point of many mental attitudes. It was characteristic of the Greek mind, to seek for harmonies and coherence, to establish a logic of living, and to establish psychological living it became necessary to live as if living were an æsthetic activity —an activity which sought to make of the continued

train of experiences a series of individual wholes organically complete in themselves, yet related to one another. That this seeking was not entirely conscious must be evident in view of the centuries which elapsed between the Archaic Greece and the Greece of the Persian Wars. That the Greek mind sought logic in thought and the mean in art and in ethics was not solely the conscious effort of individual thinkers and artists, but it was a tradition. It was a tradition never to separate the good from the beautiful. The concept of the Agathon-Kalon is but an example of the constant attempt to equate what was good with what was beautiful. It would appear from Greek history that the perpetual tribal strife between closely allied ethnical groups was an attempt at unification, and that that unity which could not be politically achieved could only be arrived at by an æsthetic view of the world and an æsthetic view of society and of religion. Throughout Greek culture one notices the effort on the part of thinkers and of artists to work unconsciously together, if consciously at times in conflict, to produce coherence which at least in historic retrospect is the achievement of the Greek mind and the view of life which it has handed down to us.

It would not be merely skipping over time contemptuously to reach the modern world and to view its art and its civilization. While it is the fashion to use the World War as a frontier separating the old from the new, it is historically necessary to view the world of our times in the light of the germinal layers from which it has developed. Economic thinkers

are in the habit of choosing the Industrial Revolution as the turning-point in modern history, and in more senses than one, that is to say, in more than the economic sense the Industrial Revolution was the germinal spot from which our modern civilization has arisen.

The industrial revolution resulting from the invention of machinery, which not only speeded up the economic life, but which created a new moneyed class, introduced a new tempo and a new set of social values. This tempo, like the speeding up of a machine, did not take place instantaneously, but all who lived in that time knew that something had happened which was once and for all to change the habit of living of the multitude, and was to give additional power to spend to those who were the masters. The machine needed housing in a way that no former mechanism needed ; the masses called upon to work in the new factories, crowding into the new cities, had hovels made for them at such speed that no plan and no purpose had time to emerge. The merchants, the factory owners, and the whole array of subsidiaries and officials needed means of expressing their new opportunities for social advancement and for expression of social power. The policy of the times was to let industry go its own way and to create its own conditions for growth. The mind grows by what it feeds upon, and in those days the captains of industry and the men and women in the front line of the industrial trenches had no other object in view but to seek their own ends and to express themselves

entirely in terms of economics. The psychology of the times was the pursuit of power and its expression in terms of wealth or the pursuit of a livelihood under the conditions which industry forced upon the masses. The battle between those who had and those who had not was too rigorously being fought out to allow, at least during the first sixty years of the nineteenth century, for preoccupation with anything beyond economic security or economic power. This period of history, whether it be in England or on the Continent, was singularly lacking in artistic achievement, but it was naturally a period of scientific advancement. This was not unnatural during the time when industry called for more machines, and the scientific method, based upon ruthless intellectual standards, could explain, not only economic relationship, but the relationships of the material world from which wealth had to be sucked at all costs.

The speeding up of life, resulting from the invention of the locomotive and the long-track railway, the launching of steam-driven ships linking England with America, the construction of world-wide telegraphic cables, brought into being centrifugal and centripetal forces which both knit together and dissipated civilizations and social customs which up till then only became acquainted after passages of time. The time factor, which is such an essential ingredient of mental life, was rapidly becoming eliminated, and that commerce with space which is the peculiar strength and weakness of intellect became the dominant interest of man. History gives place to

simultaneity, everything tends to happen at once, social achievements must be immediate, and the germ was laid for civilization which made of time the handmaid of space, and memory a mental function, not for contemplation and hushed reverie, but merely a means for adjusting immediately to situations as they arose.

The reaction to this tendency was shown in the efforts of certain artists to construct a romantic escape from the hurly burly of life and its mechanical standardization by a reversion to simple arts and crafts and a desire to introduce into everyday life an æsthetic appreciation, a parallel to which can only be found in the Middle Ages. This arty and crafty escape from the inevitable mechanization of the world was obviously an ectopic birth; it did not arise from the normal womb of history, but from an egg which was laid in the minds of well-meaning artists struggling to deny what was obviously the tendency of the century.

The tendency of the century at its close cannot be summed up in one formula. There are naturally some who would be satisfied with an economic formula akin to the materialistic dialectic of the Russians to explain the major character of the nineteenth century. They would say that the capitalist order was attempting to make use of every form of human activity to express its appetite, that science was designed to meet the demands of Capital, and that art was nothing more than the provision of an ornamental margin or frame for the picture of a

plutocratic life, and that the workers were solely engaged in producing for their masters, and that the artist was the paid minion of those who wish to maintain the tradition of wealth and to express it in sumptuous but academic formulæ. Above all things, art and religion were to be stable and to do nothing which would undermine the stability of the regime of Capital.

Even if one admits an economic root for social life, one cannot ignore the psychological repercussions of individuals and groups upon the economic order of society, nor can one ignore those fundamental psychological processes which underlie the quest for wealth and the urge towards mastery. Machinery had speeded up life as well as the means of production and distribution, and not only had it succeeded in speeding up life, it had also led to the rapid dissemination of culture, and the victories that democracy had won in its fight with Capital had given it no small share in enjoying the fruits that had been disseminated by these means. This meant that by the end of the nineteenth century the press and the public library, the stage and other arts, were accessible to the vast mass of people, not only influencing taste and opinion, but producing paradoxically, not only individual zest for improvement, but a mass expression of these improvements.

Education, from the primary schools upwards, provided increasing facilities for the study of science, and the psychological advances resulting from experimental psychology and observation of children

were beginning to bring home the need for educating and liberating artistic expression in all its forms. We were before the War beginning to witness the emergence of an educated democracy, not only aware of the importance of science in everyday life, but the value of artistic expression. Still, however, influence by the individualism of the nineteenth century, of the arts in particular, promised to produce, not only a sensitive democracy, but a democracy of sensitive individuals. This dual process of individualism, on the one hand, and the pressure of mass suggestion left civilization at the end of the nineteenth century with a paradox which the Great War was left to solve.

The age of machinery was entering on a new phase with the discovery of new processes in steel production, with the wireless, the cinema, and the aeroplane. The characteristic fundamental to all these new discoveries was speed based upon scientific discoveries in every field of physics and technology. Prior to this time, the arts were self-dependent; they depended almost entirely upon simple manual techniques; even architecture was dependent upon the bricklayer and the ornamental mason working in collaboration with the designing architect. The vision of the artist in architecture had hitherto been essentially humanistic. Even admitting that a Michael Angelo and a Christopher Wren were mathematicians fully aware of the artist's obligation to physical laws of mechanics, their designs transcended their mechanical problems. Even granting

that a knowledge of mechanics made possible the production of the Gothic vault and the dome, it was a psychological necessity that made these forms arise in the minds of architects. The fretted vault of a Gothic cathedral, mechanical marvel though it may be, is beyond understanding, except in terms of the vision of a forest glade and the religious enthusiasm which could find in it an inspiring home. The essentially humanistic architecture of the Renaissance expresses the exuberance of the artist and his sense of design, rather than his mechanical skill. The spirit which the ancient temple, the Mediæval cathedral, and the Renaissance palace embodied, was a psychological spirit born of man's desire to embody his aspirations in terms of three-dimensional design. Architecture may be described as an effort to transcribe ourselves into terms of architectural form ; it is also bent on transcribing architecture in terms of ourselves. There is an important relationship between the qualities of architecture and bodily states. We speak in no ordinary metaphor of springing arches, of flying buttresses, of soaring spires, and of swelling domes. We speak of curves that embrace, of walls that are uplifting, of cramped spaces, and of breathless heights. To the Renaissance architect the proportions of a building were felt to have a relationship with the human body, and the proportions of breadth and height should give a feeling of satisfaction, satisfying the emotional need. How otherwise can we understand the endless discussions on the Golden Section ? To Vasari a building was not

built but born; it was an organic structure; and Michael Angelo remarked of architecture that "he that hath not mastered or does not master the human figure, and in especial its anatomy, may never comprehend it." This humanistic spirit in architecture has undergone a considerable change; while the fundamental æsthetic needs will for ever remain in everything that man constructs, there is a growing compulsion in architecture that it should conform more and more with the mechanical bias of our times. We are becoming more and more subservient to the quality of the materials that science has imposed upon us and that science has encouraged us to use. The value of property in New York and the rock subsoil have made possible the erection of the Skyscraper, and the gridiron of girders has allowed for this upward soaring, or upward escape from spacial constriction. Æsthetic considerations have, however, not been entirely subordinated; in fact, the very opportunities afforded by new discoveries have allowed the artist architect to express himself in new terms. In short, in these forms there has been a happy wedding of social need and artistic expression.

But to many architects of our day, the mechanics of architecture and the needs of our economic life have made of buildings static machines. As Corbusier says, even a house is a machine to live in. Only a machine-minded generation is capable of accepting the new horizontal architecture, which is but a framework of reinforced concrete filled in with

glass. We are even prepared, and legitimately prepared, to see æsthetic qualities in buildings which surround us to-day, which a generation ago would have been regarded as incomprehensible. It has led to a uniformity in architectural expression ; factories, offices, and houses, particularly blocks of flats, are rapidly becoming indistinguishable from one another. And is this altogether surprising ? We all tend to go about our business in the same way. The spread of knowledge, the mass production of books, and the uniformity of our amusements have surely made us lose much individuality in taste, and we are only too prepared to submerge ourselves in those masses which make us forget that we are individually men. This is by no means to minimize the artistic element in modern architecture, for after all, if function is to be the outstanding feature in architecture, the concept of function is not entirely divorced from æsthetics. The simplest domestic utensil has its simple form of beauty in virtue of its utility. The spout of a teapot becomes beautiful in proportion as it fulfils its function ; the balance of handle and spout, which gives us æsthetic gratification, is a measure of the usefulness of each of these structures. So also the building satisfies us in the utilitarian way, because we can live and work in it, and our psychological state is a satisfying one in consequence. Such satisfaction is by no means without an æsthetic element, and if a building of modern design fails in this respect, you will find that it probably is not only ugly but non-utilitarian. The modern building is

usually free from any extraneous ornament primarily because such ornaments offend our newly developed sense of hygiene, and partly because the proportions are so simple that ornament would take something away from balance and proportion.

The upheaval of the Great War has brought us in many ways back to fundamentals, not only in economics, but in our emotional lives. The disillusionment that came from depressing defeat on the one hand, and unproductive victory on the other, has led to a careless attitude in some and a new form of æstheticism in others. In many ways modern architecture is a reversion to the simplest proportions and the simplest needs. A building is now regarded as solely to house the utilities, whether it be the simple utilities of domestic life or the straightforward ruthless needs of the machine and the office. In the other arts, too, there has been an interesting return to the primitive. I am not referring solely to the influence of Negro and Mexican art upon many sculptors of our day, nor to the incentive to primitive expression that has resulted from the archæological discoveries in various parts of the world. I refer mainly to what might be called the regression to primitive modes of expression to which undoubtedly these discoveries may lend some support. The post-War period has led undoubtedly to a disillusionment, to a feeling that civilization has deceived us, and that all that we had hoped for is being destroyed ; it is natural that this feeling of disillusionment should affect the artist who, always taking an independent

line, finds himself the first sufferer during a period when values are breaking down, particularly in the emotional field. We have already said that æsthetic expression is ours by right, and that to face reality is a compulsion. To escape, therefore, into the self is always a tendency in art; sometimes it is a healthy tendency, if the artist is capable of transmuting the deep emotions of his mind into some concrete expression of which he is not only the maker but the master too. But in all such tendencies which tap the unconscious, particularly when the tendency is one of escape from reality, there will be a stepping back into archaic modes of feeling and ultimately of expression, in the same way as mental conflicts always produce a retrogression to infantile modes of behaviour. This primitivism, some might call it neo-infantilism, leads to two forms in artistic expression, whether it be literature, music, or painting. On the one hand, we have the production of symbolism, such as is found in dreams, hallucinations, and in mystical experiences; and on the other hand, a preoccupation with the simplest possible forms. It is very rare, particularly in modern art, which is divorced from religion, to find archaic symbolism and mystical expression in the best artists. The co-ordinating forces of religion are no longer there to centralize the symbols used, and such expression as results is deficient in æsthetic quality, unity, and the like, and more closely allied to the incoherent compositions of the mentally sick. With regard to the other group, the preoccupation with pure form and

relationship is akin to the formalism in primitive art and in the drawings of children. The post-impressionists and the cubists are all disposed to free themselves from preoccupation with the actual content of a picture. They are concerned entirely with the simple relationships of colour, line, form, and volume which the objects, scenes, and persons of everyday life suggest; it is as if complicated and meaningful objects stand in the way of the simple appreciation of æsthetic relationships. It is a way of being disembarrassed by particulars; it is a retirement from reality into a world of abstraction, entirely under the control of the artist. This is not to presuppose that such artists are poor draughtsmen, or that they lack keen perception. On the contrary, a Picasso and a Bracque are consummate draughtsmen all the time. Van Gogh was a colourist and could certainly draw, but he was concerned with the direct emotions aroused by the visible world; he was not concerned with trees, or sunflowers, or chairs, but with the emotion that their form aroused in him. Such artists possess the perceptual acuity of children, the direct vision which brings them into close contact with objects, so close as almost to amount to an identification, so that the very soul of a chair or a flower informs every brush-stroke. It is an intuition akin to the relationship established between an animal and the objects in the external world upon which its instincts can operate. So we see that this escape from a tiresome utilitarian world has led to a submergence in primitive emotion

aroused by objects and the expression in æsthetic form of this emotion.

As far as modern writers are concerned, the mood of our times, creating as we have said a tendency to fly from the world of actuality, has not necessarily led to an ignoring of the events of everyday life, but to a search for the undertones, born of a nostalgia for the past, from which all present experience must spring. A writer who has, perhaps, acted as a stimulus to this tendency was Marcel Proust. In his eleven-volumed novel, Proust, the disillusioned, over-sensitive, and spoilt creature of his age, seeks some world of permanence in which he can live, not only as its master, but in which he can swim as in a pleasant bath. He envelops himself in the atmosphere of the past as in some pleasant anodyne, reliving the minutiæ of his sensations, and reviving in contemplative memory his emotional relations to others, using his mind like a tongue, searching for ever for lost tastes and odours. It is as if he were searching through his method for some means of reliving, not entirely to cure himself, but once and for all so to objectivize the emotional events that were once part of himself as to cast them off for ever, rounded and whole in a work of art. The Proustian method was eminently suited to the post-War mind, because it was able, in its neat selectiveness, to give a delicious thrill to those who found in life, as at present lived, too much that was caustic and acidulated. The urge towards viewing life under the guise of emotion and sentiment can only be satisfied

if the mental processes underlying emotion and sentiment can be traced, and this can only be done by applying to literature something of the technique of psycho-analysis which establishes, not that intellectual set of relationships which are necessary for the analysis of the external world, but emotional relationships which are essentially personal in character. Hence the preoccupation with subjective facts, with private moods. In fact, this type of literature becomes either as in James Joyce completely impersonal or intensely egocentric. No sooner does one submerge in the stream of consciousness, than identity of the self appears to be lost, particularly if an attempt is made to portray events in and about the self indiscriminately. As far as James Joyce and his followers are concerned, the only æsthetic quality in such writing is to be found in the deliberateness of the aim, rather than in the achievement.

Some writers, following Joyce, have succeeded in using his method as an instrument rather than as an end; they have, by the means of free prose, been enabled to set off certain phases of life and our feeling for it by using the Joyce method in patches only, and a judicious use of this technique can add illumination of a certain kind which direct orthodox writing does not give. One interesting development of the method, but subtly influenced, perhaps directly influenced by the technology of our times, has been the work of those writers who have transposed what one might call free association into terms of the

technique of the cinema. The cinema in its very nature takes a series of discreet visual impressions and makes of them a continuity. Time or duration, which is the very essence of living, has been filtered off from the film, but is restored to it by the perception of the spectator feeling back time into these discreet relationships : by the process of cutting and *montage*, interlacing but independent series of events are made to coalesce for the purpose of dramatic emphasis, and the spectator working with the producer reconstructs a temporal world out of what is a purely spacial one. The large majority of films work on a dream technique ; simultaneity as well as symbolic shots are constantly evoking emotional relationships, and tracts of free association are put together in order to produce the semblance of reality. One can picture Joyce's *Ulysses* being transmuted from the verbal into the visual medium, producing a kaleidoscopic life which would probably be more convincing than Joyce's prose, because it would be more akin to the visual imagery of a fantastic dream. *Alexander Platz* and *Manhatten Transfer* by Dos Passos are perhaps striking examples of this cinematic technique at its best. Most of the experimental writers of our day are deeply influenced by this method, and the literature of the future which is not an escape will make of this method a means of portraying the moods and motives of the contemporary world.

The technique of the cinema is perhaps the best means of understanding the artistic tendency of the

age. We cannot escape wholly from the mechanical in our present lives, and it is the artist's duty to seize hold on this mechanism as a means of expression. It is not necessary to mention those pictures which are merely a transcription in pictorial form of stories which were better described in words. If, however, we wish to express the tempo of present-day living, the way in which moods are expressed in action, and in the crisp language which is becoming more and more current, it is necessary to use the cinema to the full. One of the most attractive qualities of the American picture has been, not only in rapid transition, but in rapid, crisp, and symbolic dialogue ; the gangster picture, quite apart from its sordid material, is singularly expressive of certain phases of our lives in which vehemence and aggression are most truly expressed. The true origin on the purely æsthetic side of this tendency was to be found in the early Futurists, Marinetti and Severini, who created a furore in years preceding the War. They were avowed enemies of tradition and passionate machine worshippers, and in their pictures they attempted to portray speed and sequence by interlacing planes and angular masses of colour ; they were undoubtedly the precursors of the cinema and the modern poster, which must impress at a glance, and give by a series of interlocked images the meaning of articles advertised ; the modern advertisement, both verbal and pictorial, is very much like the sudden intimations of a dream fragment : they act upon our tendency to accept symbolic meanings which stimulate large

unconscious trends. It would be idle to continue to give examples of the outstanding artistic manifestations of the age in which we live, but I think it will be seen that they are definitely interrelated, and illustrate in what way the technical advances of the last fifty years have influenced the emotional moods which characterize our life, and how these in their turn have bent these technical advances to suit those fundamental æsthetic needs which have been the heritage of man since the cave-dwellers first painted their pictures on the caves of neolithic times.

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE FUTURE OF RELIGION

THE VERY REVEREND THE DEAN OF ST. PAUL'S

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE FUTURE OF RELIGION

By THE VERY REVEREND THE DEAN OF ST. PAUL'S

IN this essay I have to answer the question, What light, if any, does a study of psychology throw upon the probable future of religion? It appears to me that the subject naturally falls into two divisions. In the first place, we must consider the contention that modern psychology has sounded the death-knell of religion, and that the only duty now remaining is to clear away the corpse as quickly as possible. We all know that Professor Freud has expressed this opinion under the significant title, *The Future of an Illusion*, and that so far from having retracted his earlier view, he has restated it in his *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*. This is no eccentric or individual opinion; it is widely held; and we have been startled recently by a vigorous statement of the same position in a presidential address to the Section of Psychiatry at the Royal Society of Medicine by Dr. David Forsyth. It is clear that, unless we can find some good reason for rejecting this view, the subject is finished. There is no occasion to push our inquiry farther. If, however, as I hope to show, the theory that psychology demonstrates the illusory character of religion is based upon dogmatic assumptions which will not bear criticism and a simple logical error, we

can go on to the second part of our investigation, which is to determine what modifications in religious belief and practice may be expected as the consequence of our enlarged psychological knowledge.

We do well to remind ourselves that the psychological study of religion did not begin with Freud and Jung. It has indeed a long history. The search for the specific emotion which gives rise to the religious consciousness is an enterprise which has been attempted throughout the history of human thought. The opinion that fear gave birth to the gods was expressed by more than one critic in antiquity. Making a leap over the centuries, we encounter the philosophers of the Romantic Movement, who found the essence of religion in some kind of "cosmic emotion," or, in Schleiermacher's phrase, "a feeling of absolute dependence." Nor must we forget the pioneer work of William James, who, on the basis of empirical data, supposed that he had discovered the dynamics of religion and had produced some evidence of the reality of the object with which religion is concerned. It would be a mistake to suppose that these and similar discussions are wholly superseded. They differ from the analysis of religion which is familiar to us in the writings of psycho-analysts in one important respect. They deal with religion as if it were the concern of the integral human self, a function of the conscious life of man, and not the uprush of his underground psychic experience. In this respect they are, I

believe, nearer the truth than those writers who must now receive our attention.

The explanation of religion as an illusion which can be accounted for on psychological grounds is not essentially new. The fundamental idea was worked out by von Hartmann in his *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, in which he elaborated the hypothesis that religion consists in the projection by the human mind of its hopes and aspirations on the outer world, which is actually indifferent to them. A similar view, with a more optimistic setting, was held by Guyau, the author of a once famous book, *L'Irreligion de l'Avenir*. But though the general conception is not new, it has been worked out recently in more definite psychological terms, and it is claimed that we have now a clear insight into the mechanism of projection and the genesis of religion as a neurosis.

The authorities on psycho-analysis who adopt this general theory do not agree in detail, and, since it would be impossible to consider every important formulation of the thesis, we must confine ourselves to a general criticism with special reference to the conceptions of Freud. The exponents of the theory agree at least in one tenet. The unconscious and instinctive desires, the repressed tendencies, issue in a conflict in the unconscious ego which may be relieved by the projection of one element of the self upon the outer world. In his book, *Totem and Tabu*, Freud seemed to trace religion almost exclusively to the "father complex," and found the motive force which gives birth to myth and ritual in

the longing for the father, so that God is before all things the idealized father. To this opinion he evidently adheres, for in his latest pronouncements on the subject he returns to the theme that the equation at the root of all religious experience is Creator-God = father. "Psycho-analysis concludes that he really is the father, clothed in the grandeur in which he once appeared to the small child." [1]

"The grown man, though he may know that he possesses greater strength, and though he has greater insight into the dangers of life, rightly feels that fundamentally he is just as helpless and unprotected as he was in childhood and that in relation to the external world he is still a child. . . . He looks back to the memory image of the overrated father of his childhood, exalts it into a deity, and brings it into the present and into reality. The emotional strength of this memory and the lasting nature of his need for protection are the two supports of his belief in God" (pp. 208–9). In more general terms, the nature of religion is described as the product of the "pleasure principle," in contrast with science, which is the outcome of the "reality principle." The human self, out of its sense of inferiority and impotence, weaves the pleasing illusion of a "friend behind phenomena," and covers the Gorgon face of the actual world with a comforting veil which is woven by itself. Or again, it is the fictitious substantiation of wishes which are denied real fulfilment. "Religion," says Dr. Freud, in his *New Introduc-*

[1] *New Introductory Lectures*, E.T., p. 208.

tory Lectures, " is an attempt to get control over the sensory world, in which we are placed, by means of the wish-world, which we have developed inside us as the result of biological and psychological necessities " (p. 215).

The conclusion which is drawn from this analysis of the religious experience is twofold. First, it is admitted that religion may have a beneficial effect on the development of some individuals. The existence of the " general neurosis " of religion saves the individual from the necessity of forming a personal neurosis. It has, in Dr. Forsyth's phrase, " psychical truth." But secondly, religion has no content of actual truth, and religious experience is not an experience of reality. The progressive minds must dare to do without it and expose its illusory character, facing reality in its stark nakedness. Religion therefore may be regarded as a necessary but transient phase in the development of the human race. " If one attempts to assign to religion its place in evolution, it seems, not so much to be a lasting acquisition as a parallel to the neurosis which the civilized individual must pass through on his way from childhood to maturity " (p. 215).

My criticism of this theory must be confined to the most general terms. I have first to suggest a difficulty about the whole conception of religion as escape which is so simple that I have an uncomfortable feeling that it must be foolish. It is this. Does not a study of the actual deities in which men have believed make one wonder whether many of them

can have been a source of comfort to their worshippers? The existence in mythology of cruel and capricious deities has often been alleged against the view that the development of religion is a progressive self-revelation of God; but surely we may appeal to it against the assumption that all religion is the creation of pleasing illusions. Many phenomena of religious history give ground for agreeing with the Epicureans, that disbelief in the gods would remove much terror from life.

This argument does not, of course, disprove the contention that God is a "father-complex," and I can see no reason to dispute the fact that the idea of God is in many cases closely connected with the memory of the father. There can be little doubt that the attitude of the individual to God is frequently coloured by his relation to his father in early childhood, so that it is of the greatest moment for his subsequent development whether his feeling for the father is that of fear, awe, hatred, or love. All this may be admitted, and its importance recognized without in the least affecting the validity of the idea of God as such. No one ever maintained that the experience of the individual might not distort or tend to distort his conception of God. The bearing of the theory of the "father-complex" on the problem of the truth of the belief in God will be considered in the next stage of our argument, when we shall grapple with the question of "projection."[1]

[1] Cf. Dr. J. A. Hadfield, *Modern Churchman*, September 1924, pp. 339–42.

Before we leave this general discussion of the view that religion is the product of the "pleasure principle," and as such a refuge from the hard facts of life, we must refer briefly to the phenomena of the higher religions. Though it is true that in Buddhism, in Judaism, and in Christianity the thought of God as a sure refuge is to be found in different forms, the salvation which those religions offer is not a mere escape. The believer is offered, so to speak, a stand outside the world from which he can confront and overcome the otherwise overwhelming evils of this world. At their highest, the spiritual religions have summoned men to confront life's problems rather than to evade them, and have given men courage and hope for the conflict. It would be a strange misreading of the message of the Buddha and still more of that of the Christ to imagine that either minimized or concealed the evil and hardship of the world. Spiritual religion has claimed to be both an interpretation and a conquest of reality. To this point we shall return.

There is a fundamental fallacy in every argument which seeks to prove from psychological data that the object of experience is illusory. It is possible to give a psychological account of the genesis of any general and permanent belief, which account need contain no reference to any reality outside the mind, which leaves, in short, the problem of the validity of the belief entirely unaffected. Even if it were established that the idea of God is a projection of the human mind, we should have no further light than

we had before on the question whether the idea of God corresponds to any real being. Take, for example, the growth of the idea of an external world of things, and the further idea that this world of things constitutes an order of nature. We can trace the development of these concepts from their beginning in simple sense-data. But when we have completed our analysis, nothing follows from it of philosophical importance as to whether any objective world corresponds to this conception. The psychological account can be happily accepted by adherents of diametrically opposed philosophies. The realist is not shaken in his view that there is an independently existing external world, nor is the idealist less comfortable in his belief that reality is mental or dependent on mind. My point is simply this. It can be shown that the concept of nature is, in a sense, a projection of mind, but it would never occur to anyone to argue on this ground that therefore there is no such thing as an objective world or an order of nature. Why, then, is it assumed that the same kind of argument is valid in the case of the object of religious experience? On what principle are we to differentiate the logical character of these two bases of reasoning? I venture to assert that there is no distinction, and that the employment of this type of argument against the reality of God by those who would certainly refuse to admit its cogency when applied to nature is an elementary logical mistake. At least, if the sceptical conclusion is admitted in the sphere of religion, let it be admitted in the sphere of nature.

If a genetic psychological account of the origin of the idea of God proves that God does not exist, then a similar genetic account of the origin of the idea of nature proves that nature does not exist. I need scarcely point out the curious consequences which would follow from this conclusion. The object which science studies would have turned out to be illusory, and with it science itself. Now, psychology is a science, and dependent, like every other science, on the conception of an order of nature. Psychology would, then, be infected by the illusory character which pertains, on this hypothesis, to all sciences, and thus the very instrument by which we thought we had proved religion to be illusory turns out itself to be illusion. I apprehend that there could scarcely be a more perfect example of a self-destructive argument.

Of course, the prejudice that nature is "real" while nothing else is rests upon the dogmatic assumption that sense experience is the only contact we have with reality. In fact, the procedure of psycho-analysis in this matter of religion appears to be an elaborate example of the fallacy of "begging the question." Religion is represented as the product of the Pleasure Principle which succeeds in covering reality with fantasy. But it is assumed that the nature of reality is known, at least that it is known by the psycho-analyst. What I have to say on this topic scarcely lends itself to courteous statement, and I will therefore borrow some sentences of Mr. Lawrence Hyde, who seems to me to sum up the position

with complete accuracy. " Their pages [i.e. psychoanalysts, are filled with endless descriptions of the ways in which the pleasure principle is capable of gratifying its desires. But the nature of Reality is simply taken by them for granted. All we can find out about it is that it is neither art nor religion, but something which contrives at the same time to be ' actual facts ' and ' the pressure of education in the widest sense.' On turning, however, to the actual analysis performed by these psychologists, one has little difficulty in seeing that what they really mean by reality is the world as it is presented to the consciousness of the unimaginative, unæsthetic, materialistic type of man. It is to this world that the patient is called upon to adapt himself." [1]

It would seem that many exponents of the psychoanalytic theory of religion and art have never troubled to ask themselves how they arrive at the concept of reality which they assume, and have never understood what philosophy is all about, or why there is such a thing as the philosophical problem. The real point of controversy between those who believe that religion is a pathway to reality and those who do not is precisely the question, What is reality ? Art, no less than religion, has claimed to be something more than a merely subjective reaction or the expression of purely private emotions. The great artists, poets, and composers have believed themselves to be in contact with reality, and to be not only creators, but interpreters ; and religion has pro-

[1] *The Learned Knife*, p. 129.

mised to open the eyes of the spirit to the supreme Reality which is behind the everyday appearance of things. The conception of reality with which the psycho-analytic theorists on religion work excludes from the outset all these claims. It is not surprising, then, that the conclusion is easily drawn that they are nothing but the play of fantasy.

A recent utterance of a distinguished medical man almost compels me to add a few words on a closely related topic. The general public was startled to learn that, in the opinion of Dr. David Forsyth, Mohammedanism is an expression of sadistic impulses and Christianity of masochism, and having looked up the words in the dictionary, it was duly shocked. There was nothing surprising in this statement to those who are acquainted with arguments of a psychological kind ; it was indeed nothing but an example of a well-worn fallacy. When you have found a principle of explanation which works well in one sphere of phenomena, it is tempting to press it for all it is worth, and for more than it is worth, and to bend the evidence to fit your principle. Sadism and masochism, as I understand the matter, are properly aberrations of the sexual instinct, or perhaps rather tendencies of the sexual nature which exist in normal persons, but which in some individuals have an excessive development. It may be that these tendencies are at the root of those instincts which are recognized by psychologists such as McDougall under the names of " negative self-feeling " and " self-assertion." I express no opinion

on this. But I must point out that it is most misleading to say that any entity, whether mental or physical, is nothing more than that out of which it is evolved. On that line of argument we could demonstrate, if we wanted to, that science is nothing but magic. And observe the devastating consequences of the reckless application of such a criterion. It would empty life of everything which gives it noble quality or the spirit of adventure. Moreover, the weapon is two-edged, and could be turned against those who wield it against religion. I might dismiss, though I should regard it as both illogical and discourteous, Dr. David Forsyth and Professor Freud together with their attack on religion as victims of sadistic impulses, and I could find in masochism a plausible explanation of the docility with which many people accept submissively and uncritically the most staggering pronouncements of Freud and other authorities. But this kind of reasoning will never do. We are as sure as we are of anything that a good and reasonable life will include two things—first, a capacity for reverence of that which is noble and a readiness to follow, serve, and obey one who has the authority of heroic goodness and clear sight; and secondly, that quality which Aristotle called "*nemesis*" and Butler "indignation against successful vice"—the impulse to combat and destroy that which is evil. Doubtless these perverted sex impulses have affected religious devotion, and it is a useful contribution to religious psychology to point out certain dangers which may

arise ; but religion, like psychology and everything else, may surely be judged by its strongest and purest exponents, and not by its weak or perverted manifestations.

I regret that this essay should be so polemical, and I will now leave the field of controversy, and try to sum up my view of the place of psychological research in the philosophical investigation of the nature of reality. We have, I hope, seen that the particular attempts to show that religion must be illusory which have been forced upon our attention fail simply as arguments ; but it will be of more permanent interest than any refutation of a specific theory if we can discover a general reason which must make all such arguments irrelevant. I think there is such a reason. Psychology claims to be an empirical science and is concerned, like all other natural sciences, with discovering the laws of the correlation of phenomena. Now, it is becoming very generally recognized, in the case of the physical sciences, that they cannot furnish an answer to the ultimate question, What is Reality ? As they approach full development, they tend to express their results in equations, or as has been said, in " pointer readings." The problem of reality, with which is bound up the validity of religious experience, must be investigated by other methods, and falls under the realm of philosophy, which must indeed take account of the changes in scientific theories, but cannot hand over its own problem to science for solution. But I confess that I doubt whether psychology is or can be an empirical science,

so long, that is, as it pretends to deal with the whole realm of subjective experience.

I must not stay to elaborate this thesis, which obviously would take us far into philosophical speculation. It must be sufficient here to say that, sooner or later, psychology is confronted with the problem of the Ego, the ultimate subject of experience, which can never itself be a phenomenon. Have we any knowledge of that Ego? Clearly not in the way of observation and experiment, for that would imply that the subject became its own object. Nay, the psychologist, I would suggest, ought to be confronted with this problem throughout, for it is present in every experience which he studies. I may perhaps quote a passage from Dr. Aveling's *Psychological Approach to Reality*, which expresses this view. "The lived and cognized experience, whatever it may be—cognition, affection, conation, volition or the like—is always an experience to an I. No matter how we state the fact of knowledge, this I necessarily enters into our statement. I conscious of myself as knowing know something; I conscious of myself as feeling know myself feeling something; I conscious of myself as willing know myself willing something. That there is an 'I' in all knowledge is introspectively clear" (p. 192). Further, I would venture to agree with Dr. Aveling in holding that this self as immediately intuited is not complex or compound; and it must be carefully distinguished from that concept of the self which is an intellectual construction and capable of being analysed. It is

experienced, not as a substance or a potentiality, but as an activity; and I would add, still in agreement with Dr. Aveling, that here we have direct access to reality, to a "thing in itself."

Though, as I have tried to show, the psychological analysis of the religious consciousness, when it assumes the right to speak on the question of the validity of religious experience, is trespassing beyond its proper limits, I would not be taken to suggest that psychology has no contribution to make to the development of religion. Though it is untrue that religion is essentially a morbid state of the soul, it is certainly true that religion may be associated with morbid states. Though religion as such is not an escape from reality but a courageous traffic with reality, undoubtedly much religiousness has the character of an escape mechanism; but that is not because it is religion, but because it is bad religion. In this connection it seems to me important to try to get a clear distinction between fantasy and symbol. The language of religion is symbolical. According to some ferocious metaphysicians, this symbolical form shows its inferiority to philosophy. I might be prepared to agree with this if I were confident that the most important truths about the universe could be expressed in concepts or "clear and distinct ideas." But it seems to me that this would be to expect too much of the human reason; and it is not illogical to suppose that some of the most vital insights into the nature of Reality can only be conveyed to us in images. Religion can never be compelled

to say all that it has to say in terms which would pass muster in the Aristotelian Society; it must clothe itself in poetry, or it cannot disclose its full message. It would be a profound mistake, if in our zeal to eliminate fantasy, we tabooed symbolism. To take two images from Christianity, the Mother and Child and the Cross mean more than can be expressed by abstract theology, and their power over men's hearts is something greater than a wish fulfilment. They represent what is felt to be a truth about Reality.

I do not think we should be wise to attempt even to expel altogether what is perhaps plainly fantasy. There may be a loving embroidery woven by the fancy which helps the mind and does not enfeeble the will. The fancy need not be the enemy of the imagination, it may even be its ally. There is no harm in dwelling for a time in the realm of the Christmas Carol, so long as we do not allow ourselves to be diverted from the contemplation of the stark reality of the Cross.

We may hope that in the future we shall see a great extension of the co-operation between psychology and religion in dealing with individuals. I use the word "co-operation" because, in my opinion, the fruitfulness of the contact between religion and psychology depends upon each retaining its independence. Neither should be regarded as simply the handmaid of the other. By keeping steadily to the idea of co-operation, we avoid the suggestion that psychology exists for the use of religion or the far worse suggestion that religion is justified because it

may be useful in psycho-therapy. One of the most important discoveries which we owe to psychology is that there are obsessions and perversions which are beyond the control of the will. It is very difficult to draw a theoretical line between moral disease and sin, but in practice the distinction is generally clear enough. The religious teacher and pastor in his ministry to individuals often comes across penitents who should really be patients, persons who are the victims of compulsions which can be dissolved only by psychological treatment. We must look forward to the time when the ordinary Church minister will have sufficient knowledge to recognize such cases, and will be in touch with competent psychologists who will deal with them in a religious spirit. No less, I think, does the psycho-therapist need the co-operation of religion, and, to use a bad phrase, of " organized religion."

The healing of the spirit in which psychology can engage consists in something more than the dissolving of complexes and the release from obsessions. Mental and spiritual health is integration. But integration may take place at many different levels. It is not sufficient to have brought the hidden impulses into consciousness. The self needs an ideal which can provide a unifying principle and a motive force. The parable of the house swept and garnished, which was destined, because it was empty, to be inhabited by seven other devils worse than the one driven out, has a profound psychological import. But I should not be expressing my full belief if I left

the matter there. It is my conviction that prayer is a great specific for mental health. The number of people who suffer from religious mania is often commented upon, but we do not notice, because we cannot personally know more than a few cases, the vastly greater number of people who preserve their mental balance and their adaptability to circumstances because of the practice of prayer. Psychological causes can be discovered for many of the beneficent effects of prayer. The pouring out of the heart in confession is itself a purge of evil humours of the spirit. The belief that a Power not ourselves is available to help us, whether it be true or not, is a great preservation against despair. But, in my opinion, the most reasonable explanation of the facts of religious experience is that in prayer and worship the human soul does break through the bounds which commonly enclose it and establishes contact with Creative Life.

Religion, or at least the Christian religion, differs from even the highest system of morality, in that it regards it as blasphemy to despair of any soul. Since every man is made in the image of God, however deeply he is sunk in trespasses and sins, he is not beyond salvation. This is indeed a faith and not a scientific observation, and though it is not unreasonable, it is in conflict with appearances. It is a mystical perception of the inherent value of all persons. To convince the penitent or the patient that he is curable is the first step towards his cure, and there is surely no ground on which this belief can be

based so that it is of universal application other than belief in God. The ideal of the future which one may cherish is that of psychological experts exercising their art of mental therapy inspired by the Christian gospel, and approaching every case with the Christian presupposition, remembering that the Christian conception of the truly sane man is that of one who has been redeemed, not only from fear and impotence, but into the Kingdom of God. If our Christian Churches were more truly fellowships in the spirit of Christ, we could more effectively supplement the healing work of the psychologists, for we could then give to the mind released from illness or evil the continual support of loving and understanding companionship.

One further topic invites attention, though it would be absurd at the end of a lecture to do more than indicate its importance—the effect of psychology on worship. It is surprising that so little conscious use has been made of psychological studies in the ordering of religious services. Popular evangelists like General Booth have, of course, always been expert unconscious psychologists, and have made use of the psychology of the crowd long before science had considered the subject worthy of investigation. As the knowledge of crowd and group psychology and the power of mass suggestion spreads, one would expect the efficacy of methods which have been successful in the past to decline. " In vain the net is spread in the sight of any bird," and we might suppose that knowledge of what is being done to them

on the part of the masses would prevent it from being done. Experience of the general elections since the War does not harmonise with this expectation, though perhaps we exaggerate the amount of knowledge which is possessed by the population. In the religious sphere I am inclined to believe that the old red-hot evangelist's appeal to the emotions of a crowd is losing its power. I doubt whether the career of General Booth would be possible to-day, even if a man of his exceptional personality arose.

A profound ethical problem is presented by the knowledge of crowd suggestibility and the means by which it may be exploited. When these stirrings of emotion could, in all good faith, be attributed to the Holy Spirit, no problem arose, though preachers must often have felt that the operations of the Spirit were sometimes queer ; but in the present state of our knowledge, when we are well aware that many of these phenomena are explicable on natural grounds, the case is very different. I suppose it would be right to use the methods of exciting crowd emotion in order to break down resistance to the message which comes from defects of character and from settled habits, but it would be wrong to attempt to overwhelm the reason and conscience of the individual or injure his power to make a free choice as a self-determining person. The greatest evangelists of the past, such as John Wesley, have disliked and suspected manifestations which indicated loss of self-control.

In the realm of worship, as distinguished from

preaching, much may be expected from the help of psychology, and already some attempts are being made to reform public services in the light of our knowledge of the processes of the mind. There is, of course, a preliminary question. Do we know what state of mind we wish to produce in ourselves and others? Have we any clear conception of the mental condition in which the worship of God is most easy? If we have, the problem is relatively simple. We have only to discover under what conditions in normal persons such a state of mind occurs. Professor Rudolph Otto, who finds the essence of religion in the unique " sense of the numinous," has the advantage of knowing what effect he desires to produce, and the volumes of public services which he has published are an interesting record of experiments in the art of worship made by a man who is both a psychologist and a great authority on the history of religion. The guiding principle of these services is to prepare for a central period of silence, in which, it is hoped, the worshippers will have the " numinous " experience of the presence of God and orientate their wills towards some ideal which is suggested in the words of the prayers and responses. I have not had the good fortune to be present at any of these services, but a friend who has attended them tells me that they are impressive, but that the effect is somewhat marred by the consciousness that every step has been deliberately thought out with a view to producing a psychical state. It is obvious that experiments in worship of this type must lack both

that element of spontaneity which gives life and reality to services of the Protestant evangelical kind and the element of venerable antiquity linking generations together which is no small part of the appeal of services of the more Catholic tradition. In my opinion, the most helpful line of experiment would be one which, departing less decisively from custom than Professor Otto has done, would take the existing orders of service and consider what modifications could be made, which, without destroying the traditional framework, would sharpen their impact on the minds of the worshippers.

This is a field which has been very little explored. Probably we shall not make much progress until there has been a careful study of the reactions of individuals of different temperaments to various types of religious expression. I believe that such a study would bring surprises. As a small contribution to the investigation, I venture to refer to an experience of my own. Recently I have had something to do with a Choristers' School connected with a cathedral. I expected to find that the constant repetition of the daily services and the consequent familiarity with the words of prayers and psalms would have a bad effect on the religious life of the boys. I found, on the contrary, that its effect was, so far as I could judge, entirely good, and that the daily services were a joy to the boys, so that they were really sorry when for any reason they were prevented from coming. I do not suppose this would have happened if they had been compelled to

attend without taking any part. The consciousness that they were doing something very difficult, and doing it well, for the glory of God was an essential part of their feeling. Perhaps there are lessons to be learned from this for the ordering of public worship in general. It suggests that the best worship is a co-operation of people who all take part in doing something as well as they can for the glory of God.

This essay has wandered over so much ground that I will not try to sum up its contentions or pretend to impart to it in the last few lines a point which it does not possess. If we could persuade psychologists to abandon the idea that their science can show that religion is illusion and convince them that religion, on the contrary, is a normal and healthy activity of the mind, that it is, in fact, a permanent " Form " of the Spirit, we might expect great help from them in improving the expressions of the religious consciousness. What light we could derive from them if they would give as much attention to the psychology of worship as they have given to the psychology of advertising! The happy day may come when " Ephraim shall not envy Judah, and Judah shall not vex Ephraim," and then psychology will show to religion many ways in which its message may be more persuasively presented and its offering of worship made more real, while true religion will be recognized as the supreme means for the healing of the soul.

INDEX[1]

[1] Prepared by Miss N. K Satow.